THE visit of an English squadron for the Kiel Week in June,
1914, seemed to indicate a desire to give visible expression to the, fact that
the political situation had eased. Although we could not suppress a certain
feeling of doubt as to the sincerity of their intentions, everyone on our side
displayed the greatest readiness to receive the foreign guests with hospitality
and comradeship.
The opportunity of seeing great English fighting-ships and
their ships' companies at close quarters had become so rare an event that on
this account alone the visit was anticipated with the liveliest interest. All
measures were taken to facilitate the entrance of the English into Kiel Harbour
and make it easy for them to take up their station and communicate with the
shore, and it goes without saying that they were allotted the best places in
the line, close to the Imperial yacht. Accustomed as we were from early times
to regard the English ships as models, the external appearance of which alone
produced the impression of perfection, it was with a feeling of pardonable
pride that we now had an opportunity of making comparisons which were not in
our disfavour. The English ships comprised a division of four battleships under
the command of Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, who was flying his flag in
the battleship King George V., which was accompanied by
Audacious, Ajax, and Centurion, and a squadron of light
cruisers, Southampton, Birmingham, and Nottingham, under
Commodore Goodenough..
While the time of the senior naval officers was fully taken
up with official visits and ceremonies, the juniors largely made use of the
facilities afforded them to visit Hamburg and Berlin by rail. Friendly
relations were soon established between the men, after the way of seafaring
folk, and these were further promoted by games and festivities to their taste.
The feeling of camaraderie which, as my experience went,
had marked intercourse between German and English naval officers, as men of
similar ways of thought and capacity, up to the year l895, had now disappeared
as a result of the attitude of hostility towards our progress which had been
displayed by English statesmen, especially in recent years. Every attempt to
sham a relationship to which our inmost feelings did not correspond would have
compromised our dignity and lowered us in the eyes of the English. It is also
easy to realise that there could be no question of making an impression by a
full-dress muster of every possible ship. For this occasion only those of our
ships were assembled at Kiel which were based thereon.
As our Fleet increased, it had become necessary to
distribute the various squadrons between the two main bases, Kiel and
Wilhelmshaven, both with a view to using simultaneously the available docking
facilities and also to keeping the ships' companies in touch with their nucleus
crews on land. The families, too, resided at the headquarters of these nucleus
crews, to which the long service men, especially the warrant and petty
officers, returned on receiving a special order and there awaited fresh
employment. The ships spent the unfortunately all too short periods which the
annual training permitted, at their bases.
The disturbing element in this gay and peaceful picture, in
which the only note of rivalry was sounded by competitions in skill in the
realms of sport, was the news of the murder of the Austrian heir, the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand. The Kaiser left Kiel the very next day and travelled to
Berlin. The English ships departed on June 29, their light cruisers using the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. They thus had an opportunity of making a close
acquaintance with the new waterway which had only been completed a few weeks
before. Whether it could be also used by our heavy ships was one of their
questions which must be laid to the account of untimely curiosity The deepening
and widening of the Canal and the construction of the new locks at the
entrances had been completed only just in time. They had become necessary to
permit the passage of the big ships, the building of which had been imposed
upon us by the introduction of the "Dreadnought" type. The unsuitability of
this highway for battle-cruisers like the Blücher and the battleships of
the "Nassau " class had been a matter of much concern to our naval High Command
since 1909, on account of the injurious effect on the strategic situation. It
also involved laying an unnecessary burden on our main base in the North Sea,
which could not keep pace with the growing number of ships assigned to it.
About a week later the Kaiser returned to Kiel, and on July
5 started out for his usual cruise to Norway. As the situation could by no
means be considered reassuring, exhaustive conferences were held between the
Naval authorities in Berlin and the Fleet to discuss the various contingencies
of war. As subsequent events showed, the most noteworthy of these was the
hypothesis that England would remain neutral in the collision with Russia, and
most probably her Ally, France, with which we were threatened. It was on this
account that the Fleet was allowed to leave for the summer cruise to Norway at
the time provided for in the annual scheme.
This decision, as indeed that of the Kaiser, can only be
attributed to carelessness or an intention to show no nervousness. That
intention, in turn, can only have been due to a firm conviction of England's
neutrality.
In the annual scheme the summer cruise represented the high
watermark of the development attained. As a reward for the effort shown in
daily work, the individual training of the ships and the handling of separate
squadrons as well as the whole Fleet, it ended with a visit to foreign ports
instead of a sojourn in our own harbours.
