2
THE FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE-CRUISER ENGAGEMENT
At 4.28 P.M. the leading boat of the 4th Torpedo-Boat
Half-Flotilla, "B 109," reported that Elbing, the west wing cruiser on
the Chief of Reconnaissance's line, had been sent to examine a steamer about go
nautical miles west of Bovbjerg, and had sighted some enemy forces. It was
thanks to that steamer that the engagement took place; our course might have
carried us past the English cruisers had the torpedo-boat not proceeded to the
steamer and thus sighted the smoke from the enemy in the west.
As soon as the enemy, comprising eight light cruisers of the
"Caroline" type, sighted our forces, he turned off to the north. Admiral
Bodicker gave chase with his cruisers. At 5.20 P.M. the Chief of the
Reconnaissance then sighted in a westerly direction two columns of large
vessels taking an easterly course. These soon showed themselves to be six
battle-cruisers, three of the "Lion" class, one "Tiger," and two
"Indefatigables," besides numbers of lighter forces. The Chief of
Reconnaissance called back Scouting Division II, which he had sent to give
chase in the north, and prepared to attack. The enemy deployed to the south in
fighting line. It was Vice-Admiral Beatty with the First and Second English
Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, consisting of the Lion, Princess Royal, Queen
Mary, Tiger, New Zealand, and Indefatigable. That the enemy deployed
to the south was a very welcome fact for us, as it offered the possibility of
inducing the enemy to fall back on his own main fleet. The Chief of
Reconnaissance therefore followed the movement, manuvred to get within
effective firing range, and opened fire at 5.49 P.M., at a range of about 130
hm. [Edward Beatty gave a range of 18,500 yards].
The fighting proceeded on a south-easterly course. The
Chief of Reconnaissance kept the enemy at effective distance. The batteries
fixed their aim well; hits were observed on all the enemy ships. Already at
6.13 P.M., the battle-cruiser Indefatigable, the last in the line of the
enemy cruisers, sank with a terrible explosion caused by the guns of the Von
der Tann. Superiority in firing and tactical advantages of position were
decidedly on our side up to 6.19 P.M., when a new unit of four or five ships of
the " Queen Elizabeth " type, with a considerable surplus of speed, drew up
from a north-westerly direction, and beginning at a range of 200 hm., joined
the fighting. It was the Fifth English Battle Squadron.¹ This made the
situation critical for our cruisers. The new enemy fired with extraordinary
rapidity and accuracy' with the greater ease as regards the latter that he met
with almost no opposition, as our battle-cruisers were fully engaged with
Admiral Beatty's ships.
At 6.20 P.M. the fighting distance between the
battle-cruisers on both sides was about 120 hm., while between our
battle-cruisers and those with Queen Elizabeth the distance was
something like Position at 5.49 P.M. 180 hm. At this stage Torpedo-Boat
Flotilla IX was the only one of the flotillas under the Chief of Reconnaissance
that was in a position to attack. The Second Leader of Torpedo-Boats, Commodore
Heinrich, on board the Regensburg, and some few boats belonging to
Torpedo, Flotilla II, were getting up steam with all speed in a diagonal line
from the Chief of Reconnaissance's furthest point. The cruisers of Scouting
Division 11, together with the remaining torpedo flotillas, were forced by the
" Queen Elizabeths " to withdraw to the east to escape their fire and had,
therefore, in spite of working their engines to the utmost, not been able to
arrive in position at the head of the battle-cruisers.
In view of the situation, the Second Leader of the Torpedo
Boats ordered Torpedo Flotilla IX (whose chief, Captain Goehle, had already
decided on his own initiative to prepare to attack) to advance to the relief of
the battle-cruisers.
At about 6.30 P.M. Torpedo Flotilla IX proceeded to attack,
running through heavy enemy firing. Twelve torpedoes were fired on the enemy
lines at distances ranging between 9580 hm. It was impossible to push the
attack closer on the enemy, as at the same time that Flotilla IX got to work,
eighteen to twenty English destroyers, covered by light cruisers, appeared on
the scene to counter-attack and beat off our torpedo-boats. The result was a
torpedo-boat fight at close range (1,0001,500 m.). The Regensburg,
together with the boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II that were with her, and the
centrally situated guns on the battle-cruisers, then joined in the fight. After
about ten minutes the enemy turned away. On our side "'V27" and "V29" were
sunk, hit by shots from heavy calibre guns. The crews of both the boats were
rescued in spite of enemy fire, by " V 26 " and " S 35." On the enemy side two,
or perhaps three, destroyers were sunk, and two others so badly damaged that
they could not get away, and fell later into the hands of our advancing Main
Fleet. The enemy made no attempt to rescue the crews of these boats.
