CRUISER ACTION ON NOV. 17, 1917
To obtain information as to British mines and nets outside
the belt of mines on the line Horns Reef-Terschelling, so-called test-trips
were devised. The object of these test-trips was to ascertain the whereabouts
of these barriers, and having done so to find means of circumventing them.
Having, as a result of these test-trips, gained a clear idea of the situation
of the various barriers (consisting of belts of mines), the next thing was to
determine which of them should be cleared away. Every test-trip group comprised
mineseekers and sweepers with their tackle for finding mines, behind them went
torpedo-boats with U-boat "kites," with which to locate nets; these were
followed by barrier-breakers, and light cruisers with seaplanes for scouting.
Heavy warships protected the test-trip groups on routes that were known to be
free of mines.
Such a test-trip had been decided upon for November 17,
1917. Led by Rear-Admiral von Reuter, the 6th Mine-Sweeper Half-Flotilla, 2nd
and 6th Auxiliary Mine-Sweeper Half-Flotillas, the 12th and 14th Torpedo-boat
Half-Flotillas, Barrier-Breaking Division IV and the cruisers of Scouting
Division II were to search from about the centre of the line Horns
Reef-Terschelling in the direction north by west. Ships of Squadron IV, which
was on outpost duty, were to be sent to cover the group. Squadron Commander
Vice Admiral Souchon chose for this task the Kaiserin and Kaiser, with the
commander of the Kaiserin, Captain Grasshoff, in charge.
Rear-Admiral von Reuter ordered his group to assemble at 7
A.M. at a pre-arranged meeting point. The commander of the Kaiserin reported
that at 7 A.M. he would lie west of Heligoland. Airship scouting was
impossible, and the cruisers had been unable to take the seaplanes on board in
good time because of the thick weather. Of the seaplane stations on land only
Borkum was at first able to send out scouts. Towards 8 A.M. the test-trip was
assembled at the point of departure, excepting the 2nd and 6th Auxiliary
Mine-Sweeping Half-Flotillas.
As the latter could only be a few thousand metres behind,
the leader of Scouting Division II determined to fetch them up with his
flagship Königsberg. He had just left his division when it was attacked
from the N.W. by guns of large and medium calibre. The western horizon was very
misty; the type of attacking ship was very hard to make out at first. In the
east it was clearer; probably therefore our own ships showed up distinctly. The
wind blew with a force 2-3 from the W.N.W.; the sea was slightly rough. The
leader of Scouting Division II on board the Königsberg arrived. Scouting
Division II, under the command of the senior officer, Captain Hildebrand in the
Nurnberg, advanced against the enemy on a N.W. course, so as to protect the
minesweepers. The torpedo-boats struck out N. and N.W. and put a smoke screen
between the enemy and the mine-sweepers. "V45," Lieutenant-Commander Lossman,
making use of her favourable position, attacked the enemy at a distance of
40-60 hm. The minesweepers let go their tackle and steamed away to the east
developing smoke-clouds.
With this the most urgent part of their work achieved, the
cruisers and torpedo-boats under heavy enemy fire-range about 130 hm.-started
on a south-easterly course, developing smoke and steam-clouds which made the
screen between the enemy and the mine-sweepers denser. The enemy, with the
exception of a few torpedo-boats, turned aside from the mine-sweepers in their
way eastward and followed the more valuable cruisers. Owing to the smoke and
steam-clouds developed by the latter, he was obliged to steer towards the
southern wing, that is to the windward, of our cruisers, so as to get a better
chance of observation for his guns. These movements which, according to
irreproachable observations and bearings, were carried out by hostile cruisers
of the "Concord" class with a speed Of 33 knots, increased the distance between
them and the mine-sweepers. Visibility astern was, of course, very much reduced
for our cruisers. The large enemy ships did not go beyond the windward edge of
the smoke screen, as owing to the danger from mines they tried to keep within
the limits of the waters through which we had passed. They were, therefore,
only visible for a few seconds at a time; it was impossible to get absolutely
reliable observations of their composition and strength. No doubt light craft
were in advance on the windward side of the large enemy ships, apparently also
on the lee side.
