All these impressions induced me, when I wrote my report of
the Battle of the Skagerrak for the Emperor, to conclude by again pointing out
most emphatically the necessity of taking up the unrestricted U-boat campaign
at once, unless we wanted to give up all hope of defeating England. Now Admiral
von Muller's letter seemed to imply that the Emperor disapproved of my urging
this, whereas I was able to ascertain later that His Majesty, far from
appending any disparaging remark to the conclusion of my report, had actually
appended a note of approval to it, and had acquiesced in my report as a whole.
We should have begun the U-boat campaign in January, 1916,
as the Chief of the Naval Staff proposed, or at latest immediately after the
Battle of the Skagerrak, when, to my idea, the circumstances were particularly
favourable. That we failed to do so fatally affected the outcome of the war.
Thanks to the number constructed in 1915, we had a sufficiency of U-boats. We
lost valuable time that year, when our nation's power of resistance was much
greater than in 1917, when we were almost at our last gasp, and we were forced,
after all, to seize the weapon which promised to prove our salvation. And in
the course of this year England was able systematically to develop her defence.
The remainder of 1916 was taken up with similar discussions
between the Naval Staff, Fleet and Government. The Chief of the Naval Staff
endeavoured to persuade the Ministry to sanction the unrestricted U-boat
campaign, and, on the other hand, urged the Fleet to agree to the boats
resuming the war against commerce in a milder form. I was convinced that, if
the leaders of the Fleet had given way in this matter, the worst would have
happened just what we most had to try and avoid, viz. that we should
really have carried on a sort of presence campaign to act as a soporific to the
feelings of the people, and we should have presented the blunt edge of our
weapon to the enemy.
At the beginning of the year 1916 the Chief of the General
Staff of the Army, von Falkenhayn, had also strongly advocated our embarking on
an unrestricted U-boat campaign, because he had realised that our only hope of
future salvation lay in overcoming English resistance. In the autumn of 1916
Field-Marshal von Hindenburg took over the Supreme Command of the Army, to save
the serious situation which had arisen in the war on land. At that time there
was under discussion a new demand on the part of the Chief of the Naval Staff
to resume the U-boat campaign with full intensity. At the meeting of September
3 at General Headquarters in Pless, at which the matter was considered, the
following were present: the Imperial Chancellor, the Field-Marshal, General
Ludendorff, Admiral von Holtzendorff, Admiral von Capelle, as Secretary of
State of the Imperial Ministry of Marine, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, von Jagow, the Secretary of State, Helfferich, and the War Minister,
Wild von Hohenborn. The outcome of the proceedings was that, after consulting
all who were concerned in the question of the U-boat campaign, they unanimously
declared that the decision must for the time being be postponed, because the
general situation, and especially the military situation, was by no means
clear, and they resolved that the final decision should lie with General
Field-Marshal Hindenburg. I took occasion after that to send the Chief of the
Staff of the High Sea Fleet to General Headquarters, to consult with General
Ludendorff, and they agreed upon the following:
1. There is no possibility of bringing the war to a
satisfactory end without ruthless U-boat warfare.
2. On no account must a half-and-half campaign be started,
which could not achieve anything of importance, but involved the same military
dangers, and would probably result in a new limitation for the nation.
3. The U-boat campaign should be begun as soon as possible.
The Navy is ready.
4. The separate treaties with the Northern States, who had
received considerable concessions in the matter of exports to England, must be
cancelled with all speed, so that we can act without interference.
5. In no circumstances must there be any yielding.
The Chief of the Staff returned from this conference under
the impression that the question of the U-boat campaign could not be in better
hands than in those of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. I was able
to confirm this view later, when on November 22 I had occasion myself to
discuss the question at General Headquarters with the Field-Marshal and with
General Ludendorff.
The military situation in the autumn had led to a
postponement of U-boat activity, so as to avoid complications in the War Zone
round England; the only injury to commerce at the moment was that inflicted on
ships in the Mediterranean. That is why the U-boat campaign was extended to
Northern watersto sink supplies which were sent via Archangel to the
Russian seat of war.