This excursion abroad not only served the purpose of
keeping up interest in the work but also helped us to maintain our political
prestige by showing the flag, especially when an impression of power was
thereby created.
When a single gunboat turned up on a distant shore to show
the German flag there, the foreigner at once professed to regard it as obvious
that this ship was the emissary of the Imperial Government which, for the
matter of that, had at home an imposing Fleet and a great Army to secure our
position in Europe. A corresponding display of power on the spot was far more
convincing and at the same time revealed the capabilities of our shipbuilding
industry and refuted the widespread legend that England alone had the best and
largest ships.
In view of the uncertain political situation since the
summer of 1909 we had discontinued the practice of sending the whole Fleet, or
substantial parts of it, to great distances such as the Mediterranean, to
Spanish or Portuguese harbours, Cape Verde and the Azores. Thus for our purpose
the principal country for us to visit was Norway, in the numerous fjords of
whose coast it was possible to distribute the ships to the satisfaction of all
concerned and avoid overwhelming the inhabitants with a mass of sailors on
leave. The distribution also made a greater variety of excursions available to
the men, as each ship had its particular place of call.
There had only been one break - in the summer of 1912 - in
our annual visit to the Norwegian coast since 1910. In this year, 1914, the
general political situation required that the visit of the Kaiser and the Fleet
should have its usual objective. A cruise to the coasts of the eastern Baltic,
even a hasty call at our harbours in that region, does not appear to have been
in keeping with the policy we were pursuing at this critical moment.
With the cruise to Norway we abandoned the chance of
sending our Fleet east and thus bringing pressure to bear on Russia to induce
her to stop her preparations for war. The use of the floating army, which
requires no special mobilisation, is ideal for such a purpose. In that case
Danzig Bay would have offered us a firstclass base, as the larger units could
have deployed from there with extreme ease in contrast to the difficult exits
from the estuaries of the North Sea rivers - the Elbe, Weser, Jade and Ems,
while the light forces attached to the Fleet would have found a fortified base
in the harbour of Neufahrwasser.
How Norway could have been chosen for the goal of our cruise
in the situation at that moment seems incredible and gives one the impression
that we deliberately intended to shut our eyes to the danger. The chance of
appearing with a strong naval force, first as a demonstration and later in dead
earnest, in our eastern waters was from the start not given the consideration
its importance merited.
On July 14 Squadron II, of which I had assumed command at
the beginning of February in the previous year, in succession to Vice-Admiral
von Ingenahl, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, left Kiel
Bay to rendezvous off Skagen with the ships coming from Wilhelmshaven and then
carry out extensive fleet exercises which were principally concerned with the
solution of tactical problems. Through the addition of a third squadron to the
High Sea Fleet these exercises were of particular importance for this cruise,
as this newly-formed third squadron had as yet had no chance of taking part in
combined exercises.
The practical application of theoretical tactics to the
circumstances arising out of battle is inexhaustible and provides fresh
material from year to year.
The new squadron required training in that respect. In war
games, indeed, very useful preliminary work can be done in this department" but
that tactical insight which knows how to exploit a favourable situation is
itself first trained on the open sea and in the last resort it is the sum of
the impressions received which first enables the commander to come to the right
decision in the time available, which is often only a matter of seconds. For
such decisions there are no rules, however valuable certain tactical principles
may be, which have been sanctified by experience.
In the era of sailing ships it was a simple matter, owing
to the slow deployment for battle and the small range of the guns. But to-day
it is altogether different, in view of the great speed of the ships and the
huge range of the guns. The first shells usually arrive the moment the enemy is
seen, and we have known cases in which the impact of the enemy's projectiles is
the first notification of his being in the vicinity, and he has not become
visible until some time afterwards.
With regard to England, we were faced with a particularly
difficult, indeed almost insoluble problem. We had to deal with our enemy in
such a way as to give greater effect to our smaller calibre guns at short range
and be able to use a torpedo wherever possible. From the English we had to
expect that in view of the greater speed possessed by their ships of every type
and their heavier artillery, they would select the range that suited them and
fight a "holding-off" action. That, indeed, is exactly what happened in the
war. The necessity of practical training in this department illustrates the
importance of the addition of a third squadron.
