Memoirs of General William T. Sherman CHAPTER 11b - SHILOH TO MEMPHIS. APRIL TO JULY, 1862.
My orders at Chewalla were to rescue the wrecked trains
there, to reconnoitre westward and estimate the amount of damage to the
railroad as far as Grand Junction, about fifty miles. We camped our troops on
high, healthy ground to the south of Chewalla, and after I had personally
reconnoitred the country, details of men were made and volunteer
locomotive-engineers obtained to superintend the repairs. I found six
locomotives and about sixty cars, thrown from the track, parts of the machinery
detached and hidden in the surrounding swamp, and all damaged as much by fire
as possible. It seems that these trains were inside of Corinth during the night
of evacuation, loading up with all sorts of commissary stores, etc., and about
daylight were started west; but the cavalry- picket stationed at the Tuscumbia
bridge had, by mistake or panic, burned the bridge before the trains got to
them. The trains, therefore, were caught, and the engineers and guards hastily
scattered the stores into the swamp, and disabled the trains as far as they
could, before our cavalry had discovered their critical situation. The weather
was hot, and the swamp fairly stunk with the putrid flour and fermenting sugar
and molasses ; I was so much exposed there in the hot sun, pushing forward the
work, that I got a touch of malarial fever, which hung on me for a month, and
forced me to ride two days in an ambulance, the only time I ever did such a
thing during the whole war. By the 7th I reported to General Halleck that the
amount of work necessary to reestablish the railroad between Corinth and Grand
Junction was so great, that he concluded not to attempt its repair, but to rely
on the road back to Jackson (Tennessee), and forward to Grand Junction; and I
was ordered to move to Grand Junction, to take up the repairs from there toward
Memphis.
The evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, and the movements
of General McClernand's force toward Memphis, had necessitated the evacuation
of Fort Pillow, which occurred about June 1st; soon followed by the further
withdrawal of the Confederate army from Memphis, by reason of the destruction
of the rebel gunboats in the bold and dashing attack by our gunboats under
command of Admiral Davis, who had succeeded Foote. This occurred June 7th.
Admiral Farragut had also captured New Orleans after the terrible passage of
Forts Jackson and St. Philip on May 24th, and had ascended the river as high as
Vicksburg; so that it seemed as though, before the end of June, we should
surely have full possession of the whole river. But it is now known that the
progress of our Western armies had aroused the rebel government to the exercise
of the most stupendous energy. Every man capable of bearing arms at the South
was declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such. All their armies were
greatly reinforced, and the most despotic power was granted to enforce
discipline and supplies. Beauregard was replaced by Bragg, a man of more
abilityof greater powers of organization, of action, and
disciplinebut naturally exacting and severe, and not possessing the
qualities to attract the love of his officers and men. He had a hard task to
bring into order and discipline that mass of men to whose command he succeeded
at Tupelo, with which he afterward fairly outmanoeuvred General Buell, and
forced him back from Chattanooga to Louisville. It was a fatal mistake,
however, that halted General Halleck at Corinth, and led him to disperse and
scatter the best materials for a fighting army that, up to that date, had been
assembled in the West.
During the latter part of June and first half of July, I had
my own and Hurlbut's divisions about Grand Junction, Lagrange, Moscow, and
Lafayette, building railroad-trestles and bridges, fighting off cavalry
detachments coming from the south, and waging an everlasting quarrel with
planters about their negroes and fencesthey trying, in the midst of
moving armies, to raise a crop of corn. On the 17th of June I sent a detachment
of two brigades, under General M. L. Smith, to Holly Springs. in the belief
that I could better protect the railroad, from some point in front than by
scattering our men along it ; and, on the 23d, I was at Lafayette Station, when
General Grant, with his staff and a very insignificant escort, arrived from
Corinth en route for Memphis, to take command of that place and of the District
of West Tennessee, he came very near falling into the hands of the enemy, who
infested the whole country with small but bold detachments of cavalry. Up to
that time I had received my orders direct from General Halleck at Corinth, but
soon after I fell under the immediate command of General Grant, and so
continued to the end of the war; but, on the 29th, General Halleck notified me
that " a division of troops under General C. S. Hamilton of ' Rosecrans's army
corps,' held passed the Hatchie from Corinth," and was destined for Holly
Springs, ordering me to " cooperate as far as advisable," but " not to neglect
the protection of the road." I ordered General Hurlbut to leave detachments at
Grand Junction and Lagrange, and to march for Holly Springs. I left detachments
at Moscow and Lafayette, and, with about four thousand men, marched for the
same point. Hurlbut and I met at Hudsonville, and thence marched to the
Coldwater, within four miles of Holly Springs. We encountered only small
detachments of rebel cavalry under Colonels Jackson and Pierson, and drove them
into and through Holly Springs ; but they hung about, and I kept an infantry
brigade in Holly Springs to keep them out. I heard nothing from General
Hamilton till the 5th of July) when I received a letter from him dated Rienzi,
saying that he had been within nineteen miles of Holly Springs and had turned
back for Corinth; and on the next day, July 6th, I got a telegraph order from
General Halleck, of July 2d, sent me by courier from Moscow, " not to attempt
to hold Holly Springs, but to fall back and protect the railroad." We
accordingly marched back twenty-five milesHurlbut to Lagrange, and I to
Moscow. The enemy had no infantry nearer than the Tallahatchee bridge, but
their cavalry was saucy and active, superior to ours, and I despaired of ever
protecting a railroad, presenting a broad front of one hundred miles, from
their dashes.
