Towards the end of the year the lack of tonnage began to be
felt acutely, and it became clear that this lack was the chief difficulty that
England had to face as a result of U-boat warfare. In January, 1916, the new
Chief of the Naval Staff handed in a memorandum in which he subjected British
economic conditions to a thorough examination, and drew the following
conclusions from his investigations:
1. The U-boat campaign of last year, gradually increasing
its weapons but hampered by growing restrictions of a non-military nature,
dealt a blow to a new economic entity hitherto little affected by the war and
capable of strong resistance. By means of a scarcity which was mostly felt in a
considerable rise in the price of important foodstuffs as well as of
manufactured goods and! raw materials, it reduced England's commerce to such an
extent that serious economic and financial injury is apparent in all
directions. This injury has aroused a feeling of considerable anxiety in
England, where it was felt that a vulnerable spot was threatened; moreover, it
was calculated gradually to make England inclined for peace. The effect wore
off as soon as England was certain that for reasons due to considerations of a
non-military nature the U-boat campaign would not be continued.
2. The economic changes set up by the U-boat campaign have
persisted, though for the most part in a milder form. Towards the end of 1915
lack of transport reduced British sea-traffic to such an extent that the
difficulties due to the interruption in British foreign trade were rendered
more acute by the steady rise in the price of imports. Market prices followed
suit. The financial situation, too, became disquieting owing to the drain on
the country caused by the military and political situation.
3. A new U-boat campaign would be undertaken under much more
favourable circumstances than that of February, 1915, because the amount of
tonnage still available for British imports and exports cannot stand much
further diminution, as in that case the transport of essential goods will
suffer, and because England has been robbed of the better part of her power of
resistance by shortage, rise in prices and financial overstrain. Moreover, a
new U-boat campaign has such weapons at its disposal that it-is in a position
to achieve considerably more from a military point of view than last year's
campaign, for though the enemy has increased his defensive power the U-boats
are equipped with a number of new technical improvements.
4. If on this basis the U-boat campaign has to be carried on
with the same restrictions of a non-military nature as last year no doubt
England's economic, and consequently also her financial, position will be
further damaged. But it cannot be assumed with any certainty that in this way
England will be forced to make peace, partly because of the many difficulties
of carrying out a U-boat campaign with such a limitation of its specific
activities, and the consequent greatly increased possibilities of defence, but
especially because, judging by last year's experience, the effect of
terrorising shipping is to all intents and purposes lost.
5. But if a new unlimited U-boat campaign is inaugurated on
the principle that all shipping in the War Zone may be destroyed, then there is
a definite prospect that within a short time, at most six months, England will
be forced to make peace, for the shortage of transport and the consequent
reduction of exports and imports will become intolerable, since prices will
rise still more, and in addition to this England's financial position will be
seriously threatened. Any other end to the war would mean grave danger for
Germany's future economic life when we consider the war on German trade that
England has planned and from which she could be deterred only by such a defeat
as the U-boats could inflict.
6. The United States are not in a position to lend England
effective aid against a new U-boat campaign by providing her with tonnage. In
view of the ever-increasing burdens imposed by the war, it is not to be
supposed that the United States will afford England financial support for an
indefinite period. Such support would, moreover, be of no avail in an
unrestricted U-boat campaign against English trade, as it could not prevent a
scarcity of essential goods or make it possible for the English to carry on
their export trade.
The proposal made by the Chief of the Naval Staff in
January, 1916, to start an unrestricted U-boat campaign was based on the
following estimates of success:
(a). From the beginning of the U-boat war in 1915 till the
end of October of that year in the War Zone round England one or two steamers,
averaging 4,085 tons, were sunk daily by each U-boat; this does not include
steamers of less than 1,000 tons. It could, therefore, be assumed that in the
future each U-boat would sink ships amounting to at least 4,000 tons daily. If
it is reckoned that in a month only four stations are continuously
occupieda very low estimate in view of the increase in the number of
U-boats during 1915 then you get a total of 6,000 tons a day, or 480,000 tons a
month, in the War Zone round England.
(b). In the Mediterranean in the second half of the year
1915 an average of 125,000 tons of shipping was sunk every month. Assuming that
traffic did not materially fall off, as a result of the U-boat campaign, and
that in the course of the summer of 1916 the number of stations in the
Mediterranean would be further increased, the same result might be counted on;
that is, 125,000 tons per month.
