The U-boat flotilla in Flanders was first established on
March 15, 1915. As many as 37 U-boats had belonged to it at one and the same
time. The great results attained by this flotilla were achieved at the expense
of heavy losses; no other flotilla suffered such losses, and against it the
enemy's most vigorous defence was directed.
In addition to this, two flotillas of large torpedo-boats
and many mine-sweepers had been active off Flanders. They had made their mark
in numerous night raids on the coast of the English Channel, and the
bombardment of fortified places like Margate, Dover and Dunkirk; they had also
been continually occupied in clearing away the barriers laid by the English to
prevent our U-boats from coming out. Among the torpedo-boats the losses due to
mines and bombs dropped by flying men were appreciably higher than those in the
other theatres of war.
The evacuation of the shipyard at Bruges and the
establishments at Zeebrugge had been carried out according to plan and without
interference. The ships had returned through the North Sea to Wilhelmshaven;
eleven large and thirteen small torpedoboats; all U-boats excepting four had
already been dispatched to the North Sea and had arrived there without
incident. Four other torpedoboats, which required some repairs before being
ready for sea, were to follow within the next few days. Four U-boats and two
large torpedo-boats had to be destroyed as they were not in a condition to be
transported. In the shipyard at Ghent there were three large torpedo-boats
whose condition made it impossible to take them into the North Sea. These were
to be taken to Antwerp and either blown up or interned in Holland. The fast
torpedo motor-boats which had distinguished themselves as lately as August by a
successful raid on Dunkirk, had gone to Antwerp and were sent on from there by
rail to Kiel. The sea-planes of the Naval Corps had made their way by air back
to the North Sea. The aeroplanes and the rest of the Naval material that was
capable of employment in the field went over to Army Command IV. Of the heavy
guns on the sea-front only ten 29 cm. guns running on rails could be
transported; all the others had to be blown up when the batteries were
evacuated.
Just as the retirement on our West Front resulted in the
abandonment of the base in Flanders, so events in the Balkans led to a
withdrawal of our forces there as soon as the Turks concluded a separate peace,
and we could no longer dispose of the U-boat bases in the Adriatic.
The battle-cruiser Goeben was the last reserve in the
defence of the Dardanelles. Turkey had our promise that the ship should be
handed over to her after the war. Therefore there could be no question of
withdrawing the ship until there was danger of her falling into British hands.
The Imperial Chancellor had admitted that this must be avoided for the sake of
our military reputation. Consequently the officer in command in the
Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral von Rebeur-Paschwitz, had received orders to send
the Goeben to Sebastopol if her further stay in Constantinople would be of no
use.
Some of our naval mechanics stationed at Sebastopol had
tried to make seaworthy the warships which the Russians had handed over to us
in accordance with the terms of the treaty, but they met with great
difficulties owing to the neglected condition of the ships. Among these were
the battleship Volya and several torpedo-boats and mine-sweepers which we
wanted put in order to assist in the transport of large numbers of troops that
were to be taken across the Black Sea from the Caucasus and Southern Russia to
Roumanian ports. But the development of events in Turkey was such that the idea
of keeping the Goeben was abandoned. In order to secure better armistice
conditions for the transport of our troops fighting in Syria, our Government
decided to hand the Goeben over to Turkey. The English had made this one of the
main conditions, so as to be able to get possession of the ship.
In the Mediterranean our U-boats were busy until well on
into October; at the same time all preparations were made to evacuate Pola and
Cattaro, in good time. The officer in command there, Captain Pullen, was left
to decide as to this on his own responsibility. On October 28 the boats that
were ready for sea began their journey home to Germany.
Altogether there were 26 of them there, of which 10 had to
be blown up because they could not be made ready in time.
The further continuation of the U-boat campaign, if it
should appear desirable, was thus dependent on the home bases-in the North Sea
and the Baltic-and from these points it could have been directed against the
shipping off the French coast and round the British Isles. In this case the
whole strength of the U-boats could have been concentrated on this one main
object.
