ON June 1 at 3 P.M. the Friedrich der Grosse anchored
in the Wilhelmshaven Roads. Meanwhile the crews on all our ships had attained
full consciousness of the greatness of our successes against the superior enemy
forces, and loud and hearty cheers went up as they steamed past the flagship of
their leader. Though they had been under such heavy fire, very little external
damage on the ships was apparent; none keeled over or showed an increased
draught. On a closer inspection, however, considerable damage was disclosed,
but the armour-plating had so thoroughly served its purpose of protecting the
vital parts of the ships that their navigating capabilities had not suffered.
The König and Grosser Kurfürst went into dock as their
anchor cables had been shot away. The battle-cruisers were also docked to find
out to what extent repairs would be necessary. In their case the exterior
damage was considerably greater. It was astonishing that the ships had remained
navigable in the state they were in. This was chiefly attributable to the
faulty exploding charge of the English heavy calibre shells, their explosive
effect being out of all proportion to their size. A number of bits of shell
picked up clearly showed that powder only had been used in the charge. Many
shells of 34- and 38-cm. calibre had burst into such large pieces that, when
picked up, they were easily fitted together again. On the other hand, the
colour on the ships' sides, where they had been hit, showed that picric acid
had been used in some of the explosive charges. A technical Commission from the
Imperial Naval Department made a thorough investigation of the effects of the
shots in order to utilise the experience gained. We arrived immediately at one
conclusiona final decision on the much-debated question of protective
torpedo-nets for the Fleet to the effect that the nets must be done away with.
On most of the ships they were so damaged as to make it impossible to remove
them after the fighting; they hung, for the most part, in a dangerous fashion
out of their cases and it was a wonder that they did not get entangled in the
propellers, an occurrence which, during the battle or at any time for
that mattermight have greatly inconvenienced the Fleet. The total
impression produced by all the damage done was that by their splendid
construction our ships had proved to be possessed of extraordinary powers of
resistance.
The next step was to make arrangements for the repairing of
the ships as the docks at Wilhelmshaven were not able to cope with all the
work, and it was essential that the Fleet should be brought as quickly as
possible into a state of preparedness for action. The Wilhelmshaven yard was
entrusted with the repairs of the Seydlitz, and the ships of Squadron I,
of which the Ostfrieslandowing to a mine explosion-and the
Helgolandhit above the water-linehad to be placed in dock. The
Grosser Kurfurst, Markgraf, and Moltke were sent to Hamburg to be
repaired by Blohm & Voss and the Vulcan Works. The König and
the Derfflinger, after the latter had been temporarily repaired in the
floating-dock at Wilhelmshaven, proceeded through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal to
the Imperial Yard and Howaldt's yard at Kiel.
The Imperial Dockyards at Kiel under the management of
Vice-Admiral von Henkel-Gebhardi, and those at Wilhelmshaven under Rear-Admiral
Engel, as well as the private yards occupied on repairs, deserve the greatest
credit for the excellent work done in restoring the Fleet.
If the English Fleet had fared as well as the English Press
accounts led us to believe we might count on their immediately seizing the
opportunity for a great attack. But it never came off. Our efforts were centred
on putting to sea again as soon as possible for a fresh advance. By the middle
of August the Fleet was again in readiness, with the exception of the
battle-cruisers Seydlitz and Derfflinger. But a new ship, the
Bayern, had been added to the Fleet, the first to mount guns of 38 cm.
Immediately after the battle joyful messages and
congratulations on the success of the Fleet poured in from all divisions of the
army in the field, from every part of the country and from all classes of the
people. I welcomed with special gratitude the many sums received towards the
support of the families of the fallen and wounded, which showed in a touching
manner the sympathy of the donors, and which, in a very short space of time,
reached the sum of one million marks.
The first honour paid to the Fleet was a visit from His
Majesty the Emperor on June 5, who, on board the flagship, Friedrich der
Gross, made a hearty speech of welcome to divisions drawn from the crews of
all the ships, thanking them in the name of the Fatherland for their gallant
deeds. In the afternoon the Emperor visited all the hospitals where the wounded
lay, as well as the hospital ship Sierra Ventana, where lay Rear-Admiral
Behncke, Leader of Squadron III, who was wounded in the battle, and who was
able to give the Emperor a detailed account of his impressions while at the
head of the battleships. Several of the German princes also visited the Fleet,
bringing greetings from their homes to the crews and expressing pride in the
Fleet and the conduct of the men. The Grand Dukes of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and
of Oldenburg came directly after the battle and were followed very soon after
by the Kings of Saxony and Bavaria.