(c). The amount of tonnage destroyed by mines had averaged
26,640 tons a month. The same number could be assumed for the future. This
would bring the total result per month up to 631,640 tons, which would mean a
complete loss of 3,789,840 tons in six months. But the effect of this loss upon
English trade and economic conditions must be measured by a multiple of this
figure, because every lost ship would affect imports and exports, and would,
moreover, have made several journeys in six months. The total tonnage of the
English Mercantile Fleet at the outbreak of war amounted to 20 million tons in
round numbers. Judging by the rise in prices which became manifest a few weeks
after the opening of the U-boat campaign, an idea can be formed of what the
effect would be if more than a third of England's total tonnage were completely
lost, when it is considered that England is dependent on it to supply her
manifold wants and keep up her widely extended business connections. There
could then be no question of " business as usual."
But the Imperial Government rejected the admiral's
suggestion. So the Chief of the Naval Staff resolved to content himself with a
kind of payment on account, which consisted in treating all armed enemy
merchantmen as warships. But he did not give up all hope of soon being able to
take up the U-boat campaign in its intensest form.
When in January, 1916, I took over the command of the Fleet
I considered it my first task to ascertain what weapons against England lay at
my disposal, and especially to make sure whether, and in what way, the U-boat
campaign against English trade was intended to be carried out. On February 1
the Chief of the Naval Staff assured me that the unrestricted U-boat campaign
would be inaugurated on March 1. All preparatory work for the operations of the
Fleet were based on this assumption. As early as February 11 the officers in
command of the Fleet received the order as to the treatment of armed merchant
vessels. According to this order enemy merchantmen armed with guns were to be
looked upon as warships, and to be destroyed by all possible means. The
commanders were to keep in mind that mistakes would lead to a break with
neutral Powers, and therefore the sinking of a merchant vessel on account of
its being armed might only be proceeded with when the fact that it carried a
gun had been positively ascertained. In view of the warning to neutrals, which
was to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, this order was not to come into
force until February 9.
The Government again issued a memorandum about the treatment
of armed merchantmen. In this they explained at length that in view of the
instructions issued by the British Government, and of the consequent conduct of
English merchantmen, enemy merchant ships that were armed no longer had the
right to be regarded as peaceful trading vessels. The German Government
notified neutral Powers of this state of affairs, so that they might warn their
people in future not to entrust their persons or their fortunes to armed
merchantmen belonging to any of the Powers at war with the German Empire. After
this explanation no neutral State could demand that its citizens should be
entitled to protection if they travelled on armed enemy steamers into the War
Zone.
We expected that in these circumstances there would be fewer
difficulties in carrying out the U-boat campaign, while paying due
consideration to neutral shipping. But if, as the Chief of the Naval Staff had
told me, it had been decided to open the unrestricted U-boat campaign on March
1, it was not clear why this declaration relative to the treatment of armed
steamers should have preceded it. My suspicion that the date of March 1 would
not be adhered to was confirmed on the occasion of H.M. the Emperor's visit on
February 23, of which I have given an account in an earlier chapter. The
Emperor shared the political doubts which the Government had advanced, and
wished to avoid a break with America. This announcement of the Government had
received the assent of the Naval Staff, which was responsible for the war at
sea, and so of course those in command of the Fleet had to submit to the order
to resume the campaign against English trade with a few U-boats.
We would try this first and await the result. Judging by the
assurance given me, I took it for granted that the Government had learnt a
lesson from the events of 1915, and that it would not again give way if
objections were raised, but would on the contrary then proceed with the
intensified form of U-boat warfare. We had far greater means at our disposal
now to give emphasis to our threats.
I should like to point out here that those in command of the
Fleet had no right to exercise a decisive influence on the conduct of the war,
but the Chief of the Fleet, being responsible for the execution of orders,
could make representations if he found the conditions imposed on him
too-disadvantageous. Added to this, the Fleet had only someabout
halfof the U-boats at its disposal; the rest were in part attached to the
Naval Corps, and in part under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Baltic; those in the Mediterranean took their orders direct from the Naval
Staff. But the problem of the U-boat campaign was so closely connected with the
combating of the English Fleetour own Fleet's main taskthat it
became a matter of the greatest importance in its effect on the decisions of
the Navy. I therefore thought it my duty to point out the difficulties which
would arise in our conduct of the war in every sphere, if the U-boat campaign
were prosecuted on principles that were militarily unsound; all the more so as
I was accountable to the U-boats under my orders, if they were assigned to
tasks which would in the long run entail their destruction without their having
achieved the success which they promised to do if rightly wielded as a weapon.
