Passage of the WaalIts
ResultsReconnaissance at ArnheimArrival at
NaardenCapitulation of NaardenOn the Banks of the Yssel
DelfzylThe Peace of BasleCommand in OverysselOrdered to
WalcherenFeverRemoval to UtrechtConvalescence.
PICHEGRU, the new Commander-in-chief, being ill, had retired
to Brussels, and the command was meanwhile made over to Moreau, the senior
General-of-Division; the latter division was added to mine, which extended my
command from Fort St. Andre to Urdingen, where I joined the left of the Army of
the Sambre and Meuse, now in position on the Rhine. We took advantage of this
interruption of operations to revictual our troops and reorganize them, and to
train and discipline our recruits.
We had no means, no possibility of crossing the Waal, a
considerable river, whose right bank was defended by fortified dykes. The forts
of Knodsenburg, opposite Nimeguen, and Kekerdam, opposite Kronenburg, were well
armed. We constantly exchanged shots along the entire line; from one point of
view this meant a considerable waste of ammunition, from another, however, it
gave us a valuable chance of familiarizing our new recruits with the fire of
the enemy.
The frost came to our assistance. I had the ice sounded two
or three times a day. As regards provisions we were unfortunately situated; our
communications with our stores at Antwerp and Bois-le-Duc were cut off, the
bridge had been destroyed, and the country between the Meuse and the Waal was
exhausted, while we could only get very slender resources from our right
towards Cleves. I myself was reduced to regimental bread and cheese, and that
only irregularly. The Nimeguen shopkeepers had closed their doors, as we could
only offer them assignats, which they would not accept. We were compelled,
therefore, to leave our present quarters and cross the river in search of
plenty.
All my preparations for crossing the river were made, and
instructions given to start at the first signal. The ice was thickening, and we
observed that the enemy were making ready to retire, as we imagined, when I
suddenly received intelligence that they had evacuated Thiel, opposite Fort St.
Andre. I saw with my own eyes a cannon being removed from the right bank. Never
doubting that a retreat had been determined upon, the General in command at
that point received orders to cross the river, now sufficiently frozen, and to
follow the enemy, who had taken the direction of Arnheim. I signalled to the
rest of the troops that they were to attempt the passage at the points
indicated. All the columns moved forward simultaneously at break of day, and
crossed the river, almost without resistance, somewhat above and below
'Nimeguen. The stream had not frozen in the middle of the town. As soon as I
could distinguish through the fog the head of the first column nearing the fort
by the dyke, I caused several skiffs that I had previously prepared to be
launched, and crossed to the other side with two companies of grenadiers. The
fort had just been evacuated. I ordered my men to pursue slowly, so as to give
time for all our columns to come up with us, and for the cannon to pass. That
was the difficulty. The small ordnance was brought up without trouble, then the
larger, and finally the howitzers.
During this operation we heard a violent explosion, which
made the very ground tremble. It was, as I imagined, the enemy blowing up their
magazines and setting their camp on fire. Fearing lest this terrible explosion
might astonish the troops, I sent the Generals, who had come to take my orders,
to their posts, desiring them to explain this event, which signified the
absolute retreat of the enemy, and to watch our right, while I took upon myself
the charge of the centre.
They arrived just in time, for a hot and well-sustained fire
had broken out. My troops were engaged and attacked by a considerable force.
The right division had only succeeded in putting one regiment across, and was
repulsed on the left bank of the river; but the General who had provisional
command of this division arrived with two other brigades, rallied the first,
and finally, after a severe struggle, broke the enemy's ranks. The intermediate
division, which was mine, had left its place, and so had the centre, where I
was; we were without news from the left. I advanced my lines as far as the
Linge, the point which I had named in my orders as that at which we were to
concentrate.
This day brought about two important results: first, it
facilitated the invasion of Holland by separating her cause from that of her
allies, who were forced to evacuate the country ; secondly, it put into our
hands at least a hundred pieces of cannon, with which the dykes and fort of
Knodsenburg, which served us as a tete-de-pont were armed, besides ammunition
and a large number of prisoners.
This event proves that in war it is necessary on many
occasions to trust to chance, for I repeat now what I said at the time, that I
owed more to luck than to wisdom, although success is generally supposed to
depend upon plans, schemes, and arrangements. On this occasion the evacuation
of Thiel seemed to me the evident result of a retrograde movement; whereas in
reality that movement was caused by a misunderstanding. The General commanding
my left wing had conscientiously carried out his instructions, and begun his
march, when he met the evacuating body, who, having notified their retreat,
received injunctions to return to the post they had quitted. But it was too
late the place was already occupied. The two bodies marching in contrary
directions met, and an engagement was the result; but, notwithstanding the
numerical superiority of their adversaries, our men kept their ground. The
successful crossing of the Waal above and below Nimeguen, together with the
advantages gained by my extreme right, which took the offensive after its first
brigade had been repulsed, checked the enemy who were opposed to them and.broke
their lines. Our success was complete. Shortly afterwards the enemy's corps
sent to Thiel was recalled to Arnheim. This is a very simple explanation of the
reasons that caused my left to remain stationary , it could not come up or set
out for the Linge until the following day.