All took part in the firing. Our cruisers lay in the midst
of well-aimed salvos, of medium and heavy calibre. With great skill they
avoided being hit by steering a zigzag course without damaging the effect of
their own gun-fire. Our batteries replied energetically and with good results.
At 9.24 A.M. explosions resulting from our gun-fire occurred
on two of the hostile battle-cruisers. One of them thereupon sheered off. About
the same time our light cruiser Pillau forced an enemy destroyer that she had
hit to retire from the fight. The leader of Scouting Squadron II hoped by going
at full speed to separate the enemy light craft from the big ships, and so to
get a chance to attack the former, but this hope was not fulfilled; the large
ships were able to keep pace.
The U-boats of the Auxiliary Mine-Sweeping Flotilla had
meanwhile steamed on in the direction E.S.E. At 8.50 A.M. they had a fight with
the northern group of enemy destroyers at a range of 90 hm. After three hits
had been observed on the destroyers, the enemy sheered off. Our U-boats again
came under fire from 9.5 A.M. to 9.30 a.m., apparently from a leading
torpedo-boat; after that they were no longer molested and returned to port.
Several U-boats noticed that an English destroyer came to a standstill and that
another drew alongside of it. This observation was confirmed later on by a
seaplane which reported that it had seen one destroyer being towed by another.
The 6th Mine-Sweeping Half-Flotilla had steamed off to the
east. It also came into conflict with the northern group of enemy destroyers at
a range of 70 to 75 hm.; an advance Of 3 destroyers brought the latter to
within 10 hm. The English destroyers scored no hits; ours claimed one for
certain. At 9.40 A.M. the enemy destroyers retired. Mine-Sweeping Flotilla VI
then returned to port without any further molestation from the enemy. It is not
clear why the enemy destroyers did not make better use of their superior
armament and speed to destroy our weak mine-sweepers completely.
The fight of the cruisers, in loose echelon formation on a
southeasterly course, brought them into the neighbourhood of the trawlers and
the 2nd and 6th Mine-Sweeping Half-Flotilla, which at the beginning of the
conflict had made off to the south-east at full speed.
The cruisers nearest to them, the Nurnberg and the Pillau,
threw smoke bombs to protect them, and the 14th Torpedo-Boat HalfFlotilla also
helped to envelop the mine-sweepers in smoke. The enemy destroyers, which had
already come pretty near, sheered off from the smoke. The mine-sweepers steamed
off in an E.S.E. direction and were not molested by the enemy. It is possible
that the latter suspected poison gas in the smoke.
At 9.50 A.M. destroyers approached Scouting Division II to
make a torpedo attack. Judging by bearings and distances, the attack was doomed
to failure from the first. The enemy scored no hits. At the same time Admiral
von Reuter ordered our torpedo-boats to attack. The boats advanced to the
attack in a running fight, scattered as they were. It was not possible to
collect for a closed attack owing to the speed at which the fight moved on.
Altogether six torpedoes were fired; no hits were recorded with absolute
certainty. At any rate the enemy cruisers turned off sharply for the time
being, and in so doing unavoidably afforded our light cruisers a welcome
alleviation. The Königsberg and the Frankfurt also fired torpedoes; no
result was observed.
At 10.30 A.M. the battleships Kaiserin and Kaiser hove in
sight. Admiral von Reuter tried by holding an easterly course to draw the enemy
after him through the belts of English and German mines, so as to get him
between our battleships and our cruisers. He would then only have been able to
get away to the north and the north-west through the belt of mines. If he chose
this route in preference to a retreat to the west he was pretty certain to
suffer losses by striking mines. The battleships, which owing to the smoke and
steam could not overlook the situation clearly, and did not rightly interpret
the signals made by the Königsberg, steered on a N.W. course towards the
approaching ships in action, unable at first to distinguish friend from foe.
