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THE BRIDGES
THAT ÉBLÉ BUILT
THE 1812 CROSSING OF THE
BEREZINA
"Finally, toward four o'clock in the evening,
when it was almost dark, I came to the bridge. Here I saw only one bridge, the
second having been shot away. Now it is with horror, but at that time it was
with a dull, indifferent feeling, that I looked at the masses of horses and
people which lay dead, piled high upon the bridge. Only "Straight ahead and in
the middle!" must be the resolution. "Here in the water is your grave; beyond
the bridge is the continuation of a wretched life. The decision will be made on
the bridge!" Now I kept myself constantly in the middle. The major and I could
aid one another; and so amid a hundred blows of sabers we came to the bridge,
where not a plank was visible because of the dead men and horses; and, although
on reaching the bridge the people fell in masses thirty paces to the right and
to the left, we came through to the firm land." - Jakob
Walter.
by James Burbeck
When the
retreating French Army and its allies reached the banks of the ice-filled
Berezina River on the 23rd of November, 1812, they discovered their sole means
of escape blocked by the smoldering ruins of the Borisov bridge. On the
opposite bank lay a Russian force under Admiral Pavel Vasil'evich Chichagov,
who had been ordered there specifically to cut off the French Army's retreat
from Russia. But with ingenuity born of desperation, French General of
Engineers Jean-Baptiste Éblé and four hundred pontonniers managed
to quietly build two new bridges using materials taken from nearby villages.
Only days before the French Commander-in-Chief, Napoleon Bonaparte, had ordered
all sixty boats of the army bridging train to be burned along with all other
gear he had deemed nonessential. General Éblé protested the
decision at the time and discretely ordered two wagons of charcoal and six
wagons of tools to be spared. He also assigned each of his men to carry a tool
and some cramp irons.1 The Berezina bridges would
be built using only these hand-tools, during the winter, for an army on the
verge of disintegration.
"This is what happens when one heaps one
mistake upon another!"
Napoleon at Toloczina
Even before reaching the Berezina River, there had been much
debate among the French command as to their next course of action. So when
French Marshal Nicolas Oudinot's men fought their way into Borisov on the 23rd
and were unable to prevent the Russians from burning its 600 yard long bridge,
the situation for the French turned darker than before. Repairing the bridge
was out of the question because Admiral Chichagov's Russian troops overlooked
the west river bank. There were some fords to the south where the army might
cross, but it was the ford at Studianka several miles to the north which seemed
to offer the best chance. Most of the engineers were sent to the Studianka ford
(Probably General Chasseloup and his sappers) 2,
while others were sent to the southern ford at Oukoholda. The later had orders
to make as much noise as possible gathering and assembling what would appear to
be materials for a bridge. It was important that the Russians not know exactly
where the real crossing would occur. Another layer of deception was added when
the French chief of staff General Lorencé gathered some local "guides"
who were allowed to advise that the French cross at Oukoholda. Half of these
men were then released with orders to return with as much information as
possible regarding the approaching Russian columns. Lorencé certainly
hoped that some of these men would inform the Russians of these false latest
developments.
The first French engineers – probably sappers –
arrived at the Studianka ford on November 24th and started assembling bridge
trestles using timbers from the nearby town of Studianka. It was important to
work quietly because a force under Russian General Chaplits was bivouacked on
the opposite bank. At one point they even had a four man outpost staring right
across the stream at the French. At five o'clock in the evening of the 25th,
General Éblé and his pontonniers arrived on schedule with their
wagons. It was then decided that the trestles built so far were too weak, and
that only two bridges could be built instead of the three originally planned.
The trestles already assembled were apparently rebuilt, and at dawn on the 26th
the first ones were placed. This work continued until the first bridge, which
was for infantry, was completed at one o'clock in the afternoon. The second
bridge, which was built for wagons and cannon, was completed at four o'clock
that afternoon, probably by the second work crew described in
Éblé's orders. An account by General Comte de Ségur gives
a rather bleak view of the conditions:
"But, to complete our misfortune, the swollen waters
had blotted out all traces of the ford. This necessitated herculean efforts on
the parts of our poor engineers, who worked up to their mouths, struggling
against the ice carried down by the current. Some of them died of the cold or
were forced under by the great cakes of ice" According to
Caulaincourt though; "the river had subsided through freezing, and so there
was no great depth except for a stretch of twenty or thirty feet, across which
the horses had to swim... On our side, the water only came up to the horses
bellies." This contrast between the two accounts for the same day may be
due to the fact that Caulaincourt was not one of those trying to lay a bridge
out in that twenty or thirty foot stretch of freezing deep water!
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| François Pils Sketch |
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An eyewitness sketch by
Grenadier François Pils. This priceless drawing shows the size and
configuration of the Berezina bridge trestles, the tallest of which had to
remain above water level even after sinking several feet into the mud bottom in
the middle of the river channel.
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As for the bridges themselves, each one was between 100 and
150 meters in length, approximately 5 meters wide, and constructed of
twenty-three supporting trestles. Longitudinal stringers running between the
peaks of the trestles supported planks laid down across the width of each
bridge. In describing the bridge trestles, Baron Fain and Jakob Walter both
used the word sawhorse, which in french is chevalet. François
Pils' eyewitness sketch shown here does indeed depict tall sawhorse-like
trestles. Several eyewitnesses mention a problem with the trestles sinking too
far into the mud, but the pontonniers apparently circumvented this problem by
making the trestles tall enough to be pounded all the way into the mud bottom
without excessive settling. The fact that they did not have time to use pilings
to further support the trestles may also have contributed to the later frequent
collapse of the bridges.
The planks which were laid down across the top
of the bridges were certainly not nailed down, and given the shortage of nails
and cramp irons it is unsure that even the supporting stringers which ran
between the trestles were secured. No wonder the bridges proved treacherous
after several thousand men, horses and wagons had passed over them. The
stronger wagon bridge had a layer of moss and straw to help insulate it from
the stress of the passing wagons, yet despite the efforts to keep this bridge
together, it eventually collapsed.
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| Foot Bridge : Graphic |
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A computer simulation
of the Berezina foot bridge, which gives a good view of its finished
appearance. The roughly five meter long top planks were not nailed down, and
tended to flip if stepped on carelessly. In many points on the bridge, horses
were trapped in this manner, with their legs dangling between the shifted
planks. Eventually the bridge was so choked with bodies that people crossing it
were no longer walking on wood.
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| Foot Bridge : Painting |
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A magnified view of an
anonymous painting thought to be executed by an eyewitness to the Berezina
crossing. It does closely match verbal accounts from known eyewitnesses,
although it shows stabilizing stringers on top of the bridge planks. Eyewitness
accounts are very clear that the planks were not
secured.
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Ultimately the bridges were completed and men began passing
onto the west bank. This operation was made easier by the fact that General
Chaplits, who was certain that the French troops opposing him were up to
something, had been ordered by Chichagov to move south where it was believed
the French would cross. This bolt of luck assured the peaceful assembly of the
bridges on the crucial morning of May 26th. All through the construction phase
of the bridges, General Éblé regularly reported to Napoleon on
their progress, each time courteously doffing his hat in spite of the dreadful
conditions.
The first troops to cross the infantry bridge were the
men of General Legrand's Division, who also wheeled two cannon across with
them. These were followed by the rest of Oudinot's Corps, the Young Guard and
Marshal Ney's Corps, the later of which totalled a paltry six hundred men left
over from their previous week's service as army rearguard. Victor's Corps,
Davout's Corps and the Old Guard remained in positions east of the crossing to
prevent an unopposed attack by the approaching Russians. The 250 cannon still
disposed by the army slowly crossed to the west bank in spite of the repeated
breakdown of the wagon bridge. Sections of this bridge collapsed twice during
the night of the 26th and again at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th.
Each time this happened, Éblé's pontonniers got up from their
fires and waded back into the river to repair it. One of these collapses took
seven hours to repair. Initially there was a semi-circle of Gendarmes posted
around the entrance to each bridge. They were still dressed in their regulation
uniforms, and they blocked passage to any units not still bearing their
weapons. Both bridges became eerily deserted as the sixteen hours of winter
darkness settled in each evening, and during those times they were wide open
for any who cared to cross. On each of those evenings, the men crowding the
eastern bank always moved back toward Studianka to build fires for the night.
Under these dreadful conditions, the army units still bearing arms on the west
bank had become hotly engaged with Chichagov's Russians pushing up from the
south.
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Now began the final phase of the crossing. In the late
morning of the 28th, Davout's Corps and the Old Guard crossed the bridges to
the west bank, an act which galvanized the tens of thousands of stragglers
crowding the approaches. Until then, only active army units and some stragglers
had been allowed to cross the river, leaving the east bank increasingly
populated by the growing balance of stragglers. Now a howling mob descended to
the river bank and tried to push across the bridges. The press of men was so
great that when Napoleon decided to cross back to the west bank at two o'clock
in the afternoon, his escort had to use force to clear a path. The efforts by
available senior officers to restore order were useless. All during the rest of
the day, the terror stricken mob crowded the bridge crossing; wagons, horses,
men, women, children, all trying to push their way onto the bridges. On both
banks, the sound of battle could clearly be heard as Victor's Corps tried to
fight off the Russians to the east and the main army fought more Russians
pushing up the west bank from the south. Ségur's account of things at
this point are poignant:
"At the height of this ghastly scene the artillery
bridge parted in the middle. The column that was crossing the narrow
thoroughfare at the time tried in vain to turn back, but the stream of men in
the rear, unaware of the disaster, heedless of the cries of those in front,
kept pushing on and forced them over the edge; only to be themselves forced
over a second later. Then everybody rushed towards the other bridge. An
enormous number of heavy caissons, supply wagons, and pieces of artillery were
also flowing in towards it from all sides. In spite of their driver's efforts
to guide them, they dashed down the steep rough bank into the mob of human
beings, crushing all who were unable to get out of their way, then colliding
with each other and killing everybody around them as they overturned... In the
unspeakable chaos, men who had been thrown down and were being smothered
attacked with nails and teeth the legs of their comrades who were trampling on
them, only to be pitilessly kicked aside, as if they were
enemies."
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| French Chief of
Pontonniers General Jean-Baptiste Éblé |
Throughout this pandemonium, women were screaming for
their husbands and children, young girls stood on the bank watching their
parents struggling for passage and the strongest simply smashed their way
through at the cost of those around them. It was this press of humanity through
which Jakob Walter pushed. By late afternoon, the condition of the bridge had
apparently worsened as it became clogged with bodies . People continued to be
crushed, trampled and pushed off the outer edges of the bridge as more people
packed in from behind. One eyewitness noted that he moved only a few feet in an
hour. This was made worse by the abandoned wagons which had become stranded in
the muddy exit to the bridge. Yet at nightfall the mob returned to their fires
on the east bank and again left the bridges empty, free for any to cross who
would brave the darkness and cold, which was indeed severe. At nine o'clock
that evening, Victor's surviving troops crossed to the west bank. The
stragglers now had nothing between them and the Russian Army.
At half
past eight o'clock on the morning of November 29th, General Éblé
gave the order to burn the remaining bridge when he saw Russian troops
approaching it. An enormous number of wagons were left on the east bank as well
as several thousand men, women and children who could still be seen wandering
around. Some tried to rush across the flaming bridge only to have it crumble,
dumping them into the freezing water, simultaneously burnt and freezing. A
mother was seen to have built a small raft out of birch bark for her and her
children, but it promptly sank among the ice flows. Finally the Russians
arrived in force and rounded up the survivors. The surviving French troops
– who had finally beat aside General Chichagov's attempt to interfere with
their retreat – made their way across the high road leading to Zembin and
on to Vilna.
The popular account of General Éblé's
pontonniers is that none of them survived the next few days of sub-zero
weather, which killed up to half of the sixty thousand men who had managed to
cross the Berezina. General Éblé traveled as far as
Königsberg, where he died of exhaustion. The two hundred cannon
painstakingly saved at the Berezina were eventually abandoned at the base of a
steep icy hill west of Vilna. The following Spring it was recorded that 32,000
bodies were rounded up and burned on the river banks near Studianka.
° ° °
1 — Cramp iron [noun] : a strip of metal with
ends bent at right angles; used to hold masonry or wood together [syn: cramp]
(Hit your browser's Back button to return to
reading)
2 — Original
orders relating to the Berezina crossing :
From Chief of Staff Berthier to
General Éblé, ordering the move to Borisov. (French and English)
Lettre du major
général Au général Éblé.
Bobr, le 24 Novembre 1812, a quatre heures et demie du matin
Monsieur
le général Éblé, l'empereur ordonne que vous
partiez avant six heures du matin, pour vous rendre en toute diligence au
quartier-général du duc du Reggio, à Borisow, et
travailler a établir plusieurs ponts sur la Bérézina pour
le passage de l'armée. Vous vous diviserez en deux. Si tout votre monde
ne peut pas aller assez promptement, vous prendrez avec vous ce qui peut le
mieux marcher, de manière à ce que vous arriviez dans la nuit, et
que vous soyez au travail demain à la pointe du jour, et que l'autre
partie puisse être au travail demain avant midi. Ayez soin de laisser en
route des ateliers pour réparer les ponts et les plus mauvais passages.
Je donne le même ordre au général Chasseloup; vous vous
entendrez avec lui et avec M. le duc de Reggio, pour les travaux à faire
sur la Bérézina, où il est indispensable que
l'armée puisse passer au plus tard demain.
Letter from the
Major General to General Éblé.
Bobr, 24 November
1812, 0430 hours
General Éblé, the emperor orders that
you will have left before 0600 with all possible speed to the Duke of Reggio's
headquarters at Borisov, and to work to establish several bridges on the
Berezina for the passage of the army. You will divide in two. If all your
command can not go promptly enough, you will take with you those who can better
walk, in such a way you will arrive in the night, start working tomorrow at
dawn, and the other party start working tomorrow before midday. Take care to
assign work for repairing of the bridges and the most severe passages. I am
giving the same order to General Chasseloup; you will come to an understanding
with him and with the Duke of Reggio for the work to be done on the Berezina,
where it is essential that the army can pass tomorrow at the
latest. (Hit your browser's Back button
to return to reading)
- Recommended Reading
- primary sources
- Caulaincourt, Armand-Augustin-Louis de, Duc de Vicence,
1773 - 1827. With Napoleon in Russia. Grosset & Dunlap, 1959
- Fain, Agathon Jean François, Baron, 1778 - 1837.
Manuscrit de mil huit cent douze. Delaunay, 1827.
- Marbot, Marcellis de, Baron, . Memoires Vol 2.
Greenhill books
- Pils, François. Journal de Marche 1804 -
1814. Ollendorff, 1895
- Ségur, Philippe-Paul, Comte de, 1780 - 1873.
Napoleon's Russian Campaign. Time Inc., 1965.
- Walter, Jakob. Diary of a Napoleonic Foot Soldier.
Doubleday, 1991
- secondary sources
- Austin, Paul B. 1812 The Great Retreat. Greenhill
Press, 1996
- Nicolson, Nigel. Napoleon 1812. Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1985
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