This circumstance did not prevent the enemy from
sending an officer as the bearer of a flag, of truce, who had the audacity to
offer the chef-de-bataillon, Durand, the commandant of the fort, a sum of
60,000 francs in gold, with a promise that he should be conveyed in safety to
England, where he would not fail to be employed, provided he would consent to
open the gates. Such a proposal implied a thorough ignorance of the high sense
of honour which animated the French army. The bearer of the flag of truce was
dismissed with scorn, and was wholly indebted for his safety to the respect
shewn to his character, and to the rights of nations. Campoverde with all the
forces he had brought with him for this coup de main, returned to Tarragona
without obtaining any result from their movement.
The fort of la Rapita
having been placed in a state of defence, did not disappoint the expectations
entertained of it, and rendered us at this time the essential service of
securing to us the possession of the mouth of the Ebro. Two privateers, one of
which was armed at Tortosa, the other at Barcelona, captured and brought in
some vessels laden with rice and other provisions.
Called upon to fight
at all the points occupied by the 3rd corps, our soldiers were constantly
engaged in isolated encounters, the success of which was determined by the
advantage of position or of numbers, more or less vigilance or activity of the
officers, and occasionally even by the mere effect of chance ; nor did victory
uniformly reward their courage. We will not disguise the fact that the enemy
obtained the advantage over us on several occasions. It is by speaking in an
impartial manner, that we hope to give a correct idea of the war in Spain, so
different from what we had waged for the last twenty years in every other part
of Europe.
The Spanish armies had for some time past, received a fresh
impulse and activity by the recruiting system, or by being supplied with men,
horses, funds, and ammunition; in Arragon, we could not fail to discover on all
hands that the local effect of our successes was fast diminishing.
Notwithstanding the fall of Badajoz, which the marshal duke of Treviso had
taken after a glorious siege of thirty-five days, a far more serious event, the
evacuation of Portugal by the prince of Essling, restored confidence to the
Spaniards, revived their hopes, and excited them to renewed efforts at
resistance, with the aid of the English army. The inhabitants of Arragon, and
of some other provinces which were tired of the war, of its burdens, and its
vicissitudes, took very little part in such measures. The heads of armies,
however, as well as the Guerilla leaders, either received or conveyed the
impulse with the greatest alacrity, and availed themselves of the opportunity
to augment their forces, and extend their operations. Mina, who had been unable
to molest the 3rd corps during the three sieges we had lately undertaken,
re-appeared in Arragon on the 7th of April, and advanced towards the
Cinco-villas. The commandant of the small town of Sos, sent to Sadava for
assistance, as he had only a squadron of gendarmerie to defend himself. 126
foot and 23 mounted gendarmes, were sent to him on the 8th. This small troop
met, within half a league of Sadava, 900 of the enemy's troops. Yielding to the
impulse of courage, they charged the enemy, routed and pursued them for an
hour, until Mina having come up to the support of his advanced guard, and
perceiving that our detachment was inferior in numbers, and unsupported by any
reserve, assumed the offensive. Animated with the confidence with which they
were inspired by their recent success, our brave gendarmes instead of
retreating, resolutely withstood the attack. But they were soon surrounded and
overwhelmed by superior numbers ; they were annihilated after three hours'
fighting, all those who were not killed having been taken prisoners. General
Suchet regretted the loss of those gallant and choice men, but he lauded their
courage, and held it up to the army as an example worthy of imitation. With a
view to avert such disasters, he ordered general Chlopiski to proceed in
pursuit of Mina, with a column of' 200 hussars and 1,000 grenadiers or
skirmishers of the 114th regiment and of the 2nd regiment of the Vistula. This
officer discovered Mina on the 15th of April at Biota, followed him in the
direction of Sofuentes and Castillescar, and still driving that chief before
him as far as Coseda, pressed him so closely that the band of Navarrese
dispersed in disorder, throwing away their arms and ammunition, and withdrew
from our frontiers considerably weakened in numbers, and in the utmost
consternation.