Scouting Division II then determined to try to join up with the battleships.
The latter meanwhile had opened fire on the light cruisers of the "Concord"
class. The Kaiserin quickly got the range, and a hit was observed on the
leading cruiser. Thereupon the hostile ships sheered off. When Admiral von
Reuter went to turn with the Königsberg and pursue the enemy along a
northwest course, he was still under fire, and a shell hit the Königsberg,
causing a serious bunker fire.
With this shot the firing suddenly ceased. The action was
over. The enemy ran away at full speed to the N.W. In the meantime the
Hindenburg and the Moltke, which on receipt of the news that an engagement was
in progress had followed the other two battleships, had reached the scene of
action; probably their appearance induced the enemy to break off the
engagement. Our boats which started in pursuit did not succeed in getting into
touch with the enemy again. An advance with Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VII,
undertaken the same night, met with no result either. Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II,
which had advanced to the Hoofden the night before and was just returning
thence to the Bight, could not be sent in chase owing to lack of fuel.
So far as could be ascertained at such a distance and with
the smoke that was developed, the following ships were engaged on the enemy
side : 4 battle-cruisers (2 "Lion " and 2 "Courageous"), and 6 to 8 light
cruisers of the "Concord," "Caroline" and " Arethusa " classes, as well as 16
to 18 destroyers. According to seaplane observations, confirmed by other
reports, behind these cruisers and outside the Horns Reef-Terschelling line
there were other heavy fighting ships-at least one battleship squadron which,
however, did not dare to enter the belt of mines, while the enemy cruisers kept
in a straight line where our ships had passed and thus obtained some security
from that danger.
The following hits were observed from our ships: five on the
enemy battle-cruisers, six on the light cruisers, and seven on the destroyers.
Our cruisers were hit by two heavy shells, one of which was a 38 cm., and by
three 15 cm. It was remarkable what little damage the 38 cm. shell caused in
the Königsberg. It passed through all three funnels of the ship, went
through the upper deck into a coal bunker-the inner wall of which it burst;
there it exploded and caused a fire. The fragments of this shell were picked up
and its calibre determined. This proved to us that the English had built a new
class of cruiser armed with a 38 cm. gun. The great speed of the ships was
extraordinary. So far as the somewhat doubtful observations of our cruisers
went, they had only two turrets, one fore and the other aft. The fact that a
battle-cruiser felt obliged to sheer off on being hit by one of our light
cruisers seems to indicate that its armour cannot have been very strong;
probably weakened to allow of the high speed that was aimed at.
The losses on our side were : 21 killed, 10 seriously
wounded, and 30 slightly wounded. The only ship that fell a victim to the enemy
was the outpost steamer Kedingen which was stationed as a mark-ship at the
point of departure of the test-trip. The English ,directed the fire of their 38
cm. guns on this little boat, so that the crew had to go overboard. She was
captured undamaged by the English and carried off.
Our light cruisers amply fulfilled their duty of shielding
the mine-sweeping groups and drawing fire upon themselves. Their relative
strength, when compared with the enemy, unfortunately made it impossible for
them to achieve a greater success, especially as the two battleships came to
their support so late. This induced us in subsequent similar undertakings to
make the support groups stronger and to send them forward, as far as the
mine-fields would permit of such a course. The demands thus made upon the
battleships of our outpost section increased considerably. The field of
operation of the mine-sweepers extended 180 sea miles to the north and 140
miles to the west of the jade. Work at such distant points was impossible
without strong fighting support.
As a rule one-half of these support ships were placed
immediately behind the mine-sweepers, and the remainder about 50 sea miles
farther back. On days when air-scouting was possible, only half of the
outpost-ships were required, but when air-scouting was limited all the outpost
forces took part in the operations. In the neighbourhood of the Amrum Bank an
anchorage was made secure from submarine attack and surrounded by nets. Here
the support ships for the operations in the north could anchor, and thus avoid
the long return journey to the jade or the necessity of cruising about at night
and burning unnecessary fuel. But this anchorage was not ready for use until
the summer of 1918.
