Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service Chapter 24c - The Retreat from Mons : Le Cateau
By way of comparison I would mention that at Le Cateau,
where the position was infinitely superior for a defensive action, the extreme
front was only nine miles, and there I had ten brigades available, whereas in
my front of twelve miles on the 23rd and 24th I only had six brigades.
The fighting was over for the time and our troops, though
weary, and in spite of their heavy losses, were in tremendous heart and full of
confidence in their superiority to the enemy; and in this they were justified,
for, although numerically vastly superior, the Germans had succumbed absolutely
before the steady discipline and accurate rifle-fire of the British soldier. It
was this rifle-fire, and the fog of war so thick on both sides, which were the
outstanding features of the day.
The rapid and accurate rifle-fire to which our men had been
trained was an eye-opener to the enemy, and they believed at the time that they
were opposed by an enormous number of machine-guns. Their losses were very
heavy, for they came on in dense formations, offering the most perfect targets,
and it was not until they had been mown down in thousands that they adopted
more open formations. For some years the British Army had toiled to perfect
itself in this rapid rifle-fire; it had given an immense amount of hard work
and it was satisfactory to find that the toil and trouble had been more than
justified. As to the fog of war, we certainly had no idea that such large
forces were against usthe German account gives three and a half Divisions
against our 3rd Division and two and a half against our 5thwhereas the
Germans had no idea of our whereabouts or our strength. In his orders for the
23rd, so our Official History tells us, all the German Commander, General Von
Kluck, could tell his troops was that he knew of a British Squadron of Cavalry
near Mons, and that a British aeroplane had been shot down. The Germans do not
appear to have known where we had landed, or that we were actually in the line
of battle.
There is no doubt that the II Corps felt very proud of
themselves that night, and justly so; but their losses had been
heavy1,571 killed and wounded, whereas those of the I Corps had only been
40.
The day, too, had given me great confidence not only in the
troops and their leaders but in my own Staff. It had been a great day for
testing the latter, as reports, some of them none too rosy, had been coming in
in a continuous stream, and Forestier-Walker was never for a moment at a loss
as to how to deal with them and as to what instructions to issue to remedy a
difficult situation.
It was during this afternoon too that Allenby's Cavalry
Division was moved along our rear from east to west to take up a position in
the neighbourhood of Thulin, a difficult operation, necessitating keeping
roads, thronged with battle impedimenta, clear, and this was admirably carried
out by the II Corps Staff. The 8th Brigade (Doran's) had heavy work with the
enemy, and it was not until 3 a.m. on the 24th that they were back at
Nouvelles, three miles south of Mons and the same distance east of Frameries.
The II Corps then stood generally on the line from right to
left Nouvelles-Ciply-Frameries-Paturages-Wasmes-Hornu-Boussu, confidently
awaiting renewal of the battle at dawn ; for the C.-in-C. had issued orders
that this was to be done.
Nothing could be more flattering to their grand fighting
spirit than the German accounts, which show that the enemy were completely
stopped all along the line with, to use their own words, bloody losses.
At about II p.m. a message from G.H.Q. summoned my Chief
Staff officer to Army Head-quarters at Le Cateau, about thirty miles away, and
it was past 3 a.m. on the 24th when Forestier-Walker returned to my
head-quarters to say that the C.-in-C. had, in view of fresh information,
decided that instead of standing to fight, the whole B.E.F. was to retire. I
naturally asked him for the plan of retirement, and was told that G.H.Q. were
issuing none, though he had gathered that the idea was for the I Corps to cover
the retirement of the II, but that I was to see Haig and arrange a plan with
him.
There must have been some very good reason why four or five
hours of valuable time had been lost by sending for staff officers instead of
sending the order and plan for retirement directly the Chief had decided on it.
It must be remembered that we had prepared for continuing the fight and our
fighting impedimenta, such as ammunition columns, were close behind the troops
and blocking the roads, and before a retirement could commence, these would
have to be cleared away; also that it would take a long time to get the change
of orders to the troops, and lastly that I had to find out what Haig was going
to do. All this could have been done and the retirement actually begun before
dawn had we known in time. As it was, daylight was already breaking when the
order reached me and some hours must elapse before the retirement could
commence, by which time we should be in deadly grips with the enemy and would
have to carry out one of the most difficult operations in war, namely, breaking
off a fight and retiring with the enemy close on the top of us. Such were the
thoughts which flashed through my mind. However, my staff were quite unruffled
; Forestier-Walker quickly got his retirement orders out, and the invaluable
A.Q.M.G., Rycroft got the roads clear by sending the impedimenta off.