The refusal of our peace proposals in December brought about
a new situation in the U-boat war. Our enemies had given us clearly to
understand that they would accept no peace of understanding. This led to the
decision to open the unrestricted U-boat campaign on February 1, 1917. The
Chief of the Naval Staff, with the approval of the General Field-Marshal,
succeeded in bringing about this decision, in which the Imperial Chancellor
acquiesced. So on that date the most effective period of our war against
England actually began. On December , 2, 1916, the Chief of the Naval Staff had
again, in a detailed memorandum, given explicit reasons for adopting this form
of campaign. He summed up his arguments as follows:
" 1. A decision must be reached in the war before the autumn
of 1917, if it is not to end in the exhaustion of all parties, and consequently
disastrously for us. Of our enemies, Italy and France are economically so hard
hit that they are only upheld by England's energy and activity. If we can break
England's back the war will at once be decided in our favour. Now England's
mainstay is her shipping, which brings to the British Isles the necessary
supplies of food and materials for war industries, and ensures their solvency
abroad.
"2. The present state of the tonnage question, which has
already been described in detail, may be summed up as follows: Freights in the
case of a large number of important articles have risen tremendously, some of
them to ten times and more what they were before. From many other indications
we can conclude with certainty that everywhere there is a shortage of tonnage.
We may with safety assume that English shipping still amounts at the moment to
20 million tons, gross tonnage. Of this at least 3.6 million tons are
requisitioned for military purposes, and half a million tons are occupied in
coast traffic; about 3.6 million tons are under repair or temporarily unfit for
use; about 2 million tons are taken up in supplying the needs of England's
Allies; so that for her own supplies at most 8 million tons are available.
Computations based on statistics of traffic in English ports gives an even
smaller result. According to that, from July to September, 1916, English
shipping amounting to only 6¾ million tons, gross tonnage, was engaged
in traffic to England. Other shipping going to England may be estimated at
900,000 tons of enemy' non-English 'ships, and a good 3 million
tons of neutrals. Taking it all round, the shipping which supplies England
amounts to only 10¾ million tons, gross registered tonnage, in round
figures.
" 3. The results achieved hitherto in the war on shipping
justify us in assuming that further activities in this direction promise
success. But in addition to this, the bad harvests in wheat and produce all
over the world offer us a quite unique opportunity of which it would be sinful
not to take advantage. North America and Canada will, in all probability, be
able to send no more grain to England after February, so the latter will have
to draw her grain supplies from the distant Argentine; and as the Argentine can
spare very little, owing to a bad harvest, it will have to come all the way
from India, and to an even greater extent from Australia. The fact that the
grain has to come from such a much greater distance involves the use of 720,000
more tons of shipping for grain carrying purposes. It practically comes to
this, that until August, 1917, of the 10¾ million tons at their disposal
¾ million are required for a purpose for which they were never needed
before.
"4. Such favourable conditions promise certain success to an
energetic blow, dealt with our full force against English shipping. I can only
repeat and emphasise what I said on August 27: ' Clearly what we must do is to
bring about a decision in our favour by continuing to destroy shipping,' and,
further, ' It is absolutely unjustifiable from the military point of view not
to make use of the weapon of the U-boat.' I do not hesitate to assert that, as
matters now stand, we can force England to make peace in five months by means
of the unrestricted U-boat campaign. But this holds good only for a really
unrestricted U-boat campaign, not for the cruiser warfare formerly carried on
by the U-boats, even if all armed steamers are allowed to be torpedoed.
"5. Basing our calculations on the former monthly results of
600,000 tons of shipping sunk by unrestricted U-boat warfare, and the
expectation that at least two-fifths of neutral sea traffic will at once be
terrorised into ceasing their journeys to England, we may reckon that in five
months shipping to and from England will be reduced by about 39 per cent.