Further, Squadron III, comprising our latest battleships,
was not at full strength, but just formed a division consisting of the Prinz
Regent Luitpold, (flagship), and the battleships Kaiser, Kaiserin,
and König Albert. In the course of the winter, beginning at the end
of December, the Kaiser and König Albert had been away on a
longish cruise in foreign waters. The ships had paid a visit to our colonies -
the Cameroons and German South-West Africa - visited the harbours of Brazil and
the Argentine, and then passed through the Straits of Magellan to the west
coast of South America and Chile. The ships had behaved very well on the
distant cruise, which was particularly arduous on account of the long sojourn
in the tropics. In particular, the engine-room personnel had had an opportunity
of becoming thoroughly familiar with the internal arrangements On the other
hand battle-practice could not be carried out to the extent that it was at
home, where no diversions were involved.
At the same time as we were starting on our Scandinavian
cruise the English Fleet had assembled for a great test-mobilisation at
Spithead. It was thus ready and thereafter continued so.
On our way north two French destroyers which we passed on
July 16 so close that we could make out their names Stilette and
Trombeaureminded us that the President of the French Republic,
Poincaré, was on his way from Dunkirk to St. Petersburg in the
battleship France, accompanied by the cruiser Jean Bart, and
might pass us at any time. We did not like the prospect of having to show him
the usual courtesies on the high-seasa saluteprescribed by
international usage, so we drew ahead in order to avoid any chance of a
meeting.
Our battle-practice was continued until July 24, on which
day the high cliffs of the Norwegian coast were for the most part visible,
thanks to the clear, fine weather. On July 22 we had crossed the 60th degree of
latitude, which forms the boundary of home waters, but not for long. We stayed
quite a short time in Norwegian waters, in fact just long enough to allow
coaling from colliers sent to meet us at certain anchorages. My flagship
Preussen and the battleship Schlesierr, which together formed one
division, were looked after by the Dutch steamer Willi. The First
Division was in the Nordfjord by Olde, the Second, comprising Hessen and
Lothringen, was also in the Nordfjord, by Sandene, while the other half
of the squadron, the Fourth Division, had called at Molde. In the same way the
battle-cruisers and light cruisers of the Fleet, as well as the battleships of
Squadrons I and II, were distributed among other inlets, notably the Sogne and
Hardanger Fjords. The, very day we left, Saturday, July 25 the news reached us
of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. In view of that we were not at all
surprised to get an order to hold ourselves ready to put to sea immediately. In
the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, we left for the rendezvous appointed for
the whole Fleet, about 250 nautical miles from the entrance to the Nordfjord.
After the Fleet had assembled the Flag Officers of the
squadrons had a conference on the Fleet-Flagship, at which Admiral von Ingenohl
explained the political situation and the necessity for our being prepared for
the immediate outbreak of war. He also told us that England would probably
remain neutral. On this subject we had received a report that King George of
England had expressed himself in that sense to Prince Henry of Prussia. Not.
withstanding this, every possible warlike precaution was taken for the rest of
our homeward journey. But the Fleet was divided in such a way that Squadron I,
under the command of Vice-Admiral von Lans, and comprising the four ships of
the " Ostfriesland " class and the four of the "Nassau " class,
with the battle-cruisers, steamed to Wilhelmshaven through the North Sea, while
Squadrons II and III with the Fleet-Flagship returned to Kiel through the
Kattegat. This distribution of the Fleet is manifest proof of our confidence
that no attack threatened us from the side of England. It was only in the East
that danger was visible, and accordingly it seemed inadvisable to remove all
our big ships from the Baltic.
On July 29 the ships lay in Kiel Harbour and were engaged in
effecting the pre-arranged measures which as a rule precede a regular
mobilisation, measures which were ordered on account of the increasing tension
of the political situation.
All our preparations were inspired by the impression that
what we had to face was a war with Russia and France. Fuelling and taking in
supplies took up the whole of July 29. We had not yet recalled the men on
leave, as all hope of the maintenance of peace had not by any means yet been
abandoned. It was only on the following day that the news became more menacing
and England's attitude more hostile. Squadron III accordingly made preparations
to go through the Canal into the North Sea, while the final steps were now
taken to make the ships ready for the change to battle conditions, which might
at any time become necessary.
On July 31 the Commander-in-Chief in the Friedrich der
Grosse passed into the Canal on his way to the North Sea. It was obvious
from this step that for us the centre of gravity of the war at sea now lay in
the west. Shortly before his departure I had an interview with Admiral von
Ingenohl in which he told me that in case of war my task with Squadron II would
be to deal with Russia.
It is easy to understand that this commission, which put me
in a position to lead and execute the first naval enterprises independently,
had a great attraction for me. The appointment of a new Commander-in-Chief for
the Baltic in the person of Prince Henry of Prussia had no material effect on
my freedom of action at sea, once we had set out for enemy waters; and,
besides, Prince Henry's professional knowledge, his whole mode of thought and
conception of responsibility offered a guarantee that his appointment could
only serve a useful purpose. It may here be said at once that the royal
Commander-in-Chief grasped and carried out in the most typical fashion the
difficult and thankless task of our defensive operations in the Baltic, for
which we disposed of very limited resources, both as regards numbers and
efficiency, after England had appeared on the scene as the principal enemy. A
Russian invasion like that of East Prussia, which might easily have been
followed by another from the sea, and would have meant the total destruction of
numerous important and beautiful places on the Baltic coast, was spared us.
But our hopes of an independent Baltic operation were
destroyed the very same day by the order to Squadron II to follow the others
immediately to the North Sea. The High Sea Fleet was accordingly concentrated
in the Jade on August 1 and at 8 o'clock in the evening the mobilisation order
arrived, which was greeted by the crews of the ships with loud cheers.
Meanwhile, opinion had veered round completely as to the
probable attitude of England, and it was accepted as certain in the Fleet that
she would join the two opponents with whom we had alone been concerned at the
outset. This view corresponded to the temper prevailing in the Fleet. We were
fully aware of the seriousness of the situation, and that we should now be
faced with a contest in which an honourable defeat might well be our only
prospect. But nowhere was there the slightest sign of despondency over the
enemy's overwhelming superiority, but rather a burning enthusiasm and lust of
battle, worked up by the feeling of indignation at the oppression which that
superiority had meant, and the conviction that our duty was now to put in our
last ounce of strength lest we leave the Fatherland in the lurch. The crews
needed no special exhortation to give of their best, for the joy of battle
shone in their eyes. The leaders, calmly weighing up the prospects of battle,
could only feel that the men's confidence in victory encouraged them to dare to
the uttermost. The whole service was carried away by the feeling that we were
under a duty to fulfil the expectations to which expression had many a time
been given in peace.
During its history of barely more than fifty years, the
Prussian and German Fleet had not been permitted an opportunity of matching
itself in a serious campaign with European opponents of equal standing, apart
from individual affairs which justified the brightest hopes. Our ships had
shown what they could do mainly in cooperating in the acquisition of our
colonial possessions or maintaining respect for and upholding the prestige of
the German flag against the encroachments of half-civilised or savage races. We
had no personal experience of commanding and handling in battle the big ships
which had recently come into existence. Nor, for the matter of that, had our
most important opponent at sea, England.
The English Fleet had the advantage of looking back on a
hundred years of proud tradition which must have given every man a sense of
superiority based on the great deeds of the past. This could only be
strengthened by the sight of their huge fleet, each unit of which in every
class was supposed to represent the last word in the art of marine
construction. The feeling was also supported by the British sailor's perfect
familiarity with the sea and with conditions of life on board ship, a
familiarity which took for granted all the hardships inseparable from his rough
calling.
In our Fleet reigned a passionate determination not to fall
behind our comrades of the Army, and a burning desire to lay the
foundation-stone of a glorious tradition. Our advantage was that we had to
establish our reputation with the nation, while the enemy had to defend his. We
were urged on by the impulse to dare all, while he had to be careful that he
did not prejudice his ancient fame.
There was only one opinion among us, from the
Commander-in-Chief down to the latest recruit, about the attitude of the
English Fleet. We were convinced that it would seek out and attack our Fleet
the minute it showed itself and wherever it was. This could be accepted as
certain from all the lessons of English naval history, and the view was
reinforced by the statement, so often made on the English side, that the
boundaries of the operations of their fleet lay on the enemy's coasts. It was
also confirmed by an earlier remark of the Civil Lord, Lee: "If it ever comes
to war with Germany the nation will wake up one morning and find that it has
possessed a fleet." All this pointed to the intention of making a quick and
thorough job of it.
Right up to the last moment in which there was the remotest
possibility of keeping England out of the war everything was avoided which
could have provided a superficial excuse for the existence of a crisis. The
Heligoland Bight was left open to traffic so far as it was not commanded by the
guns on the Island; elsewhere there were none which had a sufficient range to
stop traffic. We had never regarded it as possible that the English Fleet would
be held back from battle and, as a "fleet in being," be restricted solely to
blockading us from a distance, thereby itself running no risks.
The test mobilisation to which I have already referred and
the advanced stage of preparation thus involved also seemed to indicate that
offensive operations were to be expected immediately. This mobilisation at the
same time afforded a proof of the resolve of the English Government not to be
afraid of increasing the existing tension, and to add the weight of their
Fleet, fully prepared for war, to the concentration of the Russian armies.
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