The duke of Tarentum was by no means disposed to remain
for any length of time in this troublesome position, and with the brave troops
that he commanded, he could cut his way in any direction that it was required
to direct his operations. The government had instructed him to advance on
Tarragona, in order to assist in the siege of Tortosa; but as he himself was
not in a condition to besiege the first of these two places, he adopted the
resolution of marching to Lerida, in order to communicate with the army of
Arragon, and to concert measures with its commander. On the 25th of August,
accordingly, he set out with his whole force, which was previously assembled.
His advanced-guard took in the first instance the route of the Col de Balaguer,
but afterwards changed the direction of its march for the defile of Ribas and
Monblanch, where the French and the Italian infantry had a most brilliant
affair; the army arrived before Lerida on the 29th of August. General Suchet
was informed of this movement by the aid-de-camp of the marshal, and left Mora
on the 23rd, passed through Mequinenza, and arrived at Lerida before the duke
of Tarentum, in order to receive him at that city. The two generals had no
difficulty in agreeing as to what was advisable, and what was practicable in
the state of affairs. Before considering those more distant operations,
contemplated by the government, it was absolutely necessary to occupy Tarragona
and Tortosa, agreeably to the instructions of the prince of Neufchatel himself.
Prudence, however, demanded that they should begin by the siege of Tortosa, and
that they should mutually aid each other in that operation. General Suchet
found himself quite capable of undertaking it with his own forces, provided he
were supported, and Marshal Macdonald in a condition to protect the operations
of the siege, if he were furnished with provisions, of which he stood much in
want. It was arranged, therefore, that the former should hasten the arrival of
his artillery before the fortress ; and that the latter should occupy Lerida,
in order to collect the produce of the harvest and form magazines. General
Suchet gave up to the marshal the amount of the requisitions for provisions
agreed to by the communes of the plain of Seu d'Urgel, which is looked on as
the granary of Catalonia. He did more ; be placed at his disposal 10,000
quintals of wheat, the stores of the 3rd division, which had been collected
with great labour at Monzon and at Barbastro. By this distribution, which
necessity demanded, he deprived himself of all the stores he might otherwise
have procured from Mequinenza and the left bank, and limited his supplies to
the remainder of Arragon. The environs of Tortosa offered nothing of the kind
for his use ; the division of Laval bad consumed the whole crop of the left
bank, after having got it cut down and thrashed out, and the left bank
presented nothing but arid mountains and marshes. The army was in consequence
compelled to draw its substance from Saragossa, Teruel, and a number of points
in Arragon, at a distance from Tortosa of more than sixty leagues. The
difficulty of getting transports very much enhanced the difficulty of
provisioning the troops, for at Mequinenza there were but a very small number
of barks, which had been collected for the use of the artillery. This service,
which was become one of the highest importance, was attended with numerous
difficulties, arising out of the season of the year and. circumstances which
were well calculated to render the general uneasy.
The waters of the
Ebro are generally low during the summer, and the enormous cargoes that we had
to transport to Tortosa, might, it was foreseen, be detained for a long time on
the voyage, or in the port where they then lay. Moreover, the march and the
stay of the army of Catalonia, in the neighbourhood of Lerida, as they again
left the Spanish army at liberty to manoeuvre between Tarragona, Monblanch, and
Tortosa, made the navigation of the river extremely perilous. Previous to his
quitting marshal Macdonald, who departed early in September, first for
Agramont, and then for Cervera, general Suchet took advantage of a moment of
security and of a rise of the stream, to despatch the first convoy of artillery
from Mequinenza, under the protection of a Neapolitan division of 2,500 men
whom the marshal placed for the time under his orders. This corps was composed
of a set of fine fellows, but they were badly armed, worse clothed, and had
been spoiled, in consequence of incorporating with them most imprudently, a
mixture of vagabonds and of persons who had been condemned, or who had been
punished as criminals. The discipline of the division felt the effect of this,
and the example which was displayed of pillage and of desertion at times, was
most fatal, although the valour of the great mass of the men, and the excellent
conduct of the officers, frequently redeemed all their faults. The marshal
proposed to the general to dove-tail, as it were, this division, which was
commanded by prince Pignatelli, into the main body of his army, and to
endeavour to derive some advantage from them, by giving them a stationary
position, which is more calculated for supervision, and for the maintenance of
order, than marching and countermarching are. The division sometimes, displayed
the good effect of the pains employed in its behalf, but without entirely
losing those vices which were inherent in its constitution. By marching from
Lerida down the banks of the Ebro, by way of Llardican, they ensured the safe
passage of a convoy of twenty-six breaching cannons of large calibre, which
arrived by water at Mora, and were transported thence to Xerta, on the 5th
September and there parked. The Neapolitan division was afterwards established
at Garcia. On the 3rd the commander-in-chief retired to his head quarters at
Mora. General Habert once more took up his old station at Tivisa, and Mas de
Mora continued to be occupied by the reserve. As soon as the army of Catalonia
had retired from Reuss, the Spaniards again established themselves in force at
Falset.