England would not be able to stand that, neither in view of post-war
conditions, nor with regard to the possibility of carrying on the war. She is
already confronted with a shortage of food which forces her into attempting the
same rationing measures that we, as a blockaded country, have had to adopt in
the course of the war. The existing conditions with which such an organisation
will have to reckon are very different and incomparably less favourable in
England than here. The necessary authorities do not exist, and the people in
England have not been educated to submit to such coercion.
"For another reason it would not now be possible to
institute a uniform reduced bread ration for the large population of England.
It was possible in Germany at a moment when the sudden reduction in the bread
ration was counterbalanced for the time being by supplies of other food. They
have missed that opportunity in England, and nothing can recall it. But with
about three-fifths of her former shipping she cannot continue her food supply
without a steady and vigorous reduction in the consumption of wheat, while at
the same time she has to keep up her war industries. In the accompanying
memorandum I have refuted in detail the objection that England might have
enough grain and raw materials in the country to be able to carry on through
this period of danger until the next harvest. Added to this, the unlimited
U-boat campaign would mean an immediate shortage of fats, since she would be
cut off from imports from Holland and Denmark; and one-third of her total
imports of butter come from the latter country, while all the margarine comes
from the former. Further, it will mean that the lack of wood and iron ore will
be intensified, because the import of wood from Scandinavia will be threatened,
while at the same time the imports of iron from Spain will be jeopardised. That
will mean an immediate reduction in coal production, because the necessary wood
will not be forthcoming; the same is true of iron and steel, and consequently
of munitions, which are dependent on both. Finally, it will at length give us
the desired opportunity of attacking the supply of munitions from neutral
countries, and by so doing relieve our army.
"As opposed to this, cruiser warfare waged by U-boats, even
if armed steamers were not exempt from sinking, would result in reducing
shipping to England by one-fifth of 400,000 tons, or about 18 per cent of the
present monthly traffic, that is less than half of what would result from the
unrestricted U-boat campaign. Judging by our experience up to date, we cannot
assume that if the armed steamers were not exempt there would be a perceptible
increase in the sinking of tonnage, which in the last two months amounted to
about 400,000 tons a month. So far as one can see, any such increase would only
serve to counterbalance the losses which must be expected to grow in number as
the arming of the ships proceeds.
" I am quite clear on the point that the loss of one-fifth
of British shipping would have a very serious effect on their supplies. But I
think it out of the question that, under the leadership of Lloyd George, who is
prepared to go to all lengths, England could thereby be forced to make peace,
especially as the above-mentioned effects of the shortage of fats, wood and
iron ore, and the continued influence on the supply of munitions would not come
into play at all. Further, the psychological effects of panic and fear would be
lacking. These, which can only result from unrestricted U-boat warfare, I hold
to be indispensable conditions of success. Our experiences at the beginning of
the U-boat war in 1915, when the English still believed we were in earnest
about continuing it, and even in the short U-boat campaign of March and April,
1916, proved how potent these effects were.
"A further condition is that the declaration and
commencement of the unrestricted U-boat war should be simultaneous, so that
there is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the neutrals.
Only on these conditions will the enemy and the neutrals be inspired with '
holy ' terror.
"6. The declaration of unrestricted U-boat warfare will
confront the Government of the United States with the question whether they are
prepared to draw the logical conclusions from the attitude they have hitherto
adopted towards the use of U-boats or not. I am most emphatically of opinion
that war with the United States of America is such a serious matter that
everything must be done to avoid it. But, in my opinion, fear of a break must
not hinder us from using this weapon which promises success. In any case, it is
desirable to envisage the consequences least favourable to us and to realise
what the effect on the course of the war will be if America joins our enemies.
So far as tonnage is concerned this effect can only be very small. It is not
probable that more than a small fraction of the tonnage belonging to the
Central Powers which is lying in America, and perhaps also in neutral ports,
will be quickly available for voyages to England. By far the greater part of it
can be damaged to such an extent that it would be useless during the first
months, which will be the decisive period. Preparations for this have been
made.
"Nor would crews be immediately available for them.
