Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service Chapter 24h - The Retreat from Mons : Le Cateau
It is undoubtedly a fact that after Le Cateau we were no
more seriously troubled during the ten days' retreat, except by mounted troops
and mobile detachments who kept at a respectful distance.
That the enemy received a very serious blow, and losses far
heavier than ours, and gained a wholesome respect for the efficiency of British
troops are facts beyond dispute, and the failure of their official accounts to
expatiate on the battle is ominously suggestive of their being none too proud
of the results. Then, again, one has only to study Von Kluck's orders and
subsequent movements to appreciate that his Army was delayed and misled for a
sufficient period to gain valuable time for Paris to prepare.
Those orders of Von Kluck on the evening of the 26th
indicate that his army rested that night on the north side of the Le Cateau
position, from which it may be deduced that he was unaware of our retirement
and had been hit sufficiently hard to prevent his making a further attempt to
take the position that evening. Again the hour given in the order for moving on
the 27th was not till 5 a.m., which is also significant. The German account of
the battle concludes with this statement : " The whole B.E.F., six Divisions, a
Cavalry Division and several French Territorial Divisions
opposed the First Army," which statement alone is flattering to the prowess of
the portion of the B.E.F. who stood at Le Cateau. Perhaps Von Kluck's own
testimony is as weighty as any which could be produced. I therefore quote from
a letter dated 22nd June 1924 from Major-General the Hon. Sir F. Bingham, who,
on recently becoming Governor of Jersey, had just resigned the position he had
held for years as British Chief of the Military Mission in Germany :
" I saw Von Kluck again and asked him if you might quote
what he said, and he said: ' Certainly, he may say that I always had the
greatest admiration for the British Expeditionary Force. It was the wonderful
kernel of a great Army. I have already said it in my book. The way the retreat
was carried out was remarkable. I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could
not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won.' "
Then, as further proof of the success of our rear-guard
battle, I quote the following from the Official History :
" In fact, the whole of Smith-Dorrien's troops had done what
was thought to be impossible. With both flanks in the air, they had turned on
an enemy of at least twice their strength, had struck him hard, and had
withdrawn, except on the right front of the 5th Division, practically without
interference, with neither flank enveloped, having suffered losses certainly
severe, but, considering the circumstances, by no means extravagant. The men
looked upon themselves as victors, some indeed doubted whether they had been in
a serious action, yet they had inflicted upon the enemy casualties which are
believed to have been out of all proportion to their own, and they had
completely foiled the plan of the German Commander."
As a final and overwhelming testimony to the value of the
day. General Joffre telegraphed to our C.-in-C. thanking him in the warmest
terms for " the powerful effect that battle had had on the security of the left
flank of the French Army."
There was a short, sharp action on the morning of the 27th.
The 11th Brigade of the 4th Division were just to the south-east of Bellincourt
(seven miles north of St. Quentin) when at 9.30 a.m. the cavalry reported enemy
in the adjacent villages, and German guns opened fire at a thousand yards
range. The Hampshires were ordered to cover the retirement, and Colonel S. C.
F. Jackson of that Regiment led his men against the guns, and unfortunately was
wounded and made a prisoner. His men, however, although they could not recover
their C.O., held on until their Brigade was safe away, and then withdrew. By
that night, the 27th, and early the next morning (August 28th) the whole of the
three Divisions were south of the Somme Canal, thirty-five miles from Le
Cateau, in little over thirty hours. A wonderful performance for troops who
were worn out before they left the battle-field ; their spirit, too, was
splendid, for they were whistling and singing as they came along. The C.-in-C.
came up to see them as they marched again south from Ham on the morning of the
28th, and I was very proud of their carriage. The 15th Brigade of Artillery,
which had lost all its guns except two and many of its men, went by the Chief
as though they were in the Long Valley.
Just before the Chief came up I had met an officer of the
4th Division whom I had known for years. I had a short talk with him, and,
noticing that he was not quite in his usual spirits, asked him if anything was
the matter. He replied it was " the order " he had just received from me. He
then went on to explain that an order had come to his Division a short time
before saying the ammunition on wagons not absolutely required and other
impedimenta were to be unloaded and officers and men carried to the full
capacity of the transport. He went on to say that the order had had a very
damping effect on his troops, for it was clear it would not have been issued
unless we were in a very tight place. I told him I had never heard of the
order, that the situation was excellent, the enemy only in small parties, and
those keeping at a respectful distance, and that I was entirely at a loss to
understand why such an order had been issued. Further, that I would at once
send to Divisional Head-quarters to say the order was to be disregarded. My
counter-order actually reached the 3rd and 5th Divisions in time, but the 4th
Division had already acted on the order, burning officers' kits, etc., to
lighten their wagons.