The new Government formed at the beginning of October, under
Prince Max of Baden as Imperial Chancellor, had approached President Wilson
with a request for the conclusion of peace; at the same time they had
undertaken to secure the cessation of hostilities as quickly as possible, and
to obtain acceptable conditions of peace. But the manner in which they
addressed themselves to this task, and their attitude during the negotiations,
did not lead to the desired goal. The ever-increasing desire of our enemies to
reduce our power of resistance till we were helpless was manifest in these
negotiations. If the Government had determined to put a stop to the unduly
exorbitant demands in good time, they might have secured important turning
points in our fate, as the Imperial Chancellor had promised in his opening
speech on October 5. On that occasion he concluded as follows:
"I know that the result of the peace proposals will find
Germany determined and united, ready to accept not only an honest peace which
repudiates any violation of the rights of others, but also for a struggle to
the death which would be forced on our people through no fault of their own, if
the answer which the Powers at war with us make to our offer should be dictated
by the desire to annihilate us."
The decisions which the Government reached, and the
information and advice supplied by the proper military quarters, may be
summarised as follows:
To our first request for mediation with a view to peace,
sent on October 5; on October 8 we received the answer :
"No armistice negotiations so long as the German armies
remain upon enemy soil."
On October 12 the reply from our Government:
"We are prepared to accept the enemy's suggestions for
evacuation, in order to bring about an armistice."
Wilson's next Note of October 14 contained the demand:
"Cessation of U-boat hostilities against passenger ships and
change of the form of Government in Germany."
The German Government's reply of October 21
"U-boats have received orders which exclude the torpedoing
of passenger ships, and with regard to the form of Government: The
responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor to the representatives of the people
is being legally developed and made secure."
Thereupon the answer from Wilson on October 23:
"Only such an armistice can justifiably be taken into
consideration as will place the United States and the Powers allied to them in
a position which will make it possible for them to enforce the fulfilment of
dispositions that shall be made, and make it impossible for Germany to renew
hostilities. Further, the demand that the Monarchy shall be abolished is
plainly expressed, otherwise peace negotiations cannot be contemplated, but
complete surrender will be demanded."
The attitude of the Supreme Army Command was responsible
for the acceptance of the first demand for the evacuation of occupied
territory, and it had signified its agreement with the text of our reply in our
Note of October 12. No decisive influence could be exerted by the fears of the
Navy regarding the danger which would threaten our industrial relations and
also our U-boat base in Emden with the withdrawal from tile Western Front; for
the Army was unable to give any guarantee that it would be able to hold the
Western Front in its then advanced position. That was the immediate reason why
an armistice was needed. In order to satisfy this need, the Navy had agreed to
stop the U-boat war during the Armistice, although the enemy would derive the
most advantage from that, if at the same time the English blockade were not
raised or considerably loosened.
But Wilson's new claim on October 14 went much further, for
the demand that passenger boats should be spared must result in practice in the
cessation of the U-boat campaign. Wilson, however, did not offer in return to
cease hostilities, but had declared that he would not enter upon negotiations
if this preliminary condition were not fulfilled by us. In so doing we should
lay aside our chief weapon, while the enemy could continue hostilities and drag
out the negotiations as long as he pleased.
It was to be expected that the Government would agree to
sparing the passenger steamers, for this concession seemed insignificant. But
its consequences might be very serious, for, according to former experience, if
the U-boats were again reduced to cruiser warfare, their effectiveness was
lost, and so far as one could see, it would be impossible, if hostilities
continued, for us to resume the unrestricted U-boat campaign. The following,
therefore, was the attitude adopted by the Navy to the new Note: "Sacrifice the
U-boat campaign if - in return - our Army obtains an armistice; otherwise, we
strongly disadvise compliance."
On October 16 I had occasion to visit the new Imperial
Chancellor and to communicate my views to him, which he seemed to understand
and share. He invited me to the conference of the War Cabinet which was to take
place the next morning in the Imperial Chancellor's palace, when General
Ludendorff would report on the military situation upon which the Government had
decided to make their attitude to Wilson's Note depend.
The statements made on this occasion as to our powers of
resistance were calculated to weaken the unfavourable impression of those made
on September 29. The answer to be sent was discussed on broad lines. We were
unanimous on the point that the accusations of inhumanity, etc., must be
repudiated. The devastation of districts that were to be evacuated was a
consequence of the war, so was the killing of non-combatants who went on ships
into the blockaded areas. It should be suggested to the President that he
should put an end to the horrors of war on land and sea by effecting an
immediate armistice, and that he should clearly state his conditions. Germany
was not prepared to accept conditions which would dishonour her. The fact was
also emphasised that the tone of our answer would have a great influence upon
the moral of the people and the Army.