Decisive effects need not be anticipated from the co-operation of American
troops, who cannot be brought over in considerable numbers owing to the lack of
shipping; similarly, American money cannot make up for the shortage of supplies
and tonnage.
"The question is, what attitude America would adopt if
England were forced to make peace. It is improbable that she would decide to
carry on the war singlehanded, as she lacks the means to make a vigorous attack
on us, and her shipping would meanwhile be damaged by our U-boats. On the
contrary, it is probable that she would associate herself with the peace
concluded by England so as to return to healthy economic conditions as soon as
possible.
" I have therefore come to the conclusion that we must have
recourse to unrestricted U-boat warfare, even at the risk of war with America,
so long as the U-boat campaign is begun early enough to ensure peace before the
next harvest, that is, before August 1; we have no alternative. In spite of the
danger of a break with America, an unrestricted U-boat campaign, begun soon, is
the right means to bring the war to a victorious end for us. Moreover, it is
the only means to that end.
"7. The situation has improved materially for us, since in
the autumn of 1916 I declared that the time had come to strike a decisive blow
against England. The failure of the harvests all over the world, together with
the effect of the war on England up to the present time, once more give us a
chance of ending the war in our favour before the new harvests are reaped. If
we do not make the best of this, the last opportunity as far as man can tell, I
see no other possibility than exhaustion on both sides without our being able
to end the war so that our future as a World Power is secured. In order to
achieve the necessary effect in time the unrestricted U-boat campaign must
begin on February 1 at the latest.
"I beg your Excellency to inform me whether the military
situation on the Continent, particularly as regards the States which are
neutral, will permit of this date being fixed. I require a period of three
weeks to make the necessary arrangements.
"(Signed) v. HOLTZENDORFF."
There is no doubt that the Chief of the Naval Staff,
although we in the Fleet had no special knowledge to that effect, must have
made known to the Cabinet the same views which he described in so much detail
in his memorandum to General Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, viz., that it was
high time to start the unrestricted U-boat campaign. In this quarter, though,
he seems to have met with greater difficulties, so that he once more appears to
have been inclined to compromise. When the orders regarding the date of the
opening of the campaign failed to reach the Fleet in the middle of December,
the time for which the admiral had announced them, and when, in reply to my
inquiries, I received evasive answers, I feared that a new obstruction had
arisen. I therefore sent Captain von Levetzow to Berlin to make inquiries. He
was given to understand in an interview with Admiral von Holtzendorff on
January 4 that for the moment he could only obtain permission to sink armed
liners. A Note on this subject was ready and about to be dispatched to America.
Again there was the danger that we should pursue exactly the same course as a
year ago, a course which had led to such miserable results. I had commissioned
my representative to warn them emphatically against this. He had occasion on
January 8 to be received by the Imperial Chancellor and to point out to him the
inadequacy of such a middle course which was bound to give offence and would be
wrecked if America offered objections. The difficulty of determining whether a
steamer were armed or not would seriously compromise the success of the
undertaking. The Chancellor went the very same evening to Pless, where the
decisive session took place the following day when the Chief of the Naval Staff
insisted on the necessity of the step, as explained in his memorandum to the
Field-Marshal, and convinced His Majesty as well.
On January 9 the officer commanding the Fleet received two
communications at short intervals. The first stated that from February 1 onward
all merchant ships as soon as it had been positively ascertained that they were
armed were to be attacked forthwith. Up to that date only armed cargo boats
were to be sunk without warning. This meant that after February 1 passenger
ships also would be subject to submarine attack. The second telegram contained
an order sent by the All Highest to the Chief of the Naval Staff to the
following effect:
"I command that the unrestricted U-boat campaign shall begin
on February 1 in full force. You are to make all necessary preparations without
delay, but in such a way that neither the enemy nor neutrals can obtain early
information of this intention. The fundamental plans of operation are to be
submitted to me."
