THE latter part of October McClellan's movements determined
						General Lee to withdraw from the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving his cavalry
						in rear, and to return to the Valley of the Rappahannock. Accordingly, my
						division took its place, about the 26th, in the marching columns of
						Longstreet's Corps, which moved in the direction of the latter point. During
						the previous month of quiet and rest, the troops had received a supply of shoes
						and clothing, and had improved in drill and discipline. This splendid corps,
						therefore, exhibited a very different appearance from that which it presented
						in its ragged and bare-footed condition, a short period before in Maryland.
						  
					 We halted in the vicinity of Culpepper Court House, where
						shortly afterwards intelligence was received that McClellan had been superseded
						by the appointment of Burnside. This General promptly made a demonstration on
						the Upper Rappahannock, as he moved towards Fredericksburg. General Lee crossed
						to the south side of the Rapidan, and, by the latter part of November, the
						Federal and Confederate Armies again confronted one another at Fredericksburg,
						where we quietly awaited the development of events.  
					 On the 11th of January, 1863, General Burnside having
						completed all necessary preparation, began to lay pontoons above and below the
						railroad bridge which had been destroyed. That entire day and night he consumed
						in crossing his forces to the southern bank of the river, under cover of, at
						least, one hundred pieces of artillery. During the 12th he formed his line
						below and above Deep Run, whilst upon the range of hills overlooking the
						valley, Lee's forces lay in readiness to receive the attack. General Jackson
						had, meantime, moved up to form line on our right, and that day, if I remember
						correctly, as we were riding together in direction of General Lee's
						headquarters, the conversation turned upon the future and he asked me if I
						expected to live to see the end of the war. I replied that I did not know, but
						was inclined to think I would survive; at the same time, I considered it most
						likely I would be badly shattered before the termination of the struggle. I
						naturally addressed him the same question, and, without hesitation, he answered
						that he did not expect to live through to the close of the contest. Moreover,
						that he could not say that he desired to do so. With this sad turn in the
						conversation, the subject dropped. Often since have I thought upon these words,
						spoken casually by each of us, and which seem to have contained the prophecy of
						his untimely death and of my own fate.   
					 My division was again the center of the Confederate Army, as
						it rested in line of battle opposite Deep Run, full of spirit and impatient for
						action. The following morning, after the fog had disappeared, and at about 10
						o'clock, the heavy lines of the enemy advanced upon our right and against
						Jackson's forces, but were driven back beneath the fire of our guns posted on
						that part of the line. Again, at about 1 p.m., the attack was renewed, and the
						Federals penetrated into a gap left in Jackson's front line. They were,
						however, speedily repulsed by his brigades held in reserve. My troops repelled
						with ease the feeble attack made on their immediate front, whilst Longstreet's
						remaining forces on the left drove the enemy back repeatedly with great
						slaughter near Marye's Hill.   
					 I was directed in this battle, as at Second Manassas, to
						obey the orders either of Generals Lee, Jackson, or Longstreet. About sunset,
						after the musketry fire had nigh ceased, I received instructions through an
						officer of Jackson's staff to join in a movement on my right as soon as A. P.
						Hill's division advanced. The order was accompanied with a message from General
						Jackson that he intended to drive the enemy into the river. I responded that I
						was in readiness to act, but, for some reason unknown to me, these orders were
						countermanded.   
					 About 10 o'clock that night I rode back to my encampment to
						procure a cup of coffee, and, General Lee's quarters being within a few hundred
						yards, I walked up the ridge and presented myself at his tent. He immediately
						asked me what I thought of the attack by the enemy during the day. I expressed
						my opinion that Burnside was whipped; that no good general would ever make an
						assault similar to that upon my right and left, without intending it as his
						main effort, and that the heavy roll of musketry I had heard clearly convinced
						me that the hardest part of the battle had been fought. He then remarked that
						he did not think Burnside had made his principal attempt, but would attack
						again the next day, and that we would drive him back and follow him up to the