It would now become manifest whether the President intended
to negotiate honestly on the basis of his Fourteen Points, or whether he wanted
to make our military situation worse than was permissible by prolonging the
negotiations unduly and by constantly increasing his demands. In the latter
case, the German people must be ready to take up the fight for national defence
and continue it to the death. Such was the lofty mood of the members of the
Government and their military advisers at the end of the session.
The next day I had occasion to report to His Majesty at
Potsdam; he had already been informed by General Ludendorff of the outcome of
the conference. Confident that the Government would not alter the decision
arrived at on October 17, General Ludendorff had returned to General
Headquarters. I considered it necessary to obtain the Emperor's approval for
the further actions of the Fleet in case, for any reason, we should after all
be forced to abandon the U-boat campaign, either temporarily or permanently. In
these circumstances the obligations imposed on the Fleet by the necessity for
protecting the U-boats would disappear. If hostilities at the Front continued,
it would be neither possible nor permissible for the Fleet to look on idly; it
would have to try and relieve the Army to the best of its abilities. His
Majesty agreed that in this case the Fleet would have freedom of action.
At the conclusion of my interview, a remark made by the
representative of the Foreign Office, Counsellor of the Legation von Grunau,
had struck me as odd. He had asked my Chief of Staff, Commodore von Levetzow,
who accompanied me, whether there could not be a statement in the Note to the
effect that the U-boat campaign would in future be conducted on the lines of
cruiser warfare. According to that, the Foreign Office had not adopted the view
that the cessation of the U-boat campaign was to be offered in exchange for the
Armistice. I therefore determined to stay in Berlin so as to make sure that the
text of the reply Note was in accordance with the decisions made on October 17.
On October 19 the War Cabinet deliberated upon this Note
prepared by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Solf. Contrary to
what had been agreed upon on October 17 it contained the sentence :
"The U-boat campaign will now be carried on upon the
principles of cruiser warfare, and the safety of the lives of noncombatants
will be assured."
The Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, opposed this draft most
vigorously, as it was equivalent to an admission that our actions hitherto were
contrary to law. "The U-boat campaign," he said, "must not be abandoned; the
Navy must not stop fighting before the Army. Moreover, the whole tone of the
Note misrepresented the feeling in the country." The Secretaries of State,
Groeber and Erzberger, spoke to the same effect.
I made a counter-proposal based on the principle that the
U-boat campaign must only be sacrificed in return for the Armistice. It ran as
follows:
"The German Government has declared its readiness to
evacuate the occupied territories. It further declares its willingness to stop
the U-boat campaign. In so doing it assumes that the details of these
proceedings and the conditions of the Armistice must be judged and discussed by
military experts."
The majority of the representatives of the Government were
in favour of the point of view defended by von Payer and myself, and Dr. Solf
received instructions to draft a new Note to this effect to be laid before the
Cabinet at its afternoon session.
Before this took place, the Ambassadors, Count Wolff
Metternich, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, and Dr. Rozen, were invited to
express their views; the representatives of the Navy were not present. Their
statements very soon brought about a complete change in the views of the
Cabinet. They now urged that the U-boat campaign should be sacrificed without
any return being demanded. The new draft Note unconditionally consented to
spare passenger ships.
I again emphatically expressed my grave fears with regard to
this dangerous concession, pointing out that by omitting to fix any time-limit
they made it possible for Wilson to prolong the negotiations, while the U-boat
campaign must, as a fact, cease, and the pressure upon the Army would continue.
By conceding this we should admit that we had hitherto acted wrongfully, and
would set free hundreds of thousands of people in England who had so far been
bound by the U-boat campaign. But I did not succeed in getting my view
accepted; even the telegram sent to the Imperial Chancellor by the Supreme Army
Command that they could not in any circumstances dispense with the U-boat
campaign as a means of obtaining an armistice could not alter the decision of
the Cabinet. They were all firmly convinced that they could not justify
themselves before the German people if negotiations with Wilson were broken
off, and that this would, be inevitable if we did not unconditionally concede
what was demanded of us.
The form of the Note determined at an evening session
contained the sentence:
" In order to avoid anything that might make the attainment
of peace more difficult, at the instigation of the German Government all U-boat
commanders have been strictly forbidden to torpedo passenger ships."