About this time, we were taunted by the Confederate soldiers
and citizens with the assertion that Lee had defeated McClellan at Richmond;
that he would soon be in Washington; and that our turn would come next. The
extreme caution of General Halleck also indicated that something had gone
wrong, and, on the 16th of July, at Moscow, I received a dispatch from him,
announcing that he had been summoned to Washington, which he seemed to regret,
and which at that moment I most deeply deplored, he announced that his command
would devolve on General Grant, who had been summoned around from Memphis to
Corinth by way of Columbus, Kentucky, and that I was to go into Memphis to take
command of the District of West Tennessee, vacated by General Grant. By this
time, also, I was made aware that the great army that had assembled at Corinth
at the end of May had been scattered and dissipated, and that terrible
disasters had befallen our other armies in Virginia and the East.
I soon received orders to move to Memphis, taking Hurlbut's
division along. We reached Memphis on the 21st, and on the 22d I posted my
three brigades mostly in and near Fort Pickering, and Hurlbut's division next
below on the river-bank by reason of the scarcity of water, except in the
Mississippi River itself. The weather was intensely hot. The same order that
took us to Memphis required me to send the division of General Lew Wallace
(then commanded by Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey) to Helena, Arkansas, to
report to General Curtis, which was easily accomplished by steamboat. I made my
own camp in a vacant lot, near Mr. Moon's house, and gave my chief attention to
the construction of Fort Pickering, then in charge of Major Prime, United
States Engineers; to perfecting the drill and discipline of the two divisions
under my command; and to the administration of civil affairs.
At the time when General Halleck was summoned from Corinth
to Washington, to succeed McClellan as commander-in-chief, I surely expected of
him immediate and important results. The Army of the Ohio was at the time
marching toward Chattanooga, and was strung from Eastport by Huntsville to
Bridgeport, under the command of General Buell. In like manner, the Army of the
Tennessee was strung along the same general line, from Memphis to Tuscumbia,
and was commanded by General Grant, with no common commander for both these
forces: so that the great army which General Halleck had so well assembled at
Corinth, was put on the defensive, with a frontage of three hundred miles. Soon
thereafter the rebels displayed peculiar energy and military skill. General
Bragg had reorganized the army of Beauregard at Tupelo, carried it rapidly and
skillfully toward Chattanooga, whence he boldly assumed the offensive, moving
straight for Nashville and Louisville, and compelling General Buell to fall
back to the Ohio River at Louisville.
The army of Van Dorn and Price had been brought from the
trans-Mississippi Department to the east of the river, and was collected at and
about Holly Springs, where, reenforced by Armstrong's and Forrest's cavalry, it
amounted to about forty thousand brave and hardy soldiers. These were General
Grant's immediate antagonists, and so many and large detachments had been drawn
from him, that for a time he was put on the defensive. In person he had his
headquarters at Corinth, with the three divisions of Hamilton, Davies, and
McKean, under the immediate orders of General Rosecrans. General Ord had
succeeded to the division of McClernand (who had also gone to Washington), and
held Bolivar and Grand Junction. I had in Memphis my own and Hurlbut's
divisions, and other smaller detachments were strung along the Memphis &
Charleston road. But the enemy's detachments could strike this road at so many
points, that no use could he made of it, and General Grant had to employ the
railroads, from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth and Grand Junction, by way of
Jackson, Tennessee, a point common to both roads, and held in some force.
In the early part of September the enemy in our front
manifested great activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13th
General Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized the town of
Iuka, which was promptly abandoned by a small garrison under Colonel Murphy.
Price's force was about eight thousand men, and the general impression was that
he was en route for Eastport, with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in
the direction of Nashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career for
Kentucky. General Grant determined to attack him in force, prepared to regain
Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it. He had drawn Ord to Corinth, and moved
him, by Burnsville, on Iuka, by the main road, twenty-six miles. General Grant
accompanied this column as far as Burnsville. At the same time he had
dispatched Rosecrans by roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to
approach Iuka by the two main roads, coming into Iuka from the south, viz., the
Jacinto and Fulton roads.
On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four
miles out of Iuka. His orders contemplated that he should not make a serious
attack, until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south; but, as usual,
Rosecrans had encountered difficulties in the confusion of roads, his head of
column did not reach the vicinity of Iuka till 4 P.M. of the 19th, and then his
troops were long drawn out on the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton road
clear for Price's use. Price perceived his advantage, and attacked with
vehemence the head of Rosecrans's column, Hamilton's division, beating it back,
capturing a battery, and killing and disabling seven hundred and thirty-six
men, so that when night closed in Rosecrans was driven to the defensive, and
Price, perceiving his danger, deliberately withdrew by the Fulton road, and the
next morning was gone. Although General Ord must have been within four or six
miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound; and he or General Grant did not
know of it till advised the next morning by a courier who had made a wide
circuit to reach them. General Grant was much offended with General Rosecrans
because of this affair, but in my experience these concerted movements
generally fail, unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country
on whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in Northern
Mississippi. If Price was aiming for Tennessee, he failed, and was therefore
beaten. He made a wide circuit by the south, and again joined Van Dorn.