						river. After conversing a few moments longer, during which time he was in the
						highest spirits, I returned to my line, where I continued the remainder of the
						night.   
					 The morning of the 14th both Armies still lay face to face,
						no aggressive movement having been initiated by either side, when about noon
						Generals Lee and Jackson rode by my position, and invited me to accompany them
						on a reconnoissance towards our right. We soon reached an eminence, not far
						distant from Hamilton's Crossing on the railroad, and upon which some of our
						batteries were posted. From this point we had a magnificent view of the Federal
						lines on their left, some seven in number, and each, seemingly, a mile in
						length. General Jackson here turned to me, and asked my estimate of the
						strength of the enemy then in sight and in our immediate front. I answered
						fifty thousand, and he remarked that he had estimated their numbers at
						fifty-five thousand.   
					 Strange to say, amid this immense assemblage of Federal
						troops not a standard was to be seen; the colors were all lowered, which
						circumstance induced me to abide by the opinion I had expressed to General Lee
						the night previous. The two Armies stood still during this entire day, and the
						following morning we awoke to find the enemy on the north side of the
						Rappahannock.   
					 In this vicinity my division was quartered for the Winter,
						and my tent remained near that of General Lee. It was my privilege to often
						visit him during his leisure hours, and converse with the freedom of yore upon
						the frontier. In one of our agreeable chats, in company with General Chilton,
						his chief of staff, he complained of his Army for burning fence rails, killing
						pigs, and committing sundry delinquencies of this character. I spoke up warmly
						in defence of my division, declaring that it was not guilty of these
						misdemeanors, and desired him to send Chilton to inspect the fences in the
						neighborhood of my troops. General Lee, who was walking up and down near his
						camp fire, turned toward me and laughingly said, " Ah, General Hood, when you
						Texans come about the chickens have to roost mighty high." His raillery excited
						great merriment, and I felt I was somewhat at a stand; nevertheless, I urged
						that General Chilton be sent at least to inspect the fences.   
					 Time passed pleasantly till the early Spring, when General
						Longstreet marched back to Petersburg, and thence towards Suffolka
						movement I never could satisfactorily account for, and which proved
						unfortunate, since it allowed General Hooker, who had superseded Burnside the
						latter part of April, to cross the Rappahannock and attack General Lee in the
						absence of one-half of his Army. The transcendent genius of "Stonewall," by
						which he executed one of his most brilliant moves to the rear of the
						assailants, once more thwarted the Federal Commander, who was hurled back
						beyond the Rappahannock to seek refuge upon Stafford Heights. But alas! at a
						terrible sacrifice, an irreparable loss to the Confederacy: the immortal
						Jackson.   
					 I had received information of Hooker's anticipated advance,
						and was most anxious to rejoin my old chief, General Lee. Never did I so long
						to be with him as in this instance, and I even proceeded so far as to apply for
						permission to move with my division to his support. The request, however, was
						not granted.   
					 Longstreet, after receiving the order to join General Lee,
						made every effort to accomplish this great end, but his wagons were,
						unfortunately, out in search of forage, and the march was consequently delayed;
						for which reason we failed to reach Chancellorsville in time to participate in
						the battle.   
					 Nothing was achieved against the enemy on the expedition to
						Suffolk, at which point he possessed a safe place of refuge within his strong
						fortifications, protected by an impenetrable abatis. During our sojourn in this
						vicinity, quite a spirited affair occurred between our troops and the Federal
						gunboats, on the Nansemond river, and in which I suffered a grave misfortune in
						the loss of Captain Turner, of the Fifth Texas. As an outpost officer, he was
						gifted with the same pre-eminent qualities which distinguished the gallant
						Upton.   
					 On the march from Suffolk to Chancellorsville, intelligence
						reached us of the Confederate victory and of the death of Jackson. This latter
						event occasioned me deep distress. I was hereupon prompted to write to General
						Lee, giving expression to my sorrow, and, at the same time, to my regret at our
						failure to join him before the great battle he had just fought and won. In
						reply to my brief note, he addressed me as follows:   
					 