HOLDING UP CONVOYS
While the Fleet was busy with the conquest of the Baltic
Islands the light cruisers Brummer and Bremse received orders to make a raid on
the traffic route between Lerwick, in the Shetland Islands, and Bergen, the
object being to inflict damage on English trade by surface craft as well as by
U-boats. In the event of their encountering nothing there they were to push on
at their own discretion to the west of the British Isles into the Atlantic, as
far as their fuel supply would allow. These two cruisers had joined the Fleet
in 1916 and had originally been constructed in German shipyards as mine-layers
for the Russian Government; they were distinguished for high speed. Their
engines were adapted for coal or oil fuel. They carried a 15-cm. gun. The
mine-laying apparatus, with the exception of the dropping-gear, had been
removed so as not to hinder the ships on their cruises. While our other light
cruisers could accommodate but 120 mines on deck, when they carried them for a
special expedition, the Brummer and the Bremse were capable of taking thrice
that number. The addition of these two cruisers was a very welcome
reinforcement, and made it possible to form two scouting groups of light
cruisers (II and IV) with modern ships of approximately the same speed, after
the alterations of the other light cruisers had been completed and they had
received a 15-cm. gun instead of their 105-cm. guns, which were too weak.
It was known that neutral merchant vessels assembled in
convoys to travel under the protection of English warships, and therefore they
might be regarded as enemy vessels, since they openly claimed English
protection so as to benefit the enemy and consequently to injure us.
Interruption of this traffic was intended to heighten the effect of the U-boat
campaign. Apart from depriving the enemy of the supplies he awaited, it would
place him under the necessity of affording better protection to the neutral
shipping placed at his service, for which more warships would be required;
these, again, would have to be taken from among those occupied in the war on
U-boats. We might also anticipate that the success of such attacks would have a
terrorising influence.
On putting out to sea the cruisers were delayed for a day,
because the mine-sweepers who accompanied them found mines in their path, but
at dawn on October 17, 1917, they lay in the middle of the fairway
Lerwick-Bergen, and before day broke they encountered a convoy of ten steamers
under the protection of two or three warships. At the head of the formation,
which was in a double row, was the destroyer Strongbow, and when she recognised
our cruisers as enemy ships she advanced smartly to the attack and was sunk
after a few shots had been exchanged.
The steamers had stopped when they realised the position
they were in, and began to lower boats in which the crews might find safety. A
second British destroyer, the Mary Rose, had first made off to the north when
the fight began, but changed her mind and returned, after about 20 minutes, to
the ships under her protection. She also attacked our cruisers and was sunk
after a short fight. The steamers were then sunk as they passed at a short
distance, which enabled the shots to be placed on the water line. As two of the
steamers had been able to get away in time on noticing the attack, the care of
the crews in the boats could be left to them, for our cruisers had to consider
their own safety on the long return journey. A further extension of the cruise
offered no prospect of success after this incident.
It was to be foreseen that this action would occasion a
great outcry among those that had suffered, if only to divert attention from
the humiliating fact that German cruisers had appeared in the Northern waters
supposed to be completely under English control. If in this starvation war,
introduced by the English, the neutrals worked against the German nation and so
openly assisted the enemy as to place themselves under the protection of his
warships, they must take the consequences of their action. To what an extent
they regarded themselves as being on the side of the enemy is shown by the fact
that some of these neutral steamers carried guns on the forecastle which they
did not hesitate to use.
If England wanted to demand the right to enjoy undisturbed
supplies, thanks to the complaisance of the neutrals, or to the pressure
brought to bear on them, no one could expect us to look on with folded hands
until English sea power had completed its work of destroying our nation by
starvation. The counter-measures which this necessitated must recoil upon
England as the originator of this form of warfare.