I declared to the War Cabinet that if we were loyally to
carry out this concession, all U-boats sent out to make war upon commerce must
immediately be recalled.
I required the consent of the Emperor to issue this order.
As His Majesty was convinced of the serious military consequences, he used his
personal influence to try and induce the Imperial Chancellor to alter the
decision of the Cabinet. But the Emperor did not succeed in making the
Chancellor change his opinions, so that His Majesty then informed me through
the Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Marine that the Imperial Chancellor had
represented the situation as such that the U-boat campaign must be abandoned.
An attempt on my part to make the Imperial Chancellor at
least put a time limit for the concession in the Note in the same manner became
fruitless. He declared that we were not in a position to make conditions, and
the Navy must bow to the inevitable and at all costs avoid provocative
incidents. I assured the Chancellor that we should do our best and that all
U-boats should be recalled from the campaign against commerce. This decision as
to the limitation of the U-boat campaign was very important because the further
operative measures of the Navy Command depended upon it; the High Sea Fleet
must again now obtain complete freedom of action.
So long as hostilities continued at the front, and there was
for the present no indication of their ceasing, the Navy must not remain
entirely inactive, while the attacks of the enemy on our Western Front grew
ever fiercer, unhindered by any fear of U-boats. A success at sea must have a
favourable influence upon the terms of peace, and would help to encourage the
people; for the demands of the enemy would depend on the powers of resistance
that we were. prepared to oppose to them, and upon the consideration whether
their own power was sufficiently great to enforce their demands. Anything that
would impair their power must be to our advantage.
The U-boats liberated from the commercial war materially
increased the Fleet's power of attack, and by choosing the point of attack
wisely it was highly probable an expedition of the Fleet might achieve a
favourable result. If the Fleet suffered losses, it was to be assumed that the
enemy's injuries would be in proportion, and that we should still have
sufficient forces to protect the U-boat campaign in the North Sea, which would
have to be resumed if the negotiations should make imperative a continuation of
the struggle with all the means at our disposal.
On October 21, when the Note had been dispatched to
President Wilson, the U-boats received orders of recall, and my Chief of Staff,
Commodore von Levetzow, was commissioned to inform the Fleet Command in
Wilhelmshaven of the course of the negotiations, and to take to them the order
of the Navy Command: "The forces of the High Sea Fleet are to be made ready for
attack and battle with the English Fleet." The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet,
Admiral von Hipper, had already drawn up plans for such a proceeding, as its
necessity was foreseen. A plan directed against the English Channel received
the preference and my assent; it was to be carried out as soon as possible. The
execution, however, had to be delayed for a few days owing to necessary
preparations; the U-boats had to be sent to their stations, and the cruisers
fitted out with mines to be laid along the enemy's probable line of approach.
The Fleet was finally assembled for this enterprise in the outer roads of
Wilhelmshaven on October 28.
Meanwhile, at noon on October 24, President Wilson's reply
had been made known, and this quite clearly demanded complete capitulation.
Animated by the same views as the Supreme Army Command I went with my Chief of
Staff together with the General Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff (on the
former's invitation) to Berlin, in order to be on the spot in case we were
wanted for the deliberations arising from the new situation. We could not
imagine that the Government could do otherwise than reply to this new demand of
Wilson's by a direct refusal, consonant with the honour of the nation and its
power of resistance.
Immediately on their arrival in Berlin in the afternoon of
the 25th, the General Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff had been sent for by
the Emperor. At this interview General Ludendorff received the impression that
the Emperor would adhere to the suggestions of the Government, so that all that
was left to us was to discover from the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer (the
Imperial Chancellor himself had fallen ill), what decisions the Government
would take.
This interview took place in the evening of the 25th, but
its results were entirely negative. In spite of the most urgent arguments on
the part of General Ludendorff, which the General FieldMarshal and I endorsed,
it was impossible to convince von Payer that our national honour and our honour
as soldiers made it imperative that we should refuse Wilson's exorbitant
conditions. The Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff declared they would hold
the Western Front through the winter. It was in vain. Herr von Payer would not
believe Ludendorff's assertions; he wanted to hear the opinion of other
generals at the front. But, above all, he had lost all faith in the powers of
resistance of the people and the Army.