   
					 "CAMP FREDS, 21st May, 1863.   
					 "MY DEAR GENERAL:- Upon my return from Richmond, I found
						your letter of the 13th awaiting me. Although separated from me, I have always
						had you in my eye and thoughts. I wished for you much in the last battle, and
						believe had I had the whole Army with me, General Hooker would have been
						demolished. But God ordered otherwise. 'I grieve much over the death of General
						Jacksonfor our sakes, not for his. He is happy and at peace. But his
						spirit lives with us, and I hope it will raise up many Jacksons in our ranks.
						We must all do more than formerly. We must endeavor to follow the unselfish,
						devoted, intrepid course he pursued, and we shall be strengthened rather than
						weakened by his loss. I rely much upon you. You must so inspire and lead your
						brave division, as that it may accomplish the work of a corps. I agree with you
						as to the size of the corps of this Army. They are too large for the country we
						have to operate in for one man to handle. I saw it all last campaign. I have
						endeavored to remedy itthis in a measure at leastbut do not know
						whether I shall succeed. I am much obliged to you always for your opinion. I
						know you give it from pure motives. If I am not always convinced, you must bear
						with me. I agree with you also in believing that our Army would be invincible
						if it could be properly organized and officered. There never were such men in
						an Army before. They will go anywhere and do anything if properly led. But
						there is the difficultyproper commanderswhere can they be obtained
						? But they are improvingconstantly improving. Rome was not built in a
						day, nor can we expect miracles in our favor.   
					 " Wishing you every health and happiness, and committing you
						to the care of a kind Providence,   
					 " I am now and always your friend,   
					 " (Signed) R. E. LEE.   
					 " General J. B. HOOD, " Commanding Division."   
					 
   
					 Again early in May we were in bivouac in the Rapidan, and
						preparations were initiated for another campaign. The artillery and
						transportation were carefully inspected, and whatever was found unserviceable
						was sent to the rear. At this period my division was in splendid condition, its
						four brigades being under the direction of Law, Benning, Anderson and
						Robertson. Past service had created with each command a feeling of perfect
						confidence in its associate whenever brought under fire. The artillery had
						again been increased by the addition of a number of pieces, as will be seen by
						the following report of Colonel Owen:   
					 
   
					  
						 
						   
							  |  
							 "Headquarters Battalion Washington
								Artillery, New Orleans, February 15th, 1879. |  
						    
						   
							 | "Copy of Report of Major Henry's
								Battalion of Artillery, July 19th, 1863, attached to Hood's Division, First
								(Longstreet's) Corps, Army of Northern Virginia: |  
						    
						   
							  
  |  
						    
						   
							 | BATTERY COMMANDERS |  
							 12 Napoleons |  
							 10 Parrots |  
							 3 inch Rifle |  
						    
						   
							  
  |  
						    
						   
							 | Captain Buckman,  |  
							 4 |  
							  |  
							  |  
						    
						   
							 | Captain Garden,  |  
							 3 |  
							 1 |  
							  |  
						    
						   
							 | Captain Reiley,  |  
							 2 |  
							 3 |  
							 1 |  
						    
						   
							 | Captain Latham,  |  
							 2 |  
							 2 |  
							  |  
						    
						   
							  
  |  
						    
						   
							 | "Official copy from original return, 18. |  
							  |  
							  |  
							  |  
						    
						   
							 | "(signed) |  
							  |  
							  |  
							 W.M. OWEN, |  
						    
						   
							  |  
							  |  
							 "Late Adjutant to Chief Artillery First
								Corps. " |  
						    
						  
					 
 
   
					 This battalion completed the organization of as brave and
						heroic a division, numbering, approximately, eight thousand effectives, as was
						ever made ready for active service. So highwrought was the pride and
						self-reliance of the troops that they believed they could carve their way
						through almost any number of the enemy's lines, formed in the open field in
						their front.    |