The effect of such action had to be heightened by a speedy
repetition of a similar attack. The next time Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II was
chosen, which comprised our biggest and fastest torpedo-boats. A half-flotilla
was to attack the convoy traffic near the English coast in the so-called "war
channel," while at the same time the other half-flotilla was to go to the
Bergen-Lerwick route. Flotilla II (Commander Heinecke), accompanied by the
light cruiser Emden (the ship substituted for the one of the same name that
Captain von Miller had commanded), left early in the morning of December 11, at
a speed of 19 knots. The weather was clear, sea smooth. At 4 P.M. the
half-flotillas parted at the north-east end of the Dogger Bank, and the Emden
remained behind.
The 3rd Half-Flotilla went north, the 4th steered for a
point on the English coast 25 sea miles north of Newcastle. At 6 P.M. a
wireless message was received that a convoy with destroyers would leave the
Firth of Forth for the south between 8 and 11 P.M. On account of this message
the leader determined to go up the "war channel " to the north, about as far as
Berwick, so as to meet the enemy on this part of the route between 3 A.M. and 6
A.M. According to other English wireless messages received, there were in the
Firth of Forth 8 British cruisers, in the Tyne some destroyers, and in the
Humber 2 destroyers with various guard-boats. This, however, did not hinder the
leader of the flotilla from pursuing his purpose. Towards 2.30 P.M. on December
12, 1917, before the flotilla had turned into the "war channel," a steamer of
about 3,000 tons was sighted coming at a distance of about 25 nautical miles
from the coast it was sunk by a torpedo. The crew of the steamer took to their
boats. As the flotilla approached closer to the coast the beacon they expected
to see were not visible, so that they could not find their way between the
Farne Islands and the land. To have gone out to sea and so round the islands
would have meant missing the convoy, so the half-flotilla turned southwards in
the direction of the mouth of the Tyne. Although the course ran only 3 to 4
nautical miles from the coast, nothing was to be seen of the land or any towns.
It was very misty near the coast. At 4.45 A.M. a steamer with very great
draught came into sight on the port bow; her size was estimated at 5,000 tons.
This ship was steering on a southerly course down the "war channel," and was
sunk by a torpedo; the crew took to the boats. A quarter of an hour later four
small steamers came in sight; obviously they were the convoy boats which had
already indicated their presence by wireless messages, and were now on the
point of entering Tynemouth. Two of them were destroyed by gunfire, the other
two escaped because our torpedo-boats were looking around for larger steamers
or destroyers that might be in the neighbourhood. As nothing further was found,
the boats started on their return journey at 6 A.M. At 5.15 P.M. they rejoined
the Emden, which had waited at sea for the flotilla.
The half-flotilla under Lieutenant-Commander Hans Holbe had
continued on a northerly course after separating from the others on the
previous day. The farther north they went the worse the weather became. Towards
10 P.M. there was a heavy swell and a strong freshening wind from the south.
The next morning, at 4 o'clock, speed had to be reduced first to 15 and then to
12 knots, because heavy seas came up from the north-west. It was impossible to
fire a gun or a torpedo. The leader of the half-flotilla had to give up his
plan and steered towards Udsire on the Norwegian coast, so as to be able to fix
his position and then to try and catch a convoy announced from Drammen. At 7
A.M. he sighted Udsire. As the barometer fell no lower and the seas seemed to
be decreasing, he once more turned upon a northerly course, which, however, had
to be abandoned again at 11 A.M., because in the sea then running he could only
make a speed of 9 knots. The boats, therefore, once more turned south,
intending to stay out of sight of land by day and to approach the coast by
night, expecting to meet some merchantmen there. In the course of the morning
one boat developed a leakage in the condenser. But the commander of the
half-flotilla decided to keep the boat with him and reduce the speed of all his
boats to 25 knots, preferring this to sending the boat back home alone from
such a great distance.
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