The discussion had to be broken off without result, as the
ViceChancellor could not be moved to make any concessions. Even when asked if,
when the full conditions-in so far as they were tantamount to capitulation-came
into force, the people would not be called upon to make a last struggle, Herr
Payer only answered: "We must first see what the situation would then be."
At an interview the next morning, granted by His Majesty to
the Field-Marshal and General Ludendorff, the latter tendered his resignation,
which the Emperor accepted.
The Government's answer to Wilson's latest demand was as
follows:
"The German Government has duly noted the reply of the
President of the United States. The President is aware of the fundamental
changes that have taken place and are still taking place in the German
Constitution. The peace negotiations will be carried on by a Government of the
people, in whose hands the decisive power actually and constitutionally lies.
The military forces are also subject to it. The German Government, therefore,
looks forward to the proposals for an armistice, which shall lead to a peace of
justice, such as the President has defined in his utterances."
The expectation that the negotiations would take a
favourable course, as the Government seemed to imagine, was doomed to
disappointment. General Ludendorff's prophecy was amply fulfilled; he predicted
that if we continued to yield, the end must be disastrous, because the
Government had neglected to steel the will of the people for a supreme
effort.
But we suffered the bitterest disappointment at the hands of
the crews of the Fleet. Thanks to an unscrupulous agitation which had been
fermenting for a long time, the idea had taken root in their minds that they
were to be uselessly sacrificed. They were encouraged in this mistaken
belief, because they could see no indication of a will to decisive action in
the bearing of the Government. Insubordination broke out when, on October
29, the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was making preparations to weigh anchor
for the planned attack. As always, the intentions and aim of the expedition had
been kept secret from the crews, until they were at sea. The mutiny was at
first confined to a few battleships and first class cruisers, but it assumed
such dimensions on these ships that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet thought
it incumbent upon him to desist from his project. By seizing the agitators and
imprisoning them in the meantime in Wilhelmshaven, he hoped that the ships
could be calmed down. The crews of the torpedo-boats and the U-boats had
remained thoroughly loyal.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet reported these events to
the Navy Command on November 2, saying that they were due to a Bolshevist
movement, directed by members of the Independent Social Democratic Party, on
board the ships. As a means of agitation, they had made use of the statement
that the Government wanted peace and the officers did not. Every provocation of
the enemy by attacks of the Fleet would hinder the peace; that was why the
officers wanted to continue the offensive. The officers wanted to take the
Fleet out and allow it to be annihilated, or even annihilate it themselves.
Since October 29, when the first signs of dissatisfaction
had become manifest, the movement had continued to spread, so that he did not
think it possible to undertake an offensive with the Fleet. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, therefore, detached the individual groups,
sending Squadron III to the Jade to place them in the keeping of the commanding
officers there.
After that, quiet seemed to prevail again in Wilhelmshaven;
but when Squadron III reached Kiel, disturbances broke out there on the evening
of November 1. The Governor, Admiral Souchon, succeeded in preserving order for
a little while, but on November 3 the disturbances grew, because they met with
no vigorous opposition. Even the deputies sent by the Government to Kiel could
not achieve any permanent improvement in the situation; just as little effect
was produced by the proclamation of His Majesty the Emperor which the Imperial
Chancellor now published, and which announced his complete agreement with the
Government. Energetic measures against the agitators, which might at the
beginning have met with success, were only possible under the protection of
strong bodies of troops which the Ministry of War dispatched. But the troops
proved untrustworthy. Nor did they arrive in sufficient numbers to produce the
desired effect.
I have no official reports of the details of the Revolution
which soon blazed up at all the Naval stations, for the military authorities
were deprived of their power of command. The instructions issued by the Navy
Command to the commanding officers to sink ships hoisting the red flag were not
forwarded. They would, at least, have been of guidance to such officers who
were in doubt as to what they should do, if they still possessed the power to
do anything. Nothing but energetic action on the part of the superior officers
who were on the spot could have saved the situation. Whether they failed in
their duty, or whether the extent of the movement was underestimated, is an
open question. Only when the history of the Revolution is written shall we get
full information on the point. The evil-doers who picked out the Fleet as the
means by which to attain their ends committed a terrible crime against the
German nation. They deprived it of the weapon which at the decisive hour might
have saved us from the fate which now weighs upon us so intolerably.
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