It struck me as odd that an order to proceed against armed
steamers should be issued on February I while the unrestricted U-boat campaign
was to start on the same day. The only explanation I could think of was that
the aforementioned Note concerning the treatment of armed steamers from
February I onwards had already been sent to the American Government, and that
it was too late to stop it being delivered. The American Government would
certainly be surprised if, after receiving such an announcement in the first
half of January, it were informed a few weeks later (February 1) of the
intensification of U-boat warfare. But it would make a vast difference to
America whether the fundamental right of neutrals to send ships to the
blockaded area was conceded, or as unrestricted U-boat war demanded, all
shipping in those parts was exposed to destruction. It seems, judging by later
communications, there was some idea of asking the American Government to
mediate; if this was so the adoption of two such different attitudes on the
U-boat question, one following the other in such quick succession, must have an
awkward effect. Nothing was made known to the Naval Staff, nor to the officers
commanding the Fleet (who certainly were not directly concerned in such
matters), of any negotiations which were in progress at that time and which
might have been unfavourably affected by the declaration of the unrestricted
U-boat campaign. When later on I took over the duties of Chief of the Naval
Staff I found no record that any letter from the Imperial Chancellor had been
received before the actual commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign on
February 1 asking for a postponement so as to make a last attempt to avoid this
extreme measure. I am convinced, too, that if Admiral von Holtzendorff had had
any knowledge of the matter he would have told me of it when he handed over
affairs to me on our change of office, if not before. Owing to his severe
illness in the summer of 1918 he never had an opportunity of making any
statement on this question.
With the unrestricted U-boat campaign we had probably
embarked on the most tremendous undertaking that the world-war brought in its
long train. Our aim was to break the power of mighty England vested in her sea
trade in spite of the protection which her powerful Fleet could afford her. Two
and a half years of the world-war had passed before we addressed ourselves to
this task, and they had taxed the strength of the Central Powers to the
uttermost. But if we did not succeed in overcoming England's will to destroy us
then the war of exhaustion must end in Germany's certain defeat. There was no
prospect of avoiding such a conclusion by the war on land; nor could we assume
that America's definitely unneutral attitude towards us would change, or that
by her mediation any peace could be obtained with satisfactory results for us,
since Wilson's proposal to act as mediator in a peace in which there should be
neither victors nor vanquished had been so brusquely refused by our enemies.
In such a situation it was not permissible to sit with
folded hands and leave the fate of the German Empire to be decided by chance
circumstances. All in a position of responsibility felt it incumbent upon
them to suggest any means that offered a prospect of warding off the impending
disaster. An opinion from the military point of view as to the chances of
success in war upon enemy sea trade had been expressed; it was based on the
statistics of tonnage sunk in previous years. In this respect expectations were
far surpassed in the coming year. But the effects of this blow dealt to English
commerce could not be foretold in the same way. It was immediately obvious that
a reduction of the English mercantile fleet by a third, or even a half, must
have a catastrophic effect on English economic conditions, and make England
incline towards peace.
The Naval Staff had made a point of carefully examining the
economic conditions with the help of experts and had recorded the results of
their researches in a number of detailed memoranda, which they had submitted to
the responsible Imperial officials. These researches had included the
complicated problems of traffic for military purposes as well as for the needs
of civilians by land and sea; supplies for the whole country as well as for the
troops in the various theatres of war; the food supply of the nation;
distribution of goods; home production; stores controlled by the State and
rationing. Moreover, all these inquiries and the considerations they gave rise
to had to be carried out in unfamiliar circumstances due to the war. Further,
an estimate had to be made of the probable direct and indirect effects of all
these conditions on the psychological state of the people. The conclusions
based on these researches were drawn up in outline so as to give some idea of
the probable effects, and they confirmed the general impressions gathered from
the beginning of our war on trade that success was certain to crown our efforts
if we pursued this course. We had no alternative but to attack our enemy by
trying to destroy his economic strength, since all his efforts were directed
towards crushing ours. Now, as never before, it depended on which of us could
hold out the longer.
In every great effort, if you want to develop it to its
fullest strength, you must have the conviction that you can defeat your
opponent. That is why the U-boat campaign required the support of all classes
that expected the victory of our Fatherland. Every doubt of its success must
strengthen the enemy's view that we would soon tire.