So when I met the Chief I told him of this order, being
fully convinced someone had issued it by mistake. However, when Sir John told
me it was his order and emphasised the necessity for it by refusing to accept,
what he called, my optimistic view of the situation, there was nothing more to
be said. Later on I ascertained that the order had come from G.H.Q. when I was
away, and, being a C.-in-C's order of an urgent nature, my administrative Staff
had rightly circulated it at once. It was unfortunate, for had I seen it I
should have protested to G.H.Q. before circulating it and I feel sure the Chief
would have cancelled it on learning the true situation, and thus have saved an
increase of suffering to those who by acting on it sacrificed their spare
clothes, boots, etc., at a time when they urgently needed them.
This day we marched to Noyon, about twelve to fourteen
miles, crossing the Oise at that place. I was able to see most of the troops on
the march. They could not understand why we were retiring, for they considered
they had given as good as they got every time they had met the Germans, and
were anxious to go at them again. I took the opportunity of explaining that we
were not falling back because we had been beaten, but to comply with the French
strategical scheme. I was particularly struck by the march discipline of the
Artillery. They made a brave show. How glad we were to get four hours' sleep at
last. The whole army wanted it. I reckoned that my Staff and I had averaged
less than two hours' sleep in the previous six nights.
On the 29th we had a little trouble getting the 3rd and 4th
Divisions south of the Oise. Both had been delayed the previous night helping
de Lisle's Cavalry Brigade to keep the enemy off. It was on this day that
General Pulteney (now Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O.) arrived to form the III
Corps and, two days later, took from me the 4th Division and 19th Brigade which
General Head-quarters had left with me since the 26th. Otherwise, beyond moving
my Corps five miles, ready for the next day's march, we did little. I, however,
was called to General Head-quarters at Compiegne, some twelve miles south of
Noyon, to receive instructions from the C.-in-C. I found with him the Chief of
Staff (Murray), Haig, and Allenby; General Joffre and one or two of his Staff
were also there. This was very interesting, as it was the first time I had seen
the distinguished Chief of the Allies. Joffre gave us good news of the progress
of an attack by the 18th, 5th, and 10th French Corps towards St. Quentin (known
as the battle of Guise) which he had ordered to help us. We heard subsequently
that the French right was successful in driving the Germans back, but that
their left, as the British did not assist, could make no progress.
The main object of the meeting, however, appeared to be a
discussion between our Chief and the French Chief. The latter wanted us to
remain up in the line, but the British Chief was insistent that the B.E.F. must
continue withdrawing as it was not in a fit state to fight until it had
repaired damages, especially in the matter of material. Consequently we resumed
our retreat next day, twelve miles to the Aisne. It was on this day that I
published the following to the troops :
I ORDER OF THE DAY HEADQUARTERS 2ND ARMY CORPS, 29th
August 1914.
As it is possible the troops of the 2nd Army Corps do not
understand the operations of the last few days, commencing on the 21st instant
with the advance to the line of the Mons Canal and ending with a retirement to
our present position on the River Oise about Noyon, the Commander of the Corps
desires to let Troops know that the object was to delay the advance of a far
superior force of the enemy to enable our Allies to conduct operations
elsewhere. This object, owing to the skilful handling of the Commanders of
units and the magnificent fighting spirit shown by all ranks against
overwhelming odds, and in spite of very heavy casualties, was achieved, and the
French Army is now reported to be advancing.
That our difficulties were not greater in the retirement
from the HAUCOURT-CAUDRYBEAUMONT-LE CATEAU position on the 26th instant
is largely due to the support given by French troops, chiefly General Sordet's
Cavalry Corps, operating on the west flank of the British troops, and we may be
thankful to our gallant comrades in arms.
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, whilst regretting the
terribly heavy casualties and the weary forced marches, in which it has been
impossible to distribute the necessary amount of food, begs to thank all ranks
and to express his admiration of the grand fighting and determined spirit shown
by all ranks, and his pride in being allowed to command such a splendid force.
He is sure that, whenever it is thought necessary to assume
the offensive again, the Troops will be as pleased as he will himself.
On the 31st we marched fifteen miles to Crepy-en-Valois
through some very broken country with a burning sun. It was this day that we
again came into touch with I Corps, separated from us since the 25th.
I have really now fulfilled my object, which was to give the
public my own account as Corps Commander of the grand performances of the II
Corps at the Battles of Mons and Le Cateau, and in the early days of the
retreat, and I shall deal in less detail with my account of the remainder of
the time I was in France ; for, except in the large strategic movements such as
the transference of the Army from the Aisne to Flanders, which were in the
C.-in-C.'s hands, from the time we reached the Aisne, and commenced trench
warfare, a Corps Commander's wings became clipped in so far as manoeuvring was
concerned. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of October, when we first
moved into Flanders, there was again a period of open fighting, and there I may
have to be a little more discursive.
In trench warfare, excepting when a big push has to be
carried out, holding the enemy, attacking him and gaining ground are mainly
planned by local Commanders, and are largely in the hands of the troops in the
trenches, and their splendid deeds are as far as possible recorded in the
Official History. However, to take my readers to the Aisne, which includes the
Battle of the Marne, I will reproduce my diary, written at the time from the
1st to 12th September, as I think it will convey a fair idea of our daily
doings.
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