The restricted form of U-boat warfare against English
mercantile ships, adopted in the course of 1915, was extremely unsatisfactory.
The damage caused thereby to her trade could be borne by England, and, on the
other hand, the only result to us was vexation and disappointment, for our
Fleet could obtain no support for its own enterprises from the U-boats.
Co-operation with separate units or with the entire Fleet could not be
sufficiently well organised to prove dependable for certain operations. First
of all, only temporary co-operation was possible in the case of enterprises by
the Fleet and attacks by the U-boats when each unit had a special duty, to be
mutually supplemented but without exacting any tactical union. If, for
instance, there was the intention to bombard a certain coastal town, it might
be assumed that English fighting forces would at once rush out from different
harbours where they were lying to drive off or capture the disturbers of their
peace. If U-boats had been stationed off such towns, where it was presumed
there were enemy ships, they would probably have had a chance of attacking.
Tactical co-operation would have been understood to mean
that on the Fleet putting out to sea with the possibility of encountering the
enemy, having the fixed intention of leading up to such an encounter, numbers
of U-boats would be present from the beginning in order to be able to join in
the battle. Even as certain rules have been evolved for the employment of
cruisers and torpedo-boats in a daylight battle to support the activity of the
battleship fleet, so might an opportunity have been found for the tactical
employment of the U-boats. But no preliminary work had been done in that
respect, and it would have been a very risky experiment to take U-boats into a
battle without a thorough trial. The two principal drawbacks are their
inadequate speed and the possibility of their not distinguishing between friend
and foe.
The first-mentioned method, however, offered the most
varied possibilities, and consideration was given as to what would be the most
desirable way to station U-boats off enemy harbours; how they could be used in
the form of movable mine-barriers, as flank protection, or otherwise render
assistance.
In order to gain assurance in the use of U-boats and secure
a basis for the activity of the Fleet, I went, in February, to Berlin to a
conference with the Chief of the Naval Staff, in which Prince Henry of Prussia,
Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic forces, also took part.
The result of this conference was the decision to come to
close grips with England. Our chief maritime elements were to be centred
absolutely in the North Sea, and the greatest restriction put on all active
measures in the Baltic. Shortly afterwards an unrestricted U-boat warfare was
to be instituted and the Naval Command was to make the necessary preparations.
March 1 was the date on which it was intended to begin, as General von
Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, recognising the importance of England's
contribution to the hostile resisting forces, had given up his previous
scruples concerning the unrestricted U-boat warfare.
On January 31, nine airships set out for an attack on
England: "L " 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21. On this occasion
Liverpool was reached for the first time, where doubtless large quantities of
war material from America were stored. Several other large factory towns in
central England were also bombed, which they hardly expected although they were
of great importance on account of their output of munitions and war material. A
cruiser on the Humber was hit and badly damaged, which, according to subsequent
information, was the new light cruiser Caroline (3,810 tons). The farther such
air-raids spread over the country the greater would be the efforts made to
defend the most important places, involving the withdrawal from the principal
scene of war of guns, airmen, gunners and munitions to protect England from
danger from the air.
Although the chief objective of every air-raid was London,
where the Admiralty controlled the whole Naval war, and where the docks and the
mouth of the Thames represented many other important objectives, to destroy
which was highly necessary for the continuation of the war, still wind and
weather did not always allow of its being attained. Sometimes during the flight
of the airships hey would be obliged to deviate from their plan of attack for
other reasons than wind and weather. Therefore all airships that went up were
given a general order to attack England in the south, centre and north. "South
" signified the Thames, "centre, " the Humber, and "north," the Firth of Forth.
These three estuaries were the main points of support for the English Fleet,
and were amply provided with all kinds of naval and mercantile shipbuilding
works. The direction of the attack, whether south, centre or north, was
determined by the wind, as the airships usually had the wind against them in
going, in order, on the return journey, to have it behind in case they had to
cope with damage or engine trouble.