But the political leaders had already done all in their
power to undermine confidence; and their fear that this kind of warfare might
assume forms which would burden us with new enemies had affected timid souls,
and it was bound to have a depressing effect if doubts of the final outcome
were allowed to appear; should expectations not be fulfilled exactly within the
periods mentioned by the Naval Staff. The enemy took full advantage of the
discouragement thus aroused, when these people despaired of attaining the
desired end; his courage and resolution to hold out were strengthened by it. It
is a great pity that the calculations of the Naval Staff were published
throughout the country; they had assumed the success of the U-boat campaign
within a fixed period of time, and were meant for a narrow circle only. Many
who would have held out but for this disappointment lost courage, realising
that we had no choice and must bear the privations until success, which could
not fail to come ultimately, was achieved. If the calculations of the Naval
Staff had fixed too early a date for the effects, and it had taken a much
longer time until England could not stand any further destruction of her
merchant ships, even then no other choice would have been left us but to make
use of these means. The refusal of our peace proposal had so clearly
demonstrated the enemy's desire to destroy us that no one would have been
prepared, in view of the general situation at the end of the year 1916, to
accept a humiliating peace.
The strategic offensive passed definitely to the Navy on
February 1, 1917. U-boats and the Fleet supplemented one another to form one
weapon, which was to be used in an energetic attack on England's might. Our
Fleet became the hilt of the weapon whose sharp blade was the U-boat. The Fleet
thus commenced its main activities during the war to maintain and defend the
new form of warfare against the English Fleet.
The English defence consisted in combating the U-boats in
home waters, and to this we could oppose nothing but the skill of the U-boats
in evading the enemy. This skill never failed to the very end, although our
losses grew heavy.
Our enemies had to go farther to defend themselves against
the danger, and had to try to crush it at its source. Only our Fleet could make
such efforts fruitless. It had to be in a constant state of readiness to meet
the English Fleet in battle; there was no other way. It expected this battle,
and had to maintain its strength as much as possible, so as to be fit to cope
with the enemy. That is why our Fleet might not weaken itself in view of this
last demand that would in all probability be made upon its strength. It found
plenty of continued and exacting occupation in combating the means that England
had devised to prevent the U-boats from getting out.
The conduct of the U-boat campaign was less a question of
the number of boats than one of their peculiar qualitiestheir
invisibility and their submersibility. The former enables them to attack
unexpectedly, the latter to escape the pursuit of the enemy. It goes without
saying that more can be achieved with 100 boats than with 20. But when the
Naval Staff was considering the prospects of a U-boat campaign the first
question was to determine the minimum number of boats that would suffice.
Moreover, the U-boat campaign's effect was not confined to that of actual
sinkings; it did much by disturbing and scaring away trade. Its results were
soon perceptible, as it became necessary to regulate traffic according to the
ports and districts threatened by U-boats for the time being. Very considerable
disturbances in supply and delivery must have been caused, if it suddenly
became necessary to alter all the arrangements for traffic, e.g. if railway
transport had to be shifted, when ports on the south or west coast of England
received no supplies from abroad, because all the ships had to be taken to
ports in the north and east.
The number of boats we were able to use in the war against
commerce at the beginning of 1915 was about 24; for the first months the new
boats built just about covered the losses. It had also become necessary to
provide several boats for the U-boat school, so that crews could be trained for
the many new boats that were being built. With these 24 boats it was only
possible to occupy permanently three or four stations on the main traffic route
of English commerce. The tonnage sunk during the whole year of 1915 equalled
the tonnage sunk in only six weeks when the unrestricted U-boat campaign was
opened. In view of the attitude of conciliation adopted towards the complaints
of neutrals, it was premature to begin the U-boat campaign in 1915. It would
have been better to wait until the larger number of boats, resulting from the
intensive building of 1915, guaranteed a favourable outcomeand then to
have persisted in the face of all objections. Had there been no giving way
in 1915, the right moment to start the campaign the beginning of 1916
would not have been missed.
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