It must have been approaching noon when I found time to seek
out Haig near Bonnet and discuss the retirement in accordance with G.H.Q. "
plan of action," which was roughly that the I Corps should cover the retirement
of the II, but that Haig and I were to meet and settle details. By the time I
met him the I Corps' retirement, ably planned, was in full swing, for Johnny
Gough, B.G.G.S., of I Corps, directly the Chief gave his orders to retire,
wired from Le Cateau to Haig, so that the latter was able to issue his
instructions at 2 a.m. and get his troops started off with such promptness that
the main bodies of his Divisions reached their destinations at Feignies, La
Longueville, and Bavai about 10 a.m., specially detailed rear-guards remaining
in positions to help us. My G.H.Q. at Sars-la-Bruyere not being in telegraphic
communication with Le Cateau, Forestier-Walker had had to bring the order to me
by motor, and daylight was approaching, as I have already said, when he reached
me. This happened almost simultaneously with the opening of the offensive, for
the Germans opened a heavy fire against the right of II Corps before dawn and
by 5.15 a.m. were attacking along the whole line. The orders issued by
Forestier-Walker were clear and to the point. He told the 5th and 3rd Divisions
that the I Corps was retiring first to certain positions in order to cover the
retirement of the 3rd Division; this latter would head for Sars-la-Bruyere and
when it did the 5th Division should aim at the line Blaugies and
Montignies-sur-Roc. At 6 a.m. the 8th Brigade of the 3rd Division commenced
falling back from Nouvelles and were not seriously troubled by the enemy. The
7th Brigade from Ciply and 9th Brigade from Frameries, however, were hard
pressed, and drove off several determined attacks in which the Germans,
according to their own accounts, lost very heavily, before they could retire.
It was 9 a.m. before the 9th Brigade could leave Frameries towards
Sars-la-Bruyere, and later still when the 7th Brigade moved off on Genly. The
fighting was very heavy in the streets of Frameries, and the Lincolns and South
Lanes as rear-guards of the 7th Brigade about Ciply had desperate fighting, the
latter losing nearly 300 men before they could move off. These rear-guards by
their devoted bravery had done their work, for the German dead lay thick on the
ground, giving their Kameraden such a salutary lesson that the retirement of
the 3rd Division was no longer interfered with.
I would call attention here to the fact that General Joffre
had directed that the B.E.F. in its retirement should keep west of the fortress
of Maubeuge, and a glance at the map will show that this necessitated a
crab-like movement, the I Corps crowding in on the 3rd Division and that
Division on the 5th Division, and unless the last could edge off more to the
west the time would come when some troops would be squeezed out. I mention this
as the situation actually arose later on and, having been foreseen, was
provided for.
I will now briefly describe the movements of the 5th
Division. They were holding a line from Paturages through Wasmes, Hornu, and
Boussu with reserves at Dour. They were subjected to heavy artillery fire
before dawn, which continued for four hours, and appears to have made very
little impression. Curiously enough, the event which first enabled the Germans
to break their line was due to an accident, but as it gives a lesson of
military importance I shall recite it. It will be remembered that on the
previous evening Haig had lent me the 5th Infantry Brigade of his Corps to fill
a gap between the 3rd and 5th Divisions, and well they did it. At 9 a.m. on the
24th, however, in accordance with orders from their own Division, that Brigade
began retiring. At the time, although the fire was heavy, not a German was
visible. Almost at once the flank of the 5th Division, exposed by the
withdrawal of the borrowed Brigade, was in trouble, and the Bedfords and
Dorsets had to fight hard to save a break through. I impute blame to no one,
for in a retirement it was a very possible thing to happen; but the incident is
a good illustration of the dangers of a divided command.
A lot of very brisk and complicated fighting took place and
this is best read in the official account, for it is too detailed to find a
place in this Memoir. The troops behaved magnificently, and many gallant deeds
were performed. It was not until 11 a.m., when some of his advanced troops had
already fallen back, that I was able to tell Sir Charles Fergusson that he was
free to carry out a general retirement. This he proceeded to do, but not
without some very severe fighting. One battery and the 2nd Battalion Duke of
Wellington's had a desperate fight, inflicting very heavy losses and driving
back six battalions of the enemy before they could retire themselves. This they
did successfully but with a loss to the Duke's of close on 400. The Cavalry
Division, with the 19th Brigade, which was attached to it, were retiring on the
west flank of the Army, and, moving rather faster than the 5th Division, had
exposed the latter's left flank. Then took place the action at Elouges so
graphically described in the Official History, when Colonel C. R. Ballard (now
Brigadier-General, C.B., C.M.G.), with the Norfolks and Cheshires of the 15th
Brigade and the cavalry and guns, covered themselves with glory and held off an
overwhelming force of Germans which had been sent by Von Kluck to envelop our
left or west flank.
About 2.30 p.m. Colonel Ballard was able to retire, but the
day was not over yet, for serious fighting continued all the afternoon. I
regret to say that the Cheshires, who fought most gallantly, did not receive
the order to retire, and were isolated and surrounded at Audregnies, when they
fought until they were almost all killed and wounded and were forced to
surrenderonly two officers and 200 men out of a thousand of this
Battalion were in bivouac with their Brigade that evening.
My head-quarters had moved back in the course of the morning
from Sars-la-Bruyere to Hon, and whilst at that place Prince Henri d'Orleans
reported himself to me with instructions from the Chief that he was to be
attached to my Staff.
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