General Laval who had been ill for nearly twenty days, died on
the 16th September ; he was deeply regretted by the army and left behind him a
reputation of courage, and probity, which did honour to his memory. His
division, during his absence had been confided to the brave general Harispe, an
experienced campaigner, who knew well, not only how to lead his men, but, by
the force of his authority and of his example, to make them follow him. The
commander-in-chief was of opinion that he could not commit into more steady
hands the command of Laval's division and the charge of the blockade of
Tortosa; he accordingly requested, and obtained for that officer the rank of
general of division, which he well merited by his services and his wounds.
General Harispe was replaced in the duties of chief of the army-staff, by the
adjutant commandant St. Cyr Nugues, who had filled the office of sub-chief,
from the month of May, 1809. He had been formerly an aid-de-camp, the friend
and companion in arms of the commander-in-chief, who entertained a real
affection for him, and entirely confided in him. Rights so acquired to
confidence and esteem, are perhaps with a general, who has charge of an army,
the chief merit of the person whom he selects to be his second, before whom,
and with whom, be meditates his plans and prepares his operations, and on whom
he reposes for ordering their execution when he has matured them for that
purpose by counsel and meditation.
As the Valencians whose army had not
been .subdued, were continually watching an opportunity for advancing to
disturb the blockade, count Suchet determined to leave a portion of the brigade
of Montmarie, in conjunction with the troops commanded by general Boussard at
Ulldecona, and placed this army of observation under the command of the general
of division, Musnier, whose place at Saragossa he directed to be occupied by
general Paris; general Verges came to Mas de Mora. Colonel Kliski, with whose
activity the commander-in-chief was well acquainted, received the command of
the detached corps that covered the right bank of the Ebro, alternately at
Teruel, Montalvan, Daroca and Calatayud, to defend that portion of Arragon from
the incursions of Villacampa. That indefatigable partizan was watching, on the
frontiers of Castille, for an opportunity of disturbing the operations of the
army of Arragon. He kept up a constant correspondence in Saragossa, which
compelled the commander-in-chief to take measures of precaution, and
occasionally to employ both severity and menaces. He obstructed wherever his
influence extended, the supply of provisions to the French, and especially the
requisitions of cattle necessary for the subsistence of the troops assembled on
the banks of the Ebro. On the 7th of August at Las Cuevas, colonel Plicque, who
was bringing 6,000 sheep with a detachment of the 114th regiment and of the
14th hussars, was surrounded and attacked by nearly four thousand men. He
maintained an obstinate fight, in which he lost three officers and a number of
soldiers, and only got back to Alcaniz by leaving his convoy behind him. The
following evening captain Cantiloube, a brave officer, who commanded a
detachment that was conducting some cattle, was surrounded and taken at
Andorra, on the side of Montalvan. About the same time the Guerillas of
Navarre, under the direction of general Reilly, who had just assumed the
command in that quarter, penetrated into Cinco Villas, where they surprised and
killed the war-commissary, Gondoin, who with a detachment of gendarmes, was
occupied in collecting provisions. These several losses affected us very
sensibly. The army of Arragon, which had been master of a fertile province,
above all things in wheat and wine, had yielded to an auxiliary corps the whole
of its magazines. It could neither send out to seek for provisions, nor bring
them safely in when obtained; it was, in consequence, in imminent hazard of
wanting food altogether, was reduced to drink water for want of boats to bring
wine, and had, in fact, nothing on which it could safely reckon but its rations
of bread, which were procured with great difficulty, and by efforts that were
constantly to be repeated Chief commissary Bondurand, who had, for a long time,
been attached to Suchet's division in the grand army, at length arrived, and
took charge of the administration of the 3rd corps. His probity and
intelligence were known to the commander-in-chief, who bad requested his
services as head commissary, and who had afterwards the highest reason to
congratulate himself on having obtained them. By thus surrounding himself with
men who merited his confidence, and whose only aim was to justify his good
opinion, he obtained advantages which his position, very frequently, did not
entitle him to expect. The privations endured by the army were rare, and Dever
arose out of imprudence or disorder, and when they were inevitable, the
devotedness of the men, rendered them light, from the courage and patience with
which they were borne.