From this point of view I endeavoured to combat the tendency
to give way, which the Chief of the Naval Staff betrayed when dealing with
political objections, although in a long and well thought-out memorandum he, as
the proper representative of the naval fighting forces, had shown that
unrestricted U-boat warfare was the best and safest means we possessed to
subdue England and generally to bring the war to a successful close.
On March 4 the decisive session at General Headquarters took
place, and the Chief of the Naval Staff informed me of the result as follows:
"For military reasons, the unrestricted U-boat campaign
against England, which alone promises full success, must begin without fail on
April 1. Till then the Imperial Chancellor must set in motion all political and
diplomatic machinery to make America clearly understand our position, with the
aim and object of securing our freedom of action. Up to that date the U-boat
campaign shall be carried on against England as effectively as possible in
conformity with the orders issued on March 1."
The following considerations were the means of bringing
about this decision at the discussion on March 4:
"The general military situation is good. East and west we
hold the territory that we have victoriously won. No serious danger is to be
apprehended from America so long as our U-boats and Fleet remain afloat.
Austria is effectively repulsing Italy's attempts at attack; Bulgaria has a
firm hold on Serbian territory; the Salonika campaign is doomed to come to a
standstill; the Russian offensive against Turkey has come to a stand on the
ErzerumTrebizond line; the English expedition in Mesopotamia has ended in
a heavy defeat; Egypt is threatened from the direction of Syria and by the
Senussi, which means that a considerable British army of defence must be kept
there. Latterly, too, military forces have had to be sent to Ireland. No
essential change in the favourable general military situation is to be
expected, nor on the other hand is there any prospect of a decisive victory of
all our forces.
"From the economic point of view the fact that we are cut
off from all imports from overseas and neutral countries becomes increasingly
apparent; even a good harvest cannot bring security for the future, as long as
England's policy of violence, whose object is to starve us out, is not stopped.
Thus the economic conditions are very different from the military. Our
opponents can hold out longer than we can. We must, therefore, aim at bringing
the war to an end. We shall not be mistaken in assuming that an injury
inflicted on England, which induces her to regard the conclusion of peace as
better business, can force the others to peace as well. England can only be
injured by war on her trade. The only means to inflict this injury is a
ruthless U-boat campaign, the effects of which England will not be able to
withstand for more than six or eight months if she cannot get assistance from
others than her present Allies. Ruthless U-boat warfare will not only inflict
damage on England; neutral shipping will also feel the full brunt of it, and
cargoes and lives will be imperilled. The small neutral States must give in and
are willing to do so: that is, to stop trade with England. America opposes this
manner of waging the U-boat campaign, and threatens us with war. From a
military point of view, and especially from the standpoint of the Fleet, we
might well risk this war. But economically it would fatally aggravate our
situation. Such a rich and distant country could stand the war for ten years or
more. But it would afford our flagging opponents very considerable moral and
material support which would enable them, including England, to hold out for a
longer period. Our aim, which is to bring the war to an end within a short
time, would be farther than ever from realisation, and Germany would be exposed
to exhaustion.
"As the present military situation is not such as to force
us to stake everything on one throw of the dice, our superiority in the field
must be maintained, and at the same time our diplomatists must do all in their
power, first to prevent us from making new, dangerous enemies, and then to find
ways and means of sowing discord among our present enemies and thereby open a
prospect for a separate peace. If we succeed in keeping friends with America,
and at the same time, by concessions in our manner of conducting the U-boat
campaign, can induce her to exert strong and effective pressure on England, so
that the legitimate trade of neutrals with the belligerents is re-established,
then we shall obtain the economic aid which will enable us to maintain our
favourable military situation permanently, and so to win the war. A break with
America certainly affords us the tactical advantage of ruthless U-boat warfare
against England, but only under conditions that will prolong the war, and will
certainly bring neither relief nor amelioration to the economic situation.
Should the attempt to keep America out of the war fail, it will still be our
lot to face these conditions. We cannot take the responsibility of neglecting
to make this attempt, for the sake of a few hundred thousand tons of enemy
shipping that we might sink during the time the attempt is being made.''
These attempts met with no success whatever; certainly not
within the period set aside up to April 1. Neither was the assumption fulfilled
that we might exert pressure upon England through the agency of America, so as
to re-establish legitimate trade with neutrals, and thereby obtain the economic
aid which would enable us to maintain our favourable military situation
permanently. As soon as this was recognised we were confronted with the
necessity of drawing the inevitable conclusions, and of beginning the economic
war against England in its intensest form. Otherwise the dreaded state of
affairs spoken of at the session of March 4 would become a reality, and our
opponents would be able to hold out longer than we could if no change occurred
in the economic situation. The dullest must have been forced into some
recognition of this, when on April 20, in connection with the Sussex incident,
America presented her threatening Note.
The date of April 1 had passed, and still the unrestricted
U-boat campaign had not been started. But the leaders of the Fleet had no
special reason for urging an early start, as the U-boats then at sea had not
gathered sufficient experience on the basis of which we might make counter
proposals.
On March 24, 1916, the steamer Sussex, with 300 passengers
on board, among them being a number of American citizens, was torpedoed in the
Channel while crossing from Folkestone to Dieppe. So far as German observation
went, it was not made clear at first whether the steamer had been hit by a
U-boat, or had struck a mine. Certainly a ship had been torpedoed on that day
and in that neighbourhood, but the German commander, judging by the
circumstances and the appearance of the ship, took it for a minelayer of the
new "Arabis" class. The American Government took occasion, in consequence of
this incident, to send a very sharp Note to the German Government, protesting
against the wrongfulness of the submarine campaign against commerce. It
threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Germany if the German
Government did not declare the abandonment of its present methods of submarine
warfare against passenger and merchant vessels, and see that it was carried
out.
As a result of this Note, presented on April 20, 1916, our
Government decided to give in and sent orders to the Naval Staff to the effect
that submarine warfare was henceforward to be carried on in accordance with
Prize Law. This order reached the Fleet by wireless telegraphy when it was on
the way to bombard Lowestoft. As war waged according to Prize Law by U-boats in
the waters around England could not possibly have any success, but, on the
contrary, must expose the boats to the greatest dangers, I recalled all the
U-boats by wireless, and announced that the U-boat campaign against British
commerce had ceased.
On April 30 I was informed by the Naval Staff that His
Majesty approved of the interruption of the U-boat campaign against commerce
ordered by the Commander of the Fleet, and he directed that the U-boat weapon
should meanwhile be vigorously used for military purposes. The order to resume
the U-boat campaign against trade would be given when the political and
military situation should demand it.
Having U-boats at my disposal for military purposes gave me
the desired opportunity of extending the operations of the Fleet, and it was
owing to this circumstance that the Fleet had occasion on May 31 to meet the
English Fleet in battle near the Skagerrak. To my idea the moral impression
which this battle left on the neutral nations created a most favourable
atmosphere for us to carry on the war against England by all possible means,
and to resume the U-boat campaign in all its intensity. I took the opportunity
of submitting this view to H.M. the Emperor, when he visited the Fleet at
Wilhelmshaven on June 5.
In May the Naval Staff had again begun to try to persuade
the leaders of the Fleet to change their mind and resume the U-boat campaign in
accordance with Prize Law, so as to be able to inflict at least some injury on
England. But as even the regulations as to the treatment of armed steamers had
been rescinded, I refused to contemplate a resumption.
In June, soon after the battle, the Naval Staff again
returned to this subject, and on June 20 invited me to state my point of view
in order to incorporate it in a memorandum to be presented to the Emperor. I
replied that in view of the situation I was in favour of the unrestricted
U-boat campaign against commerce, in the form of a blockade of the British
coast, that I objected to any milder form, and I suggested that, if owing to
the political situation we could not make use of this, our sharpest weapon,
there was nothing for it but to use the U-boats for military purposes. A few
days later the Chief of the Naval Cabinet thought to persuade me to change my
attitude. He wrote me the following letter on the subject, dated June 23, from
General Headquarters:
"The Chief of the Naval Staff has given me your letter to
read on this subject; its conclusions may be summed up in the words, 'Either
everything or nothing.' I can fully sympathise with you in your point of view,
but unfortunately the matter is not so simple. We were forced, though with rage
in our hearts, to make concessions to America, and in so doing to the neutrals
in general, but, on the other hand, we cannot wholly renounce the small
interruptions of trade that it is still possible for us to carry out, which are
proving of considerable value, too, in the Mediterranean. It is the thankless
task of the Chief of the Naval Staff to try and find some way of making this
possible in British waters as well. And it is my opinion that the Chief of the
Fleet should assist him in this as far as in him lies, by bringing about a
compromise between the harsh professional conception of the U-boat weapon and
the general, political and military demands which the Chief of the Naval Staff
has to satisfy. Of course, to that end it is necessary that the Chief of the
Fleet should unreservedly acknowledge the decisions of the All Highest with
regard to the limitation of the U-boat campaign, as the result of the most
serious deliberation upon the military, political and economic situation. This
is, of course, merely what is to be expected of him as a soldier. And further,
that he should pledge himself to make use of the U-boat as a weapon, despite
the limitations imposed, in order in the first place to injure, or at least
continually to threaten, the import trade of England. I do not take it upon
myself to offer any suggestions on the way in which such use can be made of the
U-boats, especially as I know it is a far more difficult matter near the
English coast than it is in the Mediterranean.
"What I ask of you is merely this: that you should
personally try to arrive at some understanding with the Chief of the Naval
Staff which will lead to some positive result, and by so doing put an end to a
situation in which His Majesty might be forced to issue commands instead of
merely approving; as, for instance, if he should order so many more U-boats to
be given up for use in the Mediterranean, as offering a more fruitful field for
the U-boat campaign against commerce.
"In conclusion, I should like to remark that for my part I
still believe in the possibility of a ruthless U-boat campaign. The conflict
between America and Mexico, the growing bitterness of the neutrals on account
of England's blockade, increasingly good prospects for the harvest, and last
but not least our successes on both frontsall these are matters which
tell in favour of such use of our U-boats, without involving us in an uncertain
political adventure.
(Signed) v. MULLER."
I replied that nothing more could be expected of me than
that I should express my honest conviction, especially as it was in connection
with new and far-reaching decisions to be taken by the Emperor that my opinion
on the subject was asked.
On his visit on June 30 the Imperial Chancellor gave me the
impression that he had not the slightest intention of employing against England
all the weapons at our disposal, but also that he would not give his consent to
an unrestricted U-boat campaign, so as not to be faced with fresh troublesome
incidents. The course of events hitherto had shown that America interfered on
England's behalf as soon as the U-boat campaign began to have perceptible
results. For ever so long America had systematically prevented us from using
our most effective weapon. Our attitude gave our people the false impression
that, despite America's objections, we were still going to use our U-boat
weapon with all our might. The people did not know that we, pledged to the
nation by our big talking, were only pretending to carry on the U-boat
campaign, and America laughed because she knew that it lay with her to
determine how far we might go. She would not let us win the war by it. So we
did not wield our U-boat weapon as a sword which was certain to bring us
victory, but, as my Chief of the Staff, Rear Admiral von Trotha, put it, we
used it as a soporific for the feelings of the nation, and presented the blunt
edge to the enemy. Gerard was right; he never wanted a war between America and
Germany but he wanted our defeat. That suited his book ever so much
better.
If we review the course of development of our policy from
January, 1916, we find that it had zigzagged in the following manner:
1. On January 13, 1916, the Naval Staff declares: If the
U-boat campaign is to achieve the necessary success it must be carried on
ruthlessly.
2. On March 7, 1916: Decision of His Majesty's, passed on by
the Naval Staff: For military reasons the inauguration of the unrestricted
U-boat campaign against England, which alone promises full success, is
indispensable from April 1 onward.
3. On April 25, 1916: We are to carry on the war against
trade absolutely according to Prize Law, consequently we are to rise to the
surface and stop ships, examine papers, and all passengers and crew to leave
the ship before sinking her.
4. On June 30, 1916: The Imperial Chancellor informs the
Commander of the Fleet that he personally is against any unrestricted form of
U-boat campaign, " which would place the fate of the German Empire in the hands
of a U-boat commander."
5. At the same time a proposal from the Chief of the Naval
Staff: The war against merchant ships to be carried on in the following manner:
They are to be approached under water to see whether they are armed; if they
are not armed, the boat is to rise to the surface at a safe distance, examine
papers, and sink the ship when the crew is in safety.
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