On the 6th of September, at Memphis, I received, an order
from General Grant dated the 2d, to send. Hurlbut's division to Brownsville, in
the direction of Bolivar, thence to report by letter to him at Jackson. The
division started the same day, and, as our men and officers had been together
side by side from the first landing at Shiloh, we felt the parting like the
breaking up of a family. But General Grant was forced to use every man, for he
knew well that Van Dorn could attack him at pleasure, at any point of his long
line. To bo the better prepared, on the 23'd of September he took post himself
at Jackson, Tennessee, with a small reserve force, and gave Rosecrans command
of Corinth, with his three divisions and some detachments, aggregating about
twenty thousand, men. He posted General Ord with his own and Hurlbut's
divisions at Bolivar, with outposts toward Grand Junction and Lagrange. These
amounted to nine or ten thousand men, and I held Memphis with my own division,
amounting to about six thousand men. The whole of General Grant's men at that
time may have aggregated fifty thousand, but he had to defend, a frontage of a
hundred and fifty miles, guard some two hundred miles of railway, and as much
river. Van Dorn had forty thousand men, united, at perfect liberty to move in
any direction, and to choose his own point of attack, under cover of woods,
and. a superior body of cavalry, familiar with every foot of the ground.
Therefore General Grant had good. reason for telegraphing to General Halleck,
on the 1st of October, that his position was precarious, " but I hope to get
out of it all right." In Memphis my business was to hold fast that important
flank, and. by that date Fort Pickering had been made very strong, and capable
of perfect defense by a single brigade. I therefore endeavored, by excursions
to threaten Van Dorn's detachments to the southeast and east. I repeatedly sent
out strong detachments toward Holly Springs) which was his main depot of
supply; and General Grierson, with his Sixth Illinois, the only cavalry I had,
made some bold and successful dashes at the Coldwater, compelling Van Dorn to
cover it by Armstrong's whole division of cavalry. Still, by the 1st of
October, General Grant was satisfied that the enemy was meditating an attack in
force on Bolivar or Corinth; and on the 2d Van Dorn made his appearance near
Corinth, with his entire army. On the 3d he moved down on that place from the
north and northwest. General Rosecrans went out some four miles to meet him,
but was worsted and compelled to fall back within the line of his forts. These
had been begun under General Halleck, but were much strengthened by General
Grant, and consisted of several detached redoubts, bearing on each other, and
inclosing the town and the depots of stores at the intersection of the two
railroads. Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and on
the morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence. Our men, covered by good
parapets, fought gallantly, and defended their posts well, inflicting terrible
losses on the enemy, so that by noon the rebels were repulsed at all points,
and drew off, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. Their losses, were
variously estimated, but the whole truth will probably never be known, for in
that army reports and returns were not the fashion. General Rosecrans admitted
his own loss to be three hundred and fifteen killed, eighteen hundred and
twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two missing or prisoners, and
claimed on the part of the rebels fourteen hundred and twenty-three dead, two
thousand and twenty-five prisoners and wounded. Of course, most of the wounded
must have gone off or been carried off, so that, beyond doubt, the rebel army
lost at Corinth fully six thousand men.
Meantime, General Grant, at Jackson, had dispatched
Brigadier-General McPherson, with a brigade, directly for Corinth, which
reached General Rosecrans after the battle; and, in anticipation of his
victory, had ordered him to pursue instantly, notifying him that he had ordered
Ord's and Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across to Pocahontas, so as to strike the
rebels in flank. On the morning of the 5th, General Ord readied the Hatchie
River, at Davis's bridge, with four thousand men; crossed over and encountered
the retreating army, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners,
dispersing the rebel advance, and forcing the main column to make a wide
circuit by the south in order to cross the Hatchie River. Had General Rosecrans
pursued promptly, and been on the heels of this mass of confused and routed
men, Van Dorn's army would surely have been utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dorn
regained Holly Springs somewhat demoralized.
General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next
morning, the 5th, and it was then too late. General Grant was again displeased
with him, and never became fully reconciled. General Rosecrans was soon after
relieved, and transferred to the Army of the Cumberland, in Tennessee, of which
he afterward obtained the command, in place of General Buell, who was removed.
The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was,
indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed
the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. From the timid defensive we were
at once enabled to assume the bold offensive. In Memphis I could see its
effects upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had
sustained a death-blow. But the rebel government was then at its maximum
strength; Van Dorn was reenforced, and very soon lieutenant-General J. C.
Pemberton arrived and assumed the command, adopting for his line the
Tallahatchie River, with an advance-guard along the Coldwater, and smaller
detachments forward at Grand Junction and Hernando. General Grant, in like
manner, was reenforced by new regiments.
Out of those which were assigned to Memphis I organized two
new brigades, and placed them under officers who had gained skill and
experience during the previous campaign. |