All this afforded clear proof that no other organisation in
the Empire was so fitted to signify its unity as the Navy, which brought
together in closest contact those belonging to all classes in the Fatherland
and united them by common action in fortune and misfortune. Apart from the
inspection of the ships, these visits also offered an opportunity of gaining
information respecting the general duties of the Fleet and the plans for the
impending battle that was expected, for, as those visits proved, the battle had
greatly enhanced the interest in the Fleet throughout the whole country.
The development of the battle and its lessons were thus
summarised by me at the time:
" The battle was brought about as a result of our
systematic efforts to attract the enemy out of his retirement, especially of
the more drastic operations which culminated in the bombardment of the English
coast. England's purpose of strangling Germany economically without seriously
exposing her own Fleet to the German guns had to be defeated. This offensive
effort on our part was intensified by the fact that the prohibition of the
U-boat trade-war made it impossible for us to aim a direct blow at England's
vital nerve. We were therefore bound to try and prove by all possible means
that Germany's High Sea Fleet was able and willing to wage war with England at
sea and thus help to establish Germany's claim to independent overseas
development.
" The German idea incorporated in the founding of the Fleet
had to hold its own in battle in order not to perish. The readiness to face a
battle rests on the fundamental idea that even the numerically inferior must
not shirk an attack if the will to conquer is supported by a devoted staff,
confidence in material, and a firm conviction of perfect training.
" A preliminary fight between cruisers lasting about two
hours, which proved the superiority of our guns, was followed by the engagement
with the vastly superior enemy Main Fleet. The clever attempts made by the
English to surround and cut us off from home by their Main Fleet were turned
into a defeat, as we twice succeeded in pushing into the enemy formation with
all our strength, and in withdrawing from the intended encircling movement. In
spite of various attacks during the night we forced a way for ourselves to
Horns Reef, and thus secured an important strategical point for the following
morning.
" The enemy suffered twice as much material loss and three
times as many losses in personnel as we did. English superiority was thus
wrecked, for the Fleet was unable to keep in touch with us at the close of the
day-battle and its own formation was broken.
" After an encounter with our leading ships, as darkness
came on the English battle-cruisers lost touch with us in a mysterious way.
They advanced into an empty North Sea.
" At the end of the battle the English Main Fleet had lost
touch with its other units and they only came together again the following day
at 6 P.M.
" After a continuous, and for the English very disastrous,
night's fighting, Jellicoe did not seek us out the following morning, although
he possessed both the power and the requisite speed to do so.
" We have been able to prove to the world that the English
Navy no longer possesses her boasted irresistibility. To us it has been granted
to fight for the rights of the German Nation on the open seas, and the battle
proved that the organisation of our Navy as a High Sea Fleet was a step in the
right direction. The German national spirit can only be impressed on the world
through a High Sea Fleet directed against England. If, however, as an outcome
of our present condition, we are not finally to be bled to death, full use must
be made of the U-boat as a means of war, so as to grip England's vital nerve."
I expressed these views to the Imperial Chancellor, who
visited the Fleet on June 30 in company with the Under-Secretary of State, von
Stumm, and laid great emphasis on them in my report of July 4, as I noticed
from communications from the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Naval Cabinet
that efforts were on foot for resuming the U-boat warfare in its inadequate
form. The Imperial Chancellor gave me a detailed but gloomy picture of the
situation which forced him for the time to ward off any further enemies from
Germany, who, he was convinced, would soon show themselves on the proclamation
of unrestricted U-boat warfare. I explained to him the military reasons which
would render ineffectual the carrying on of the U-boat war on a cruiser basis.
Whether political circumstances would permit us to employ
the most effective weapon against England was, however, a matter for the
Cabinet to decide, and for my part as Chief of the Fleet I would not attempt to
exert any pressure in that direction, as that was the business of the Naval
Staff. But I could not approve of carrying on the U-boat campaign in a milder
form, for that would be unsatisfactory from every point of view. The Imperial
Chancellor agreed with me, but declared, for various reasons, that he could not
embark on a course of unrestricted U-boat warfare, because it was impossible to
avoid incidents which might lead to complications, and the result would be that
the fate of the German nation might lie in the hands of one U-boat commander.
Before leaving Wilhelmshaven he met at dinner all the admirals then stationed
there, and on this occasion he expressed the hope that in this war we should
succeed in making good use of all the weapons of the Navy.
After this visit, however, it became abundantly clear to me
that for the time being we were hardly likely to resume the active U-boat
campaign against English commerce. In a long interview with the Imperial
Chancellor that afternoon, I gathered from his remarks that he was very anxious
not to incense England further, or to provoke that country to " war to the
death."
Very soon all sorts of rumours arose concerning this visit:
the Chancellor had gone with the object of persuading the admirals to weaken
their attacks upon the British; he had more especially objected to the airship
raids. All these reports were absolutely unfounded, for these matters were
never touched upon, and moreover, I could not have considered it within his
province to give me advice as to the manner in which war was to be waged.
Until the active operations of the Fleet were resumed, the
torpedo-boats continued their efforts to get in touch with the enemy. As the
base in Flanders offered better opportunities for this, while the Fleet was
restricted in its activities, a flotilla was despatched there. This arrangement
was continued later. At first detachments of the various flotillas were sent in
turn, in order as far as possible to afford all boats the opportunity of
becoming familiar with the methods of attack from that point. Later on, it
appeared more advantageous to place a single flotilla for this purpose under
the control of the Naval Corps, so as to make full use of the knowledge they
had acquired of the local conditions.
At the beginning of August it was possible to resume the air
raids again, as the nights had by then grown darker. The first attack was made
in the night of the 2nd and 3rd, and was directed upon the counties of Norfolk,
Suffolk and Essex. London, too, was extensively bombed. In the night of August
8th - 9th there was another attack, this time upon the Midlands; and at the end
of the month, in the night of August 24th25th, there was a third raid
upon the City, and the south-west district of London, as well as upon Harwich,
Folkestone and the roads at Dover. One army airship took part in this. In spite
of active opposition the airships returned safely from all three expeditions.
We learnt that the English defences had been decidedly
improved, which rendered our attacks more difficult. The greater the effort
England made to maintain her army on the Continent and in the other theatres of
war, in order to do her part in forcing the decision against us on land, the
more embarrassing she must have found it to organise a strong defence against
airships.
Between these two periods of attack the airships were placed
at the service of the Intelligence Department in connection with an attack
which was planned as soon as the ships had been made ready, and which was to be
again directed towards Sunderland. No change in the strategic disposition of
the English Fleet had been observed. The U-boat campaign against commerce in
the war-zone round about England was still in abeyance, and the U-boats were
ready to be used for military purposes. These two weapons, the airships and the
U-boats, would, I thought, make up for the superiority of the English Fleet in
other respects.
The disposition of U-boats outside British ports on May 31
in accordance with the plan we had adopted had resulted in no success worth
speaking of; it was bound to fail if the English Fleet was already at sea when
the flotilla put out. Nor was their method of attack satisfactory. Before the
Firth of Forth each of the seven U-boats which had been dispatched thither had
a certain sector assigned to it, and these sectors radiated from a central
point at the mouth of the estuary. The nearer the boats came to the estuary,
the nearer they approached each other in the neighbourhood of this central
point, so that they were liable to get in each other's way, or mistake one
another for hostile craft. If they stood farther out to sea, the distance
between them was increased and they lost their formation, thereby making it
easier for the enemy to get through
The matter was, therefore, reconsidered, and new
arrangements made which promised greater success. Trial was first to be made of
the method of a movable base line in the direction of the probable approach of
the enemy, on which line the U-boats were to take up positions. The boats in
commission in the middle of August were divided into three groups, two of which
consisted of boats belonging to the Fleet, and the other of boats attached to
the Naval Corps in Flanders. The two former were first to take up positions
indicated in the accompanying plan by "U-Line I " and " U-Line III." In this
way they afforded protection to the Fleet on either flank when proceeding to
attack. The U-boats of the Fleet took up a position of defence for flank and
rear against possible attacks from the Channel. In addition to the Lines I and
III, other positions had been provided, which the boats were to take up either
after a certain interval of time, or upon a prearranged signal. In order that
the boats should be directed in accordance with the aims and movements of the
Fleet, the officer commanding the U-boats was on board one of the battleships
for the duration of the Fleet's attack.
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