In the beginning of February, a detachment of the
garrison of Fuentes, consisting of fifty men of the 1st and 2nd regiments of
the Vistula, was employed in collecting supplies at the village of Azuera, near
Belchite. Milawski, the officer who commanded the detachment, having neglected
to adopt the usual military precautions, was surprised in bed at one o'clock in
the morning, by a daring Guerilla chieftain, who was hovering in the very
centre of the province of Arragon. The fifty men were all carried off, except
two who succeeded in effecting their escape. Such an occurrence had never
before taken place in the 3rd corps. Our detachments had, sometimes, yielded to
superior numbers; but they never allowed themselves to be taken by surprise, so
indispensable was watchfulness admitted to be on all hands, and so habitual had
it become to us. The order of the day addressed to the army on the 12th of
February, was couched in the following language: The commander-in-chief
signifies to M. Milawski his displeasure at this officer having, omitted to
adopt proper military precautions, and occasioned the loss of forty-eight
gallant men of the 3rd corps, by such culpable neglect! This was the first, and
it also proved the last time that count Suchet was under the necessity of
publicly noticing the fault of a Polish officer, whilst he was daily called
upon to congratulate the generals of that gallant nation, on the courage and
zeal displayed by their officers and soldiers.
On the 11 th of April, a
column had been sent from Ulldecona, where we had a cantonment of cavalry, to
Vinaros and Benicarlo, in order to enforce obedience to some requisitions for
supplies. A body of the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, advanced
through San-Mateo, and attempted to surprise 100 horsemen who had remained at
Ulldecona in perfect security. Lieutenant Delmart, at the head of a few
hussars, made a rapid movement against the enemy's advanced guard, charged, and
completely routed it. The chef d'escadron, Rubichon, with eighty cuirassiers,
followed the hussars, and suddenly found themselves in the presence of 500
Spanish cavalry, who broke up their ground with the intention of coming up to
them. This officer immediately cried out to his troops to charge, without
reckoning the numbers of the enemy. The encounter was alike sudden and
desperate. The Spanish horsemen could not resist the shook ; they were broken
in ; lost in a few moments about fifty of their number, and betook themselves
to flight. The enemy's infantry was pursued for some time across the woods and
mountains. The cuirassiers of the 13th regiment uniformly sustained their
character for boldness and decision; this occasion furnished a fresh proof of
it, which was highly honourable to M. Rubichon, their commander.
On the
4th of April, colonel Dupeyroux, of the 115th of the line, being on his way
from Teruel to Morella, with 1,000 soldiers of his regiment, learned that 1,500
Valencians had advanced as far as the small town of Cantavieja, in the heart of
the mountains. He marched against the enemy without a moment's hesitation;
found them posted in a narrow defile in front of Cantavieja, and resolutely
attacked them, without allowing them time to recover from their surprise: he
had ordered, at the same time, the position to be turned by 150 skirmishers,
who, crossing some steep heights, proceeded to place themselves on the flank
and in the rear of the Valencians. This was the signal for their retreat ; they
dispersed, and were pursued for upwards of six leagues. Colonel Cevallos, their
commander, did not bring back twenty men of the corps to Castellon de la
Plana.
The 3rd corps d'armee, after having pacified Arragon, and
entered upon the work of bringing lower Catalonia under subjection, by the
capture of Lerida and Tortosa, had still to contend against the different armed
bands by which it was surrounded, whilst waiting until the operations for the
siege of Tarragona could be carried into effect. The marshal duke of Tarentum
had returned to Barcelona to which place he was recalled by the general aspect
of affairs in Catalonia. The Catalonian mountaineers attempted to establish
themselves in the town of Balaguer, at the gates of Lerida ; Colonel Henriod
directed captain Lecomte, of the grenadiers of the l4th regiment, with 500 men
of his battalion, twenty dragoons, and a four-pounder, to drive them from that
position, which possessed some importance, on account of its bridge over the
Segre. This officer ordered the occupation, during the night from the 30th to
the 31st of March, of the roads through which the Catalonians would have to
retreat, and made a brisk attack upon the town before day break. After an
obstinate defence, the Catalonians were defeated and found themselves involved
in a fresh encounter during their flight. The dragoons with lieutenant Bignon,
their commander, greatly distinguished themselves..
We collected 600
muskets ; a great number of Spaniards were either killed or taken prisoners,
and scarcely 2 or 300 succeeded in effecting their escape. This event restored
tranquillity, for a short time, to the vicinity of Lerida, and the fertile
plains of Urgel, the resources of which it was of such vital interest for us to
preserve, with a view to provide for the subsistence of the army. |