During the attack by the torpedo-boats, the English
battlecruisers were effectively held in check by the Scouting Division I with
heavy artillery, which at the same time manuvred so successfully that
none of the numerous enemy torpedoes observed by Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX hit
their objectives. Towards 6.30 P.M. a powerful explosion was observed on board
the third enemy cruiser the Queen Mary. When the smoke from the
explosion cleared away the cruiser had disappeared. Whether the destruction was
the result of artillery action or was caused by a torpedo from the
battlecruisers or by a torpedo from Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX can never be
ascertained for certain, but most probably it was due to artillery action which
caused an explosion of ammunition or oil on board the enemy vessel. It was not
until night that I heard of the destruction of the two battle-cruisers.
The attack by Flotilla IX had at all events been successful
in so far that for a time it checked the enemy's fire. Admiral Hipper took
advantage of this to divert the cruisers to a north-westerly course and thus
secure for himself the lead at the head of the cruisers in the new phase of the
fight. Immediately following on the attack by the torpedo-boats, the German
Main Fleet appeared on the scene of battle just in the nick of time to help the
reconnaissance forces in their fight against considerably superior numbers.
3
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE FIGHT: THE PURSUIT
At 4.28 P.M.² about 50 nautical miles west of Lyngoig,
on the Jutland coast, the first news of the sighting of enemy light forces was
reported to the Main Fleet proceeding in the following order: Squadrons III, I,
II, the flagship at the head of Squadron I, on a northerly course, speed 14
knotsdistance between the vessels, 7 hm., distance between the squadrons,
35 hm., the torpedo-boats as U-boat escort for the squadrons, the light
cruisers of Scouting Division IV allotted to the Main Fleet to protect their
course.
At 5.35 the first report was sent that heavy forces had been
sighted. The distance between the Chief of Reconnaissance and the Main Fleet
was at that time about 50 nautical miles. On receipt of this message, the
fighting line was opened (that is, the distance between the squadrons was
reduced to 1,000 m., and between the vessels to 500 m.), and the order was
given to clear the ships for action.
In the fighting line the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is
not tied to any fixed position. When there is a question of leading several
squadrons it is not advisable to take up a position at the head of the line, as
it is not possible from there to watch the direction in which the fight
develops, as that greatly depends on the movements of the enemy. Being bound to
any such position might lead to the Commander-in-Chief finding himself at the
rear instead of at the head of his assembled line. A position in the centre or
at a third of the line (according to the number of units) is more advantageous.
In the course of events the place of the eighth ship in the line for the
flagship has been tested and approved of.
During the whole time that fighting was going on I had a
clear look-out over the whole line and was able to signal with great rapidity
in both directions. As the fighting line of the warships was more than 10 km.
long, I should not have been able to overlook my entire line from the wing,
especially under such heavy enemy firing.
The message received at 5.45 P.M. ,from the Chief of
Reconnaissance that he was engaged with six enemy battle-cruisers on a
southeasterly course showed that he had succeeded in meeting the enemy, and as
he fought was drawing him closer to our Main Fleet. The duty of the Main Fleet
was now to hasten as quickly as possible to support the battle-cruisers, which
were inferior as to material, and to endeavour to hinder the premature retreat
of the enemy. At 6.5, therefore, I took a north-westerly course at a speed of
15 knots, and a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly course in
order to place the enemy between two fires, as he, on his southerly course,
would have to push through between our line and that of the battle-cruisers.
While the Main Fleet was still altering course, a message came from Scouting
Division II that an English unit of warships, five ships (not four!) had joined
in the fight.
The situation thus was becoming critical for Scouting
Division I, confronted as they were by six battle-cruisers and five
battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything possible had to be done to get
into touch with them, and a change was made back to a northerly course. The
weather was extremely clear, the sky cloudless, a light breeze from N.W., and a
calm sea. At 6.30 P.M. the fighting lines were sighted. At 6.45 P.M. Squadrons
I and III opened fire, while the Chief of Reconnaissance, with the forces
allotted to him, placed himself at the head of the Main Fleet.
The light enemy forces veered at once to the west, and as
soon as they were out of firing range turned northwards. ,Whether the fire from
our warships had damaged them during the short bombardment was doubtful, but
their vague and purposeless hurrying to and fro led one to think that our fire
had reached them and that the action of our warships had so surprised them that
they did not know which way to turn next.
The English battle-cruisers turned to a north-westerly
course; Queen Elizabeth and the ships with her followed in their wake,
and thereby played the part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers. In so
doing, however, they came very much nearer to our Main Fleet, and we came on at
a firing distance of 17 hm. or less. While both the English units passed by
each other and provided mutual cover, Captain Max Schultz, Chief of
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla VI, attacked at 6.49 P.M., with the Eleventh Torpedo-Boat
HalfFlotilla. The result could not be seen.
The fighting which now ensued developed into a stern chase;
our reconnaissance forces pressed on the heels of the enemy battlecruisers, and
our Main Fleet gave chase to the Queen Elizabeth and the ships with her.
Our ships in Squadron III attained a speed of over 20 knots, which was also
kept up on board the Kaiserin. Just before fire was opened she had
succeeded in repairing damage to one of her condensers. By the Friedrich der
Grosse, the Fleet Flagship, 20 knots was achieved and maintained. In spite
of this, the enemy battle-cruisers succeeded soon after 7 o'clock in escaping
from the fire of Scouting Division I. The Queen Elizabeth and her sister
ships also made such good way that they were only under fire from the ships of
Scouting Division I and of the Fifth Division (First Half of Squadron III). The
hope that one of the ships pursued would be so damaged as to fall a prey to our
Main Fleet was not fulfilled, although our firing was effective, and at 7.30
P.M. it was seen that a ship of the " Queen Elizabeth " type after she had been
hit repeatedly, drew slowly out of the fighting line with a heavy list to
leeward. Two modern, destroyers, the Nestor and Nomad, were all that fell to
the share of the Main Fleet; they were hit and badly damaged in the attack by
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX, and were overtaken and sunk by us; the crews were
taken prisoner.
At 7.20 P.M., when the fire from Scouting Division I and
from the ships of the Fifth Division appeared to grow weaker, the leaders of
the Fleet were under the impression that the enemy was succeeding in getting
away, and gave orders to the Chief of Reconnaissance and to all the fighting
forces "to give chase." Meanwhile, the previously clear weather had become less
clear; the wind had changed from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and smoke from the
funnels hung over the sea and cut off all view from north and east. Only now
and then could we see our own reconnaissance forces. Owing to the superior
speed of Beatty's cruisers, our own, when the order came to give chase, were
already out-distanced by the enemy battle-cruisers and light craft, and were
thus forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner circle and
adopt the enemy's course. Both lines of cruisers swung by degrees in concentric
circles by the north to a north-easterly direction. A message which was to have
been sent by the Chief of Reconnaissance could not be dispatched owing to
damage done to the principal and reserve wireless stations on his flagship. The
cessation of firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to the
increasing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the horizon, until
finally it became impossible. When, therefore, enemy light forces began a
torpedo attack on our battle-cruisers at 7.40 P.M., the Chief or Reconnaissance
had no alternative but to manuvre and finally bring the unit round to
S.W. in an endeavour to close up with the Main Fleet, as it was impossible to
return the enemy's fire to any purpose.
4
THE THIRD PHASE OF THE FIGHTING THE BATTLE
I observed almost simultaneously that the admiral at the
head of our squadron of battleships began to veer round to starboard in an
easterly direction. This was in accordance with the instructions signalled to
keep up the pursuit. As the Fleet was still divided in columns, steering a
north-westerly course as directed, the order "Leader in Front" was signaled
along the line at 7.45 P.M., and the speed temporarily reduced to 15 knots, so
as to make it possible for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high
pressure, to get into position again.
As long as the pursuit was kept up, the movements of the
English gave us the direction, consequently our line by degrees veered round to
the east. During these proceedings in the Main Fleet, Scouting Division II,
under Rear-Admiral Bodicker, when engaged with a light cruiser of the
"Calliope" class,³ which was set on fire, sighted several light cruisers
of the "Town " class, and several big ships, presumably battleships, of which
the Agincourt was one. Owing to the mist that hung over the water, it was
impossible to ascertain the entire strength of the enemy. The group was at once
heavily fired on, returned the fire, discharged torpedoes, and turned in the
direction of their own Main Fleet. No result could be observed, as artificial
smokes was at once employed to protect the cruisers. In spite of the fog
theWiesbaden and Pillau were both badly hit. The Wiesbaden
(Captain Reiss) lay in the thick of the enemy fire, incapable of action.
The Chiefs of the 12th and 9th Torpedo-Boat Half-Flotillas
who were stationed behind the cruisers, recognising the gravity of the
situation, came to the front. Both came under fire from a line of numbers of
big ships on a N.W. course, and fired their torpedoes from within 60 hm. of the
enemy. Here, too, it was impossible to observe what success was achieved, as
dense clouds of smoke hid the enemy from view directly they veered round. But
both the above-mentioned commanders reckon that they met with success, having
attacked under favourable conditions.
While this encounter with the advance guard of the English
Main Fleet was taking place, we, on our flagship were occupied debating how
much longer to continue the pursuit in view of the advanced time. There was no
longer any question of a cruiser campaign against merchantmen in the Skagerrak,
as the meeting with the English fighting forces which was to result from such
action had already taken place. But we were bound to take into consideration
that the English Fleet, if at sea, which was obvious from the ships we had
encountered, would offer battle the next day. Some steps would also have to be
taken to shake off the English light forces before darkness fell in order to
avoid any loss to our Main Fleet from nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks.
A message was then received from the leader of Scouting
Division II that he had been fired on by some newly arrived large ships. At 8.2
p.m. came a wireless: " Wiesbaden incapable of action." On receipt of
the message I turned with the Fleet two points to larboard [port] so as to draw
nearer to the group and render assistance to the Wiesbaden. From 8.20 onwards
there was heavy fighting round the damaged Wiesbaden, and good use was
made of the ship's torpedoes. Coming from a north-north-westerly direction, the
"Queen Elizabeth" ships and also probably Beatty's battle-cruisers attacked
(prisoners, however, stated that after 7.0 P.M. the latter took no part in the
fight).
A fresh unit of cruisers (three "Invincibles" and four
"Warriors ") bore down from the north, besides light cruisers and destroyers. A
further message from the torpedo-boat flotillas which had gone to support
Scouting Division II, stated that they had sighted more than twenty enemy
battleships following a southeasterly course. It was now quite obvious that we
were confronted by a large portion of the English Fleet and a few minutes later
their presence was notified on the horizon directly ahead of us by rounds of
firing from guns of heavy calibre. The entire arc stretching from north to east
was a sea of fire. The flash from the muzzles of the guns was distinctly seen
through the mist and smoke on the horizon, though the ships themselves were not
distinguishable. This was the beginning of the main phase of the battle.
There was never any question of our line veering round to
avoid an encounter. The resolve to do battle with the enemy stood firm from the
first. The leaders of our battleship squadrons, the Fifth Division turned at
once for a running fight, carried on at about 13,000 m. The other divisions
followed this movement on orders signalled from the flagship. By this time more
than a hundred heavy guns had joined in the fight on the enemy's side,
directing fire chiefly at our battle-cruisers and the ships of the Fifth
Division (the " König " class). The position of the English line (whose
centre we must have faced) to our leading point brought fire on us from three
sides. The " Queen Elizabeths " fired diagonally from larboard [port]; the
ships of the Main Fleet, which Jellicoe had brought up, from the forecastle
starboard. Many shots were aimed at the Friedrich der Grosse, but the
ship was never hit.
During this stage of the fight the cruisers Defence,
Black Prince, and Warrior came up from the north, but were all
destroyed by the fire from our battleships and our battle-cruisers. Fire from
the Friedrich der Grosse was aimed at one of the three, which in a huge white
cloud of steam was blown into the air, at 3,000 m. distance. I observed several
enemy hits and consequent explosions on the ships at our leading point.
Following the movement of the enemy they had made a bend which hindered free
action of our Torpedo Boat Flotilla II stationed there.
I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were still
farther forward. Owing to the turning aside that was inevitable in drawing
nearer, they found themselves between the fire of both lines. For this reason I
decided to turn our line and bring it on to an opposite course. Otherwise an
awkward situation would have arisen round the pivot which the enemy line by
degrees was passing, as long-distance shots from the enemy would certainly have
hit our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness of the artillery, the enemy
was more favourably situated, as our ships stood out against the clear western
horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden by the smoke and mist of the battle.
A running artillery fight on a southerly course would therefore not have been
advantageous to us. The swing round was carried out in excellent style. At our
peace manuvres great importance was always attached to their being
carried out on a curved line and every means employed to ensure the working of
the signals. The trouble spent was now well repaid; the cruisers were liberated
from their cramped position and enabled to steam away south and appeared, as
soon as the two lines were separated, in view of the flagship. The
torpedoboats, too, on the leeside of the fire had room to move to the attack
and advanced.
While the veering round of the line was proceeding, two
boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III ("G88" and "V73 ") and the leading boat of
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla I (" S 32 ") had attacked. The remaining boats of
Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III had ceased the attack on an order to retire from the
leader. The weakening of the enemy fire had induced the First Leader to give
the order, being persuaded that the enemy had turned away and that the
flotilla, which would be urgently needed in the further development of the
battle, would find itself without support. Owing to the shortening of the line
at the head, the boats of the other flotillas were not able to attack. One
division (Torpedo-Boat Flotillas IX and VI) had just returned from the 8
o'clock attack. The enemy line did not follow our veer round. In the position
it was to our leading point, it should have remained on, and could have held us
still further surrounded if by a simultaneous turn to a westerly course it had
kept firmly to our line.
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