General Suchet had soon an opportunity which he
eagerly seized of repairing the injury inflicted by Villcampa, in carrying off
his sheep. That partizan, in the month of September, advanced towards Montalvan
with his troops, which were greatly augmented by recruits and armed peasants,
and threatened to disturb the tranquillity of a part of Arragon. In the hope of
getting up with, and defeating him, general Habert was detached front the camp
before Mora, with the 5th regiment of light infantry.
By a rapid
movement, he rallied round him the troops which colonel Plicque had at
Alcanhiz, and those of Kliski at Muniessa, and marching straight upon
Villacampa, the latter was compelled to disperse, and to re-cross the frontiers
of Cuenca and Valencia. A general search that took place, in consequence of
this event, gave us back the sheep we had lost, and furnished the army with the
provisions they so much required.
The only thing that especially
pressed on the attention of the commander-in-chief after this success, was, the
transport of the artillery that had been used in the siege of Mequinenza, and
that was now to be employed in that of Tortosa. At the former place every thing
was ready : guns, ammunition, gabions, fascines, and every other requisite. An
attempt was made to float another convoy of artillery, but the water was so low
that it was found impossible, and the commander-in-chief determined to begin
the transport of the guns by land. The new road, though exceedingly well made,
traversed rugged hills and a desert uninhabited country, which presented no
resources for the purpose ; a single convoy by water would have brought down
more in three days than 15 or 1800 horses could in a month. But perseverance
consists in always advancing towards its object speedily if possible, but if
not at least steadily though slowly. Several convoys of guns were brought by
land; some of the Valencians and Catalonians attacked one that was passing
through the defile of Las Armas on the 29th; but captain Claudot of the l7th
regiment, who commanded in that quarter, defended it with as much intelligence
as courage, and nothing was lost..
During the months of September and
October the army of Catalonia continued to occupy the plain of Urgel to
considerable purpose, but notwithstanding a large quantity of grain it afforded
them, they were not yet in a condition to approach the army of Arragon and to
co-operate with it, and our corps in consequence found themselves shut up in
the lower Ebro without the power of effecting any thing. The only chance of the
commander was in a rise of the waters and in the assistance that circumstances
might render him : his expectations were deceived. On the 28th of October
marshal Macdonald wrote to him: " The governor of Barcelona has announced to me
the approaching departure of a convoy from Perpignan between the 2nd and the
4th of November, and he presses me in the name of general d'Hilliers to favour
its advance. Were this convoy taken or dispersed, Barcelona might be lost, and
there can be no doubt that the enemy will try every means of intercepting it.
My presence alone can ensure its safety, and you are well aware that even were
the chances equal, we could not expose ourselves to this hazard which if it
happened to be against us would be without remedy." The preservation of
Barcelona was an object before which all others must of necessity yield. The
passage of a convoy by Figueras, Gerona, and Hostalrich, might have appeared to
be sufficiently assured by the body of troops which the duke of Tarentum bad
left in upper Catalonia, but that corps had recently met with a check at
Abisbal, which rendered it a matter of prudence not to leave it unsupported by
the efforts of O'Donnell's army on so important an occasion. O'Dorinell had by
a bold coup-de main just succeeded in cutting off general Schwartz and the men
he commanded on the sea coast between Palamos and the mouth of the Ter; in the
action he had received a severe wound which incapacitated him from acting, but
not from commanding, and the vigour and activity of his men seemed rather
increased than diminished by the accident. General Suchet who, with a view to
soften the rigours of war, never allowed an opportunity to escape him of
establishing honourable connexions with the generals of the enemy, sent a
messenger to request the exchange of a wounded officer who had been taken
prisoner, young Detchatz, lieu tenant of the 5th light infantry, and at the
same time to make an offer to general O'Donnell of a surgeon. The Spanish
commander did not accept it; but he expressed extreme gratitude on account of
it, and sent back the officer on his parole. |