Commander Odo Lowe, "L 19, never returned from an attack
made during the night of January 31February 1, 1916. On the return
journey the airship, owing to fog, found itself over Dutch territory, and was
fired at, not being at a very great altitude. Owing to the damage done, when it
again came over the water it was unable to rise on account of a strong
northerly wind, and so was forced to come down at about 100 nautical miles from
the English coast, in a line with Grimsby. It was seen there in a sinking
condition by a steam trawler (King Stephen) which, although within hailing
distance, allowed the helpless crew to perish in the waves. This shameful deed
was publicly acclaimed by an English bishop a strange manifestation of
his Christian principles ! The behaviour of that bishop is so typical of
English mentality that it is worth while adding a short comment on it. Two
points are invariably and entirely lacking in English views on the war: they
never admit the "necessity of war " for their opponent and never recognise the
difference between unavoidable severity and deliberate brutality. The
Englishman thinks it quite justifiable to establish a blockade in the North Sea
which exposes his naval forces to a mere minimum of danger, and pays no heed to
the rules of International Law. That the consequence of the blockade was to
bring starvation on the entire German nationthe step indeed was taken
with that avowed purposedoes not in the least affect his feelings for
humanity. He employs the means that serve his war aims, and no objection could
be raised did he allow the same to hold good for the enemy. But
insteadwhether in conscious or unconscious hypocrisy is an open
questionhe raises indignant opposition to all counter-measures. Our
air-raids caused injury to civilians. It was inevitable, when institutions
serving war purposes were so close to populous districtsperhaps with a
view to secure protection for them. To the Englishman, it was of no moment that
the airship crews exposed themselves to the greatest personal danger in thus
fighting for their suffering Fatherland. Accustomed as he was to carrying on a
war with hirelings, and mostly abroad, he considered any personal encroachment
on his comfort as a crime against humanity and made a terrible ado to increase
favour for his cause. English behaviour in the mine-war is an example of this.
At the second Peace Conference at the Hague, Satow, an
English delegate, raised a violent protest against a decision authorising the
laying of mines in the open sea, in view of the danger to neutral shipping. In
spite of this, an extensive area at the eastern egress from the Channel was
mined by the English. Success in war, in their view, stood higher than their
former principles and professed consideration for the neutrals. Our
mine-warfare along the English coast was cried down as a terrible crime,
although it is distinctly allowed by the Hague regulations. The same hypocrisy
concerning what the rights of war conceded to the one or the other belligerents
is also prevalent in English professional literature. According to English
ideas it is quite right and correct that the English Fleet, in spite of its
double numerical superiority, does not consider it necessary to advance to the
German coast. But when the weaker German Fleet refrained from committing what
obviously would have been military errors, it was ascribed to lack of courage.
When the English Fleet, as we see later, had in battle, in spite of twofold
superiority, twice as many losses as the weaker adversary, it was still termed
an English victory ! What has become of all common sense? After this digression
we must resume.
One of the first enterprises on the newly-drawn-up programme
of operations was an encounter during the night of February 10 - 11 with
English guardships off the Dogger Bank; they were in all probability stationed
there in connection with our airship raids, either to give warning of their
approach or to give chase on their way back. Torpedo-Boat Flotillas II, VI and
IX, led by Captain Hartog, the First Leader of torpedo-boats, while patrolling
at night came across a new type of English vessel which they at first took to
be a cruiser, but finally decided it was a new vessel of the " Arabis " class.
After a brief exchange of shots, the vessel was sunk by a torpedo; the
commander, some officers and 28 of the crew were saved and taken prisoners. A
second ship was also hit by a torpedo and observed to sink. The ships had only
recently been built, were of 1,600 tons, had a crew of 78, slight draught, and
a speed of 16 knots.
On February 11 an order from the Chief of the Naval Staff
was sent to the Fleet regarding the action to be observed toward; armed enemy
merchantmen. At the same time a "Note from the Imperial German Government on
the Treatment of Armed Merchantmen " was published in the Press. This Note
contained uncontestable proof, gathered from instructions issued by the English
Government, and various other sources, that the armed English merchantmen had
official orders whenever they saw and were close to German U-boats, maliciously
to attack and wage ruthless war on them. The Note concluded with the following
notice:
Berlin, February 8, 1916.
" 1. Under the circumstances now prevailing, enemy
merchantmen carrying guns have no longer the right to be considered as such.
German naval forces will therefore, after a short respite in the interests of
the neutrals, treat such ships as belligerents.
"2. The German Government notifies the neutral Powers of the
conditions in order that they may warn their subjects to desist from entrusting
their persons and property to armed merchantmen belonging to the Powers at war
with the German Empire."
The order to the naval forces, which out of consideration
for the neutrals was not to come into force until February 29, was as follows:
"Enemy merchantmen carrying guns are to be considered as warships and destroyed
by all possible means. The officers must bear in mind that mistaken identity
will lead to a breach with the neutrals and that the destruction of a
merchantman because she is armed, must only be effected when the guns are
clearly distinguished."
This new announcement from the Government, in which the
Chief of ,the Naval Staff evidently had a share judging from his order to the
Fleet, came as a surprise to me and appeared as though it were a reversal of
the policy of unrestricted U-boat warfare which on February I had been promised
for certain within a month, and which it now seemed doubtful would be carried
out. The order imposed upon the officers that they should "distinguish " the
guns made action very difficult for the U-boat officers, and it was they who
were chiefly concerned. For at the distance necessary to secure this evidence
the enemy, if he vindictively opened fire, could hardly miss. But if a U-boat
when submerged were in a position to attack a steamer, and could only fire a
torpedo when there was no doubt that she carried guns, the opportunity would
almost always be lost.
I made known my objections to the order, both verbally and
in writing, when I had occasion in the course of the month to go to Berlin; a
violent north-westerly storm, which set in on February 1617 had stopped
all operations in the Fleet. I was informed that the intention shortly to open
the unrestricted U-boat warfare still held good. An order to that effect
sanctioned by the Emperor was already drawn up; it merely remained to fill in
the date of starting. This appeared to me of the greatest importance, and, as
meanwhile the Emperor had announced his intention of visiting the Fleet on
February 23, I took that to mean that I need no longer entertain any doubts.
On the appointed day, at 10 A.M. His Majesty went on board
the flagship Friedrich der Grosse lying in dock at Wilhelmshaven ready to put
to sea. Besides his own personal suite, he was accompanied by Grand Admiral
Prince Henry of Prussia, the Secretary of State of the Imperial Naval
Department, Admiral von Tirpitz, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral von
Holtzendorff. It was the second time during the war that the Emperor had
visited the Fleet. A little more than a year before the Emperor had introduced
to the Fleet my predecessor in command. I had occasion to give a long report on
the situation in the North Sea and also to express my opinion on the conduct of
the war, for which I took as basis the matter of the unrestricted U-boat
warfare. The Emperor agreed with my statements and interpreted them to a
meeting of admirals and officers, when he spoke in laudatory terms of the
activities and deeds of the Navy during the previous year and gave an
explanation of the orders that had caused the Fleet to be held back. His
Majesty then took the opportunity to remark that he fully approved of the order
of procedure submitted to him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.
This announcement was of great value to me, as thereby, in
the presence of all the officers, I was invested with authority which gave me
liberty of action to an extent I myself had defined. The intentions of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet were thoroughly understood in this circle, as I
had discussed in detail the programme of operations and had handed it in
writing to those whom it concerned. The date for beginning the unrestricted
U-boat warfare was, however, still uncertain. When I put the question to him,
the Emperor remarked that he could not be influenced by the military
suggestions only, though he recognised that they were justified, as besides his
position as Chief War Lord, he was also responsible as Head of the State. Were
he now to order the unrestricted U-boat war, it would probably meet with
approval in the widest circles, but he must be careful that the entry into war
of America on the side of the enemy did not give rise to consequences that
might outweigh the advantages of unrestricted U-boat warfare.