I went to Nimeguen to make my report. The Commander-in-chief
and the Commissioners came to meet me. I was almost ashamed to receive their
congratulations, because chance had had a much greater share in the success of
the day than my combinations, which, as a matter of fact, were founded upon the
apparent retreat of the forces opposed to me, who in reality had no idea of
such a thing; but the manner I had adopted in spreading out my lines, and the
various points I had attacked, had made the enemy believe that they were
bearing the brunt of the whole
French army, while their own was scattered over a wide
extent of territory.
Next evening, towards dusk, we made a reconnaissance in the
direction of Arnheim. The noise and shouting that we heard, combined with the
accounts of some deserters and country folk, confirmed our unanimous opinion
that a general retreat was going on, and the Commander-in-chief gave his orders
in consequence. We were, however, too weak to pursue the enemy, invade Holland,
and surround the strongholds at one and the same time. This condition of
affairs was explained to the Commissioners, and they were requested to write to
their colleagues with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, to which we had now
come very close; while our Commander-in-chief asked his colleague to lend him
for the time two divisions to replace those under my command. This request,
approved by the Commissioners, was granted without delay, and I quitted my
position in order to strengthen my left.
A general movement had been caused on the one side by the
enemy's retreat, and on the other by the general advance of the army. I crossed
the Leek at Amerungen without meeting any enemies, and advanced towards
Amersfort, after having turned the lines of the Greb, armed with two hundred
guns. The Dutch troops were drawing away from their allies, but being too weak
to make a stand against us, they retired into fortresses or distant provinces.
None of our corps remained long bivouacked. They only needed
a few hours' rest, for great emulation existed as to who should first reach and
take Amsterdam. I did not waste any time, but I had a diagonal line to follow,
while the others could march straight ahead. The floods were out and the roads
under water, but that was no obstacle, on account of the frost. I arrived in
front of
Naarden, one of the strongest places in Europe, on the ice.
This is the masterpiece of Cohorn, emulator and rival of Vauban ; but the
water, the principal defence of the place, was now useless. I invested it, and
ordered the gates to be opened. The garrisons had orders to commit no act of
hostility, to offer no resistance, and to make the best terms possible. They
therefore parleyed with us.
The cold was very sharp, and we warmed ourselves at our
bivouacs on the ice. My injunctions were to agree to everything, provided that
the place were handed over to me on the spot. The articles of capitulation were
at length signed, and I took possession of the town. As I reached the gates, a
Dutch officer, who had just been replaced by one of ours, and who was drunk,
threw himself at the feet of one of my aides-de-camp, exclaiming: ' Brave
republican, I owe you my life !' Observe that we had fired neither cannon nor
musket, and that we had not even drawn our swords from their scabbards !
At sunrise next day, leaving a strong garrison at Naarden, I
started for Amsterdam, and on the road learned that the capital of Holland had
been occupied by our troops the previous evening. Mine thus became useless, so
I sent them into cantonments, going myself to Amsterdam to take the news of the
capitulation of Naarden, and to receive fresh orders. On arriving in presence
of the General in command, I presented him with the signed articles. He
answered jokingly:
' I pay no attention now to anything less than the surrender
of Provinces !'
As a matter of fact, and since the general capitulation of
the Netherlands, with the exception of a few places still held by the enemy, my
conquest decreased in importance, whereas under other circumstances it would
have redounded to the credit of the General who had succeeded in subduing it.
It was against this very place that Louis XIV., himself there in person, in the
zenith of his power, had failed.
I received orders to move upon the Yssel, to occupy
Harderwick, Kampen, Zwolle, Zutphen, Deventer, and to replace the troops of the
Sambre and Mouse Army at Arnheim. The enemy retreated at our approach.
The weather had become milder during my short stay at
Amsterdam, and the thaw had begun. It was thawing rapidly when I reached the
Yssel, and the ice had broken in several places, causing a dyke to burst. The
bridge of boats at Kampen could not be removed, and the ice accumulated round
it. Half my men had already crossed; the remainder had halted, on learning from
the inhabitants that they could only cross at imminent risk, as the bridge must
infallibly be carried away. At this moment I came up. Reflecting that the
troops already on the other side ran a great risk of falling into the hands of
the enemy, I determined to chance it, and gave orders to advance, rapidly
crossing the bridge, which was already much strained. The bridge bore us
because the waters that had carried away the dyke on the right bank had found
an outlet, and were spreading over the country, but then we incurred another
danger, that, namