IN the year 1916, up to the time of the Battle of the
Skagerrak, the following additions had been made to the U-boat fleet: 38 large
U-boats, 7 large submarine minelayers, 34 U-B-boats. Two large submarine
minelayers, 3 U-B-boats and 3 U-C-boats had still to undergo steam trials; 53
large U-boats, 10 large submarine minelayers, 27 U-B-boats and 66 U-C-boats
were under construction. Since the outbreak of war we had lost 21 large
U-boats, 1 large submarine minelayer, 6 U-B-boats, 7 U-C-boats, and 2 U-B-boats
had been handed over to the Bulgarian Government. The distribution of all the
U-boats was so arranged that half were under the orders of the Admirals of the
Fleet, and of the rest one half were stationed in the Mediterranean, while the
other half, the last quarter, were assigned to the Naval Corps in Flanders. For
the sake of quick construction the new types of so-called "U-B "-boats and "
U-C "-boats had been introduced, in addition to the main type of large U-boats
similar to "U 19," the first one fitted with Diesel engines.
The chief characteristics of the different types were as
follows:
"U 19," surface displacement, 650 tons; highest speed on the
surface, 12 knots; under water, 9 knots; number of torpedoes, 9, of 50 cm.
calibre. Improvements were made in the type. From " U 40 " onwards the
displacement was raised first to 700 tons, and from "U 80 " onwards to 800
tons, the speed was raised to 17 knots on the surface, the number of torpedoes
increased to 12, and from "U 90 " onwards to 16. The torpedo of 50 cm. calibre
had an explosive charge of 200 kilos. The first large submarine minelayers were
not armed with torpedoes. They had a displacement of 760 tons, a surface speed
of 9.5 knots, and under water 7.5 knots; they carried 34 to 36 mines.
Of the U-B-boats, at first a small number with a
displacement of 125 tons was built for use in Flanders, with four torpedoes,
speed of 8.5 knots on the surface and 5.5 knots under water. The U-B-boat was
then enlarged to 500 tons, with a speed on the surface of 12.5 knots and of 7
under water.
The U-C-boats were of a type designed both for minelaying
and firing torpedoes. At first only a small number of these was built, with a
displacement of 150 tons; ultimately the boats had a displacement of 400 tons,
speed of 11 knots on the surface and 6.5 under water. They carried 18 mines and
could take four torpedoes.
At the beginning the U-boats were armed with one 5 cm. gun
as a defence against enemy submarines. But as their use was developed in the
war, such various demands were made upon them that their armament had to be
increased. One or two guns of 8.8 cm. were placed on the U-boats, U-B-boats,
and the U-C-boats; the submarine cruisers were in part armed with a gun of 15
cm. calibre.
The majority of the large U-boats was assigned to the Fleet
for use in the blockaded area west of England. The length of their trips was 21
to 28 days, but this was also dependent on the amount of ammunition used when
the boats had found a favourable opportunity to fire their torpedoes soon after
leaving port. The big minelayers were also under the command of the Fleet, and
could be sent on distant expeditionsto the White Sea or to the
Mediterranean.
The U-B-boats, being rather smaller, had proved to be very
handy and quickly submersible, although they could not remain so long at sea.
They were, therefore, mainly assigned to the base in Flanders, as were the
U-C-boats, of which a small number, however, was at the disposal of the Fleet
and used for laying mines on the east coast of England. The distribution of the
boats among the various bases was carried out according to the facilities the
latter had for repairing the boats on their return from expeditions. The large
amount of technical apparatus in a U-boat required very careful overhauling and
repair on her return from an expedition; also the damage due to the voyage or
to enemy attacks had to be repaired. Generally speaking, after four weeks at
sea a boat would need to lie in the dockyard for the same length of time for
repairs. The Imperial dockyard at Wilhelmshaven had been enlarged and was the
chief place to which the U-boats of the Fleet were sent for repair. The docks
at Kiel and Danzig were needed for other purposes; the bases at Zeebrugge and
Pola were used at first mainly for overhauling the boats. Until these dockyards
had been altered so as to be able to undertake more extensive work the boats
which belonged there had to return home for important repairs.
When the U-boat campaign was opened on February 1, 1917,
there were 57 boats already in the North Sea. The officer commanding the Baltic
district had eight assigned to him, the Naval Corps in Flanders had at its
disposal 38, and the stations in the Mediterranean 31 U-boats of different
types. The favourable experiences of the commercial U-boat U-Deutschland had
led to the construction of U-cruisers, of which the first series had a
displacement of 1,200 tons, which was later on raised to 2,000 and more. When
they could no longer be used for trade purposes the commercial U-boats were
taken over by the Navy and altered for use as warships. They were fitted with
two guns of 15 cm. calibre and two torpedo tubes, and could carry about 30
torpedoes in accordance with the extended period during which they could be
used on cruises, cruises which reached as far as the Azores and lasted up to
three months. With this fleet of U-boats the Navy was well equipped to do
justice to the task assigned to it, although England had used the whole of 1916
to develop her defence. The sinkings of the year 1917 prove this. They
were:
February, |
1917 |
781,500 tons |
March, |
|
885,000 " |
April, |
|
1,091,000 " |
May, |
|
869,000 " |
June, |
|
1,016,000 " |
July, |
|
811,000 " |
August, |
|
808,000 " |
September, |
|
672,000 " |
October, |
|
674,000 " |
November, |
|
607,000 " |
December, |
|
702,000 " |
January, |
1918 |
632,000 " |
February, |
|
680,000 " |
March, |
|
689,000 " |
April, |
|
652,000 " |
May, |
|
614,000 " |
June, |
|
521,000 " |
July, |
|
550,000 " |
August, |
|
420,000 " |
September, |
|
440,000 " |
The enemy's defence consisted, firstly, in directly
combating the U-boats, and, secondly, in special measures which England adopted
to counterbalance the loss of tonnage. The first impediment our U-boats had to
overcomeI am speaking of the activities of the U-boats assigned to the
Fleet (the same applies to the Flanders boats), whereas those in the
Mediterranean mostly worked under less difficult conditionslay in the
minefields blocking the North Sea. To deal successfully with these the Fleet
had had to create a special organisation. In addition to the actual
mine-sweepers, whose work it was to keep certain paths through the belt of
mines clear, special convoying flotillas had been formed, fitted with
minesweeping apparatus, which accompanied the U-boats along the routes that had
been cleared, till they reached the open sea, and met them at the same spot on
their return from their fields of operation to take them safely home again.
When attacking steamers the boats had to reckon with their armament, for in
spite of the large number of guns required and the crews to man them, nearly
the whole of the English Merchant Fleetat any rate all the more valuable
steamerswas armed.
As a further defence, besides the destroyers which were
excellently suited to this purpose and were armed with depth charges, a large
number of new kinds of boats with shallow draft had been built especially to
combat the U-boats. Nets and all sorts of wire entanglements hindered the
U-boats in their work near the English coast. The so-called "Q "-boats,
intended to serve as traps for submarines, were specially fitted out; they
presented the appearance of neutral ships, and on the approach of the U-boat
let fall their disguise and attempted to destroy it with guns and explosives.
The practice of gathering considerable numbers of British merchantmen together
and convoying them added greatly to the difficulties the U-boat encountered in
achieving success; these ships were protected according to their size and value
either by light craft or by bigger warships.
During the first months of the U-boat campaign I never
missed an opportunity of hearing the story of his experiences and adventures
direct from the lips of the commander of a returning U-boat; and thus I had
opportunity to form an idea of the perseverance, courage and resolution of
these young officers who won my highest admiration for the seamanship and the
calm intrepidity, which they succeeded in communicating to the crew as well. It
is a splendid testimonial to the spirit of the Navy that all who could possibly
be considered suitable for the U-boat service, both officers and men, rushed to
offer themselves. Even older Staff officers, in spite of their many years of
service, begged to be taken as commanders of U-boats, even if they had to serve
under a flotilla commander younger than themselves.
The three half-flotillas into which the U-boats of the Fleet
lied been formed at the beginning of the war developed in time into four
flotillas. Their commanders were: First U-Flotilla, Commander Pasgnay; Second
U-Flotilla, Commander von Rosenberg; Third U-Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander
Forstmann (Walter); Fourth U-Flotilla, Commander Pranse. I should like to
mention in connection with these Lieutenant-Commander Bartenbach, who was at
the head of the U-flotilla in Flanders, who so often supported the enterprises
of the Fleet with his boats. In an exemplary manner, despite all obstacles, he
directed the difficult operations of the Flanders boats, against which the
British defence was particularly heavy. All who served with him were animated
by a spirit of comradeship and readiness for action, which had the most
refreshing and grateful effect upon anyone who spent any time with them.
The Chief Director of the U-boats under the command of the
Fleet was Captain Bauer; he himself took part in the fighting expeditions of
the U-boats in the blockaded area round England, in order to be able to form
his own opinion of the circumstances in which the boats under his command had
to operate. It is his great merit that he recognised the capacity of the U-boat
and brought it to that degree of efficiency to which its later successes are
due. When, later on, owing to the increasing activity in construction, the
number of U-boats grew to such an extent that their organisation far surpassed
that required for a squadron and demanded a corresponding increase in
authority, Commodore Michelsen, who had hitherto commanded the torpedo-boats,
was placed at the head. His great knowledge and experience of the department of
torpedoes designated him as particularly suitable for this post, and he
completely fulfilled all expectations in this respect.
The U-boat service was the one which suffered the heaviest
losses of the Navy; the number of boats lost on fighting expeditions amounted
to 50 per cent. Altogether 360 U-boats and U-boat cruisers were employed in the
U-boat campaign, of which 184 were lost in the course of their enterprises.
This high percentage of losses was for the most part due to the defence of the
enemy, which grew more and more vigorous, as he tried to get the better of the
U-boat danger by the use of all sorts of dodges and methods; yet a large
proportion is ascribable to the fact that our U-boat commanders could not
resist the temptation, when sinking a steamer, to save the lives of those on
board as far as possible, even though they so often met with disappointment.
I should like to illustrate the difficulties encountered by
our U-boats by a few instances, quoting the official reports concerning them.
But it would be impossible to do all the commanders equal justice, for they
vied with each other in meeting the dangers which their difficult business
involved, and with which the public are already familiar through various
popular writings.
The journey to America of the "U 53 " is a splendid
testimonial to the perseverance of the crew and the high quality of the
material. On September 11 this U-boat received orders to lie off the American
coast about the time when the U-merchant boat Bremen was expected to
arrive at New London (North America), in order to search for and attack enemy
ships which, in all probability, would be waiting there for the submarine
merchantman. After completing this task, the boat was to call at Newport, Rhode
Island, but was to leave again after a few hours at most, so as to give the
American authorities no excuse or occasion to detain her. There was to be no
replenishment of supplies, with the possible exception of fresh victuals. If no
enemy warships were met with, she was to carry on commercial war according to
Prize Law off the American coast.
On September 17 the boat started on her outward voyage from
Heligoland. In the North Sea she had very heavy weather. There was a S.S.W.
gale and such high seas that the men on watch on the conning tower of the boat
were up to their necks in water all the time.
The supplies of the boat had had to be increased so as to
make the voyage possible. Four ballast tanks were altered for use as fuel
tanks, so that the oil supply was increased from 90 cb. m. to 150 cb. m.; the
supply of lubricating oil of, 14½ cb. m. was considered sufficient for
the voyage. Added to this, there was the increase in fresh water and food
supplies, so that the boat's draught was increased by 40 c.m. So far as her
sea-going qualities were concerned, her commander reported that the boat rode
very steadily on the whole, but that every sea went over her upper deck, even
when the force of the wind was only 4; from almost every direction spray flew
over the bridge. Consequently for those on duty on the bridge, the voyage,
especially at first, was a tremendous strain. The commander did not think that
the officers and petty officers would be able to stand it (the rubber suits
that had to be worn almost daily for the first fortnight were not watertight),
and he would have turned back if the weather had not improved soon after
September 24.
The route for the voyage out had been chosen to run from the
most northerly point of the Shetland Islands, which they passed on September
20, straight to the Newfoundland Bank, so as to remain on the northern side of
the usual belt of low barometric pressure. Weather conditions were uncertain
and changeable. There was often a very high and very steep swell, in which the
boat pitched heavily. They, however, experienced following winds nearly all the
time, which were favourable for journey. After reaching the Newfoundland Bank,
the boat, was carried vigorously to the west by the Labrador current. On the
whole the health of the crew was good, until they were nearing Newfoundland
Bank. Then a number were attacked with headache and sickness, which is said to
be a common occurrence in these parts.
On October 7 the boat lay before Long Island Sound. No war
ships were encountered. At 3 P.M. the commander entered the harbour of Newport,
Rhode Island, accompanied by an American submarine, which had joined him on the
way, and there he paid official visits to Admiral Knight and the commander of
torpedoboats, Admiral Gleaves. He wrote in his diary:
"The former received me very coolly, and said that the
Bremen, as far as he knew, had been sighted about 10 days before between
Newfoundland and New York. [That was not correct, as the Bremen never reached
America.] Admiral Knight obviously thought it most desirable that the ' U 53 '
should leave again the same evening. If I had not announced that such was my
intention, I think I should have been given a pretty broad hint on the subject.
"Admiral Gleaves was very friendly and much interested; he
inquired about all particulars of the voyage. The adjutants of both admirals
returned my visit. At 4.30 P.M. Admiral Gleaves himself came to inspect the
boat. I took him over her, as, earlier in the day, I had done several young
officers. More than anything else the Diesel engines roused envious admiration.
Many officers came on board with their ladies, as did civilians, reporters, and
one photographer. The crew received all sorts of little presents. At 5.30 P.M.
we weighed anchor. Proceeded to sea at 6.30 P.M. Trial dive. Course, Nantucket
Lightship; 270 revolutions equivalent to 9 knots."
Nantucket Lightship was reached on October 8 at 5.30 A.M,
Very clear, calm weather prevailed. The commander decided to examine the
merchant traffic outside territorial waters and to wage cruiser warfare.
At this meeting-point of so many trade routes, the boat was
able to stop seven steamers in the course of the day, and after the crews had
in every case left the ship, she sank the British steamer Strathdene from
Glasgow (4,321 tons), the Norwegian steamer Chr. Knutsen (3,378 tons) with
gasolene destined for London, the British steamer Westpoint (3,847 tons), the
Dutch steamer Blommersdyk (4,850 tons), whose whole cargo consisted of absolute
and conditional contraband. According to an American certificate, the
Blommersdyk, before reaching her destination, was to call at Kirkwall (in the
Orkney Islands, a British examining station for merchant steamer traffic). In
his log the commander reports as follows:
"Meanwhile, in this narrow space besides the two
steamers there was an English passenger boat as well, the Stefano, from
Liverpool, 3,449 tons, which had already been stopped and was disembarking her
crewand the ' U 53 ' sixteen American destroyers had assembled, so that
we had to manuvre with the greatest care. While I was towing back the
boat of the Blommersdyk, which had brought the officer with her papers, ' U 53
' got so near an American destroyer that we had to reverse with both engines to
avoid a collision. We cleared one another by about 50 m. When reversing, I cast
my tow loose, and her crew did not return to the Blommersdyk at all, but went
straight on board a destroyer. I had told the officer that the crew would be
given twenty-five minutes in which to disembark till 6.30 P.M. To make
sure that no one should be hurt, he was to haul down his flag to show that no
one was left on board. Then I approached the passenger steamer to examine her
papers, or, in case she had not yet lowered a boat, to dismiss her forthwith
out of consideration for the passengers. I had already given orders for the
signal, ' You can proceed,' when I realised that the steamer had been abandoned
and all on board accommodated on an American destroyer. I then returned to the
Blommersdyk. By means of a siren and calling through a megaphone I made sure
that no one was left on board. A destroyer which lay very near the steamer was
asked by Morse signal to move away a little, so that the ship might be sunk.
This the destroyer did at once. Hit with torpedo, a depth of 4 m. in hold 4.
The steamer was then sunk by a second torpedo."
The passenger steamer Stefano was then also sunk. At 10.30
P.M. the boat began her return voyage. Though it would have been very desirable
to extend our activities off the American coast as long as possible, yet any
further delay would have endangered the whole enterprise because of the fuel
supply; for during the short stay at Newport, the boat, in accordance with the
general instructions issued to her, had taken in no supplies of any kind. For
the return voyage we counted on a consumption of fuel of 60 cb. m., and a
certain reserve was allowed in the event of head winds and storms. That this
precaution was necessary is proved by the fact that although the weather as far
as the Shetlands was very favourable, the boat arrived at Heligoland with only
14.5 cb.m. of fuel. For the return voyage the longer route via Fastnet Rock was
chosen. In so doing, the unsettled weather conditions that had been encountered
in the higher latitudes on the voyage out were avoided; also on this southern
side of the belt of low barometric pressure there was less fear of head winds
than in the north. After waiting twenty hours at the S.E. corner of the
Newfoundland Bank to weather a storm, the boat proceeded with little delay as
far as the Hebrides, passing through an area of high pressure (770 mm.)
accompanied by a steady west wind. The route then followed was round the
Shetland Islands. On October 28, at 3 P.M., the boat entered the harbour at
Heligoland. It had covered a distance of 7,550 sea miles and had only stopped
once for two and a half hours in Newport. When the boat arrived at
Wilhelmshaven next day, I was able to assure myself by personal observation
that all her crew were in excellent condition. They might well be proud of
their eminent, seaman-like, and technical achievement.
«
LAST CHAPTER °
NEXT SECTION » |