When convinced that this decision could not then be altered,
and not knowing what the political counter reasons were, and since it was the
business of the Naval Staff to come to an understanding with the Imperial
Administration, I selected two U-boats to test the effect of the war under the
new conditions in the war zone off the west coast of England, in order that a
judgment might be formed for further plans. The commanders of the boats, "U32"
(Baron von Spiegal) and " U 22 " (Hoppe), gave me a verbal report on their
return on March 18. " U 22 " had sunk four steamers, with about 10,000 tons of
cargo, three times as many neutral ships, but had been forced to let two
passenger steamers get through. Owing to bad weather and damages " U 22 " had
no success. Meanwhile other U-boats were on the way to operate with the same
intent. The success of their activities had not then been reported.
A wireless message on March 3 from the auxiliary cruiser
Moewe was a surprising and joyful piece of news. She reported being stationed
south-west of the Norwegian coast, and asked to be enrolled in the High Sea
forces. This opportunity of practically testing the newly established outpost
service was most opportune. It was a point of honour for the Fleet to preserve
the intrepid and successful raider from a disastrous end off a home harbour.
But great was the anxiety, as the Moewe had reported clouds of smoke sighted in
clear weather, and evidently, from the appearance, belonging to a group of
warships, but the distance was then too great to proceed to her assistance. The
enemy, however, did not turn his attention to our cruiser, which endeavoured to
give off as little smoke as possible, and when night fell had not been
molested. Acting on the warnings given her, she happily escaped the further
danger of striking any of the numerous English mines, that were unknown to her,
between Horns Reef and Amrum Bank. Such ample protection was afforded her by a
dense fog that she passed our first outposts unnoticed. But the fog lifted at
the right moment to allow the ships sent out to meet her to escort her in
triumph into the Jade, where she received a splendid welcome. The prudent and
resolute behaviour of the commander, Count zu Dohna, his firm belief in the
success of his undertakinglightly called "luck " by some, though really
based on the intrepid courage of the man, which spread to the entire
crewdid not fail to make a deep impression on all of us who, on the first
evening after his return, listened to the vivid description of his adventures.
From January 1 to February 25, 1916, the Moewe captured 15 steamers, of a total
tonnage of 57,835 tons. The first news received of her activities was the
arrival of the prize Appam, under Lieut. Berg, of the Naval Defence, at Norfolk
(Virginia), carrying the crews of the seven steamers sunk up to then. Further
news of the Moewe's activities was the announcement that the steamer Westburn,
under command of Badswick, had been taken into Teneriffe. After taking his 200
prisoners into port, he sank his ship the next day before the eyes of the
English armoured cruiser Sutlej that was lying in wait, so that the prize might
not fall into her hands. And now the Moewe had got back to us in safety I We
considered her most important success to be the sinking of the King Edward, the
flagship of the 3rd English Battle Squadron, which, on January 3, struck a mine
laid by the Moewe, and owing to the damage caused! sank between Cape Wrath and
the west ingress to the Pentland Firth.
This encouraged our hopes that the Greif, an auxiliary
cruiser sent out a few days previously under Captain Tieze, would have an
equally successful trip. Unfortunately, news came to hand a few weeks later
that she had been held up on the English guardship line between the Shetlands
and Norway, and after a fierce fight had succumbed, but not until she had
torpedoed and sunk the auxiliary cruiser Alcantara, a vessel three times her
size. This first encounter, in which the Greif had already suffered severely,
attracted a second auxiliary cruiser, the Andes, and the light cruiser Comus,
which came up with two destroyers and joined in the fight. Faced by such
superior forces, Tieze, after a fierce fight lasting two hours, left the ship,
with the surviving members of the crew, and sank her. While the English at
first took part in the rescue of the crew, the Comus, according to the
statements of prisoners since returned home, again opened fire on the lifeboats
and rafts, asserting that a U-boat had been sighted. The result was that
several others were killed, the commander among the number. Commander Nevetzky,
First Lieut. Weddigen, and Lieut. Tiemann, had already been killed in the
battle. About two-thirds of the crew were taken prisoners by the English.
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