While he was steaming along on a southerly course, at 12.30
P.M. a convoy of six steamers came into sight which was protected by two
destroyers and four trawlers. It was going from Lerwick to Norway on an
easterly course.
The destroyer Partridge, which was ahead of the formation on
the port side, steamed towards our half-flotilla and came under fire at 1
o'clock. The destroyer Pellew, which was on the starboard side, had steamed
ahead full speed, and the Partridge joined her.
The British destroyers left the convoy and the four trawlers
to their fate; probably with the idea of drawing our boats away from the
latter, and of fighting them. The fire of the British destroyers was not very
effective. The fight was carried on at a distance of 50 hm. till the Partridge,
after a shot in her main steam-pipes, could not continue. She tried to carry on
the fight with her torpedoes, but one torpedo stuck in the tube which had been
damaged by gunfire; a second torpedo, fired at short range at our boat "V 100,"
hit, for the shock was distinctly felt in the boat, but it did not explode.
While three boats of our half-flotilla took up the fight with the two
destroyers, the fourth boat (which could only travel at 25 knots) was sent to
destroy the convoy. The destroyer Pellew, pursued by the leader of the
half-flotilla, succeeded-thanks to her superior speed-in getting out of sight
in a squall of rain, and escaped to the land. Four officers and forty-eight men
of the Partridge and the trawlers, which were all sunk, were taken on board as
prisoners of war, as Well as 23 civilians. Our casualties were three wounded.
The convoy consisted of one English, two Swedish, two Norwegian and one Danish
merchant steamer. The shipwrecked men of the latter refused to come on board
our boats; of the others some consented to come on board, and then the steamers
were all sunk. The whole affair was over in three-quarters of an hour. Owing to
the high seas, it cost a lot of trouble to get the English on board when they
were floating about in the water, having taken refuge on rafts. The
half-flotilla then started on its return journey round Skagen, as a weather
report announced stormy weather in the North Sea, and so reached Kiel Harbour.
This repeated interference with merchant traffic, which had shown the
insufficiency of the protection afforded by English convoys, had the desired
result, and compelled the employment of stronger forces.
Information obtained by U-boats was to the effect that
American ships were pressed into service for this purpose; they were
recognisable by their masts. This confirmed statements received from other
quarters that the English Fleet was receiving support from the Americans in the
War Zone of the North Sea. Thus there was little further prospect of our light
craft being able to destroy any more convoys. Stronger forces would have to be
employed for this purpose. This led to an expedition of the Fleet in April,
1918.
AN EXPEDITION OF THE HEINECKE TORPEDO-BOAT
FLOTILLA
In February, 1918, Flotilla II was confronted with a new
problem, which it solved brilliantly. The Naval Corps in Flanders had sent a
request to the commanders of the Fleet begging them to destroy the English
light-barrier which had just been instituted between Dover and Calais. In the
last months the enemy had, with much expenditure of material, tried to make
these Straits impassable for our U-boats. According to the reports of the
boats, there were net barriers between Cape Grisnez and Folkestone, and farther
south between Boulogne and Dungeness. The nets were guarded by a large number
of vessels which, by means of searchlights and magnesium lights, formed a very
effective light-barrier all night long. This made it very much more difficult
for our U-boats to get through unmolested, and the Straits were actually almost
impassable. The forces in Flanders alone were not able to deal a sufficiently
effective blow to this Anglo-French barrier to the Channel. For this
undertaking the commanders of the Fleet chose the strong boats of the Heinecke
Flotilla, which was sent direct from the German Bight without first touching
the coast of Flanders, so as to make sure of surprising the enemy.
On the day of the enterprise Flotilla II was to be off Haaks
Lightship at 5.30 and thence proceed in close formation as far as the northern
end of the Channel by the Sandettie Bank; there the two half-flotillas were to
separate; one led by the Flotilla Commander was to attack the barrier west of
Varne Bank, and the other was to attack cast of that point. When the attack was
over they were to enter Zeebrugge Harbour, take in a fresh fuel supply, and
start the return journey to the German Bight the same night.
Owing to bad weather the enterprise, originally planned for
February 7, was postponed to the 13th. In the meanwhile the route the boats
were to have followed had been made impracticable by new English mine-fields,
and they had to go close by the Frisian Islands, thereby running the risk of
being seen early in the evening from Dutch territory and their advance being
reported. Consequently the misty weather on February 13 was not unwelcome.
Flotilla II managed to pass along the mine-swept route at Terschelling with the
help of the land, without having been able to see any landmarks; but when it
arrived off Haaks Lightship it had to give up the attempt because of the fog;
the boats would have had to travel at high speed to reach their goal in time,
and this was impossible in the foggy weather. The flotilla anchored during the
night north of Norderney. The next day, February 14, it started again in very
clear weather. So as not to betray his real goal, the Flotilla Commander set
out from Helder on a westerly course; when out of sight of land he steered
south, and, after darkness had fallen, down the Dutch coast far as the Schouven
Bank. At the Hook of Holland one of the boats had to be sent back to the German
Bight owing to defects in the condenser. In the night of the 15th at 12.30 AM.
the two half-flotillas separated according to plan north-east of the Sandettie
Bank. The group led by Captain Heinecke was to circumvent the first and more
northerly barrier near the English coast, and begin by attacking the southern
barrier presumed to be off Dungeness, and then on his return tall up the
northern barrier from the Varne Bank to Folkestone. The latter, being a
light-barrier, could be seen from far off. On approaching it, it became clear
that it consisted of a large number of craft, anchored or moored to buoys,
which were placed right across the fairway, not in one line, but in echelon in
a broad band. These boats lit up the fairway all the time with searchlights,
and from time to time, about every quarter of an hour, they threw magnesium
light overboard which, floating down the tide for minutes at a time, lit up the
vicinity for a distance of two or three miles, so that it was almost as light
as day. In and out among these a lot of boat moved without lights, armed
trawlers, submarine chasers and motor boats, to attack any U-boat that might
come. At the north-west end of the barrier a searchlight, apparently placed on
land between Dover and Folkestone, threw a steady beam of light in the cross
Channel direction. In these circumstances it was impossible to get round the
barrier, and the Flotilla Commander determined to make a direct attack. He
first made for a large boat placed about the middle of the barrier with a
specially bright revolving searchlight; this he sank from a distance of 300 M.
It was an old cruiser, or a special boat of the " Arabis " type. After this the
group first swept round to the north-west and then went more slowly along the
barrier in a more or less south-easterly direction. In a short time they sank
13 of these guardships, including a U-boat chaser with the number " 1113," a
small torpedo-boat and two motor-boats, one of which had come up in order to
fire a torpedo; these were all sunk at close range by gunfire.
The enemy was taken completely by surprise. Several of the
boats sounded their sirens, clearly under the impression that they were being
attacked in error by their own ships. No warning was given, and a considerable
time elapsed after we had opened fire before all lights were put out. This may
have been due to the fact that the big ship that was sunk first had been in
command of the whole, or else the ships on guard may have been used to hearing
gunfire owing to the frequent fights with U-boats. An attempt to take prisoners
had to be abandoned, because owing to the swift tide it proved too dangerous
for our ships to go alongside the sinking boats that were in part moored to
buoys. The whole affair lasted from about 1.30 A.M. till about 2.30 A.M. Owing
to the lateness of the hour it was out of the question to attack the other
barrier supposed to lie farther south, from which, however, no lights or
searchlights were seen, and so the return journey was begun.
Meanwhile the other half-flotilla had turned towards the
southern end of the barrier, and first made for Cape Grisnez. Again one of the
boats developed a leakage in the condenser, but the commander of the
half-flotilla could not dismiss the boat and had to reduce the speed of the
other boats to that of the defective one. Off Calais the group encountered the
first guardship, lying close to the coast, a large, armed trawler, and, taking
her by surprise, sank her by gunfire. Steering west, they met a number of other
boats which were using searchlights and magnesium lights. In several cases the
supply of magnesium lights on the guardships, caught fire owing to the shots.
In this part of the barrier, too, it was some time before the boats realised
that the enemy was among them, and retired to the west. Altogether this
torpedo-boat half-flotilla sank twelve armed guardships, and two motor-boats.
At 2.40 A.M. the half-flotilla started upon the return
journey. At 3.30 A.M. the stern lights of six English destroyers were sighted
ahead. Owing to his unfavourable position with regard to the enemy and the
reduced speed of the one boat, which left him with only two boats that were
quite intact, the commander of the half-flotilla was forced to avoid a fight.
He turned off and did not reply to the enemy's signal. The latter at first
followed, in the wake of the half-flotilla, but after altering his course a few
times was lost to view. On making for Zeebrugge the torpedo-boat " G 102 "
struck a mine about 12 nautical miles from the harbour entrance; two
compartments filled with water, but the boat was able to reach the harbour
without assistance. Three men were killed through this mishap. These were the
only casualties of the expedition.
After replenishing their supply of oil fuel in Zeebrugge the
flotilla began its return journey in the evening of the same day and reached
home without further incident. The damaged boat was temporarily repaired in
Flanders, and followed a few days later. The flotilla's success was due to the
completeness of the surprise. Besides the direct damage inflicted on the enemy
by the sinking of so many boats that were of value to him, we accomplished our
aim of breaking the barrier across the Calais-Dover Straits through which our
U-boats were again able to pass for the time being. A scouting trip carried cut
the following day by the torpedo-boats of the Naval Corps showed that the guard
had been completely withdrawn.
The demands made on the skill of the officers commanding
these boats were very great, as it was difficult to distinguish things clearly
because of the gunfire, and particularly because of the smoke on the water from
the magnesium lights. The gun-layers did excellent work in shooting down the
fast motor-boats which, owing to their speed, could only be discerned at the
last moment, but were always knocked out by the first shot. It was a great help
to the expedition to be able to break the return journey by running into
Zeebrugge, because otherwise the voyage would have had to be made by daylight,
and in that case the English would probably have made an attempt to cut our
boats off.
ADVANCE OF THE FLEET TO THE NORWEGIAN COAST
When the portion of the Fleet that had been sent cast had
returned from the conquest of the Baltic Islands, some weeks elapsed before the
ships and torpedo-boats had had the damage repaired that they had suffered from
mines and from running aground. The winter months brought no change in the
activities of the Fleet, which were directed towards supporting the U-boat
campaign.
In the spring of 1918, when our army was attacking in the
west, English interest was bound to centre in the Channel. Through agents,
through the aeroplane service in Flanders, and through following the enemy's
wireless messages, we ascertained that he had materially reinforced the
warships protecting his transports, and that large ships had been sent to the
Channel, and parts of the crews of the Grand Fleet had been sent to reinforce
those of the light craft in the Channel. On the other hand, the enemy had
carefully improved the convoy traffic between England and Norway since the
successful raids of the Brummer and the Bremse, and of the boats of
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II. Our U-boats had learnt that the steamers were
assembled there in large convoys, strongly protected by first-class
battleships, cruisers and destroyers. A successful attack on such a convoy
would not only result in the sinking of much tonnage, but would be a great
military success, and would bring welcome relief to the U-boats operating in
the Channel and round England, for it would force the English to send more
warships to the northern waters. The convoys could not be touched by light
craft. But the battle-cruisers could probably, according to information
received, deal with all exigencies likely to arise if they could have the
necessary support from the battleship squadrons.
So far as could be made out convoys mostly travelled at the
beginning and middle of the week. Consequently Wednesday, April 24, was chosen
for the attack. A necessary condition for success was that our intentions
should be kept secret. It was enjoined upon the officers in command of the
subordinate groups to use their wireless as sparingly as possible during the
expedition, which was to extend beyond the Skagerrak up to the Norwegian coast.
On the pretext of manuvres in the Heligoland Bight all warships at our
disposal were assembled on the evening of the 22nd in the Schillig Roads. Here
the officers in command of the various groups were informed of our intentions
and received their orders. The plan was to attack the convoy with the
battle-cruisers, the light cruisers of Scouting Division II, and Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla II under the leadership of the officer commanding the Scouting
Divisions, Admiral von Hipper, while the remainder of the ships took up a
position from which, in case of need, effective support could be given to the
cruisers. All other flotillas were to remain with the main body of the Fleet.
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla V could not be included, as its radius of action was too
small. The commander of this flotilla, Commander von Tyszka, was entrusted with
the conduct and protection of the convoy service through the mine-fields
south-west and west of Horns Reef.
To ensure safety of progress through the mine-fields in
preparation for this enterprise, protective barriers had been placed about 70
sea miles west of Horns Reef, running from north to south. The area between
Horns Reef and this protective barrier was to be the starting-point of the
expedition. The U-boats that had recently put to sea had received orders to
seek opportunities for attack off the Firth of Forth and to report all warships
and convoys that were sighted.
On the 23rd at 6 A.M. the various groups put to sea, Admiral
von Hipper leading with the Scouting Divisions I and II, with the Second Leader
of the torpedo-boats and Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II; following him came the main
body of the Fleet in the following order : Scouting Division IV, Squadron Ill,
the Flagship of the Fleet, the First Leader of torpedo-boats, Squadron I,
Squadron IV, and with the main body Torpedo Flotillas I, VI, VII and IX.
Immediately after they left the jade a heavy fog descended. As far as List the
way was clear; from there it led through enemy mine-fields; to get through
these it was necessary for the Fleet to be accompanied by minesweepers, and
therefore a certain amount of visibility was needful at least two miles. At
first we were able to proceed at 14 knots. But when, at 11.30 A.M., we reached
the entrance to the mine-field and visibility was only 100 metres, we had to
anchor. Half an hour later it cleared up; one could see three to four nautical
miles, and the expedition could proceed. The journey through the mine-fields
passed off without a hitch. When darkness fell the boundary had been reached,
and the mine-sweepers could be dismissed. The poor visibility had so far
favoured the enterprise. The enemy line of submarines on guard round the German
Bight seems to have been broken through, if indeed it was occupied at all.
During the night it cleared up; daybreak brought fine, clear
weather. At 8 A.M. the Moltke reported to the High Sea Commander: "Grave
damage, speed four knots, position about 40 sea miles W.S.W. of Stavanger." All
haste was made to reach the scene of the accident; the Strassburg, the foremost
ship in the line of advance, was detached to the Moltke, and the
battleship Oldenburg made ready to tow. At 10.40 A.M. the Moltke was
sighted; soon after von Hipper appeared from the N.W. with his two Scouting
Divisions. He had detached the Moltke at 6 A.M. to the main body of the Fleet.
At that time she could still do 13 knots. He had not received the message that
she was reduced to four knots. When towards 9 A.M. he received the news that
the Moltke could not move and that the Flagship had not made out the
signal-which, however, was a mistake-he decided to go to her assistance
himself. He sent no report to the main body of the Fleet owing to the orders
that the use of wireless messages should be reduced as much as possible. He had
the more reason for this course because when he turned he was already in the
northern part of the convoy route, and thanks to the clear weather he could see
that for the time being nothing was in sight, and that any approaching convoys
would not escape him if he made a fresh advance later. As the Moltke had
now been taken charge of by the main body the Admiral received orders to
advance again to the north. On this second occasion he searched the convoy
track as far as the 60th degree of latitude but sighted nothing.
At about 11.45 A.M. the Moltke was taken in tow by
the Oldenburg. The manoeuvre was carried out without a hitch in the
shortest possible time. The main body of the Fleet with these two ships then
set out on the return journey; their speed was 10 knots. There were two routes
open to us; the one led through the Kattegat, the other straight into the
German Bight. By choosing the former the Fleet would presumably have avoided a
meeting with the English Fleet which had time to come up and oppose us, as we
could only go at a slow speed in order not to leave the Moltke in the
lurch. But the road through the Kattegat was very roundabout, and in addition
the passage through the Belt would have been very difficult for the damaged
ship, and in order to protect the tow all our ships would have had to return
through the Little Belt. This was undesirable for two reasons, firstly, on
account of the Danes, and secondly because it might provoke the English to lay
mines in the Kattegat. This latter proceeding might be very unpleasant for our
U-boats, and I decided, therefore, to return through the North Sea into the
Bight in spite of the possibility of being attacked by superior forces.
Meanwhile the following condition of affairs had been
discovered on board the Moltke. The inner propeller on the starboard
side had been flung off (the ship had four propeller shafts); the turbine had
raced, and before the machinery for stopping it could act the training wheel
had flown to pieces. Fragments of the wheel had penetrated the discharge pipe
of the auxiliary condenser, several steam exhaust pipes, and the deck leading
to the main switch-room. The central engine-room and the main switch-room were
immediately flooded owing to the damage to the auxiliary condenser, while the
wing engine-room made water rapidly. Salt water penetrated into the boilers,
and the engines gradually ceased to work. Through a curious chain of
circumstances an accident to a propeller, slight enough in itself, had brought
the ship completely to a stand, so that it was powerless to move. Two thousand
tons of water had flowed into the ship before a diver succeeded at length in
closing the valves which controlled the flow of water in and out of the
auxiliary condenser. It was not till then that they got the water under
control. In the afternoon the port engines were able to run at half speed; but
for the time being there was no guarantee that they would continue to run. The
ship would have to be towed right into the Bight, and the highest speed
attainable by the tow was 11 knots. At this rate of progress we could not reach
the belt of mines west of Horns Reef before dawn the next day.
Information received from the Naval Staff at 2 p.m.
concerning the times of arrival and departure of convoys indicated that we had
not been lucky in our choice of a day to attack them. Apparently the convoys
from England to Norway had crossed the North Sea the 23rd.
At 6.30 P.M. we received a wireless message from a U-boat
that eleven enemy cruisers were about 80 miles behind us. But probably the
U-boat had mistaken the cruisers that were following us under Admiral von
Hipper for those of the enemy.
At 8.50 p.m. the towing cable of the Oldenburg broke, which
entailed a delay of an hour. For the night the tow was left at the end of the
line. At 11 p.m. Admiral von Hipper had approached to within 30 nautical miles
of the main Fleet. At dawn all the ships were together. The enemy was nowhere
to be seen. The journey through the belt of mines was accomplished according to
plan. Minesweepers met and convoyed the Fleet back in the same manner as on the
outward journey. One mine-sweeper, " M 67," struck a mine and sank; most of the
crew were saved.
Off List the Moltke was cast loose, and was able to
proceed at a speed of 15 knots. About an hour after she had been cast loose, at
7.50 p.m., she was attacked by a submarine 40 nautical miles north of
Heligoland and was hit amidships on the port side. She could not avoid the
torpedo, but was able to turn towards its course so that it struck at a very
acute angle. The injury did not prevent the ship from entering the Jade under
her own steam.
Unfortunately the expedition did not meet with the success
hoped for. The opportunity of joining issue with our Fleet was not made use of
by the enemy, although by the wireless messages which had to be sent owing to
the accident to the Moltke he must have known of the presence of our
ships. The bringing in of the Moltke under such unfavourable conditions
of sea and weather as arose during the night of the return journey was an
eminent military achievement, especially the part played by the Oldenburg
(Commander, Captain Lohlen) which towed her, and the work done in stopping the
leak by the men on board the Moltke deserves great praise.
This expedition was unfortunately the last which the Fleet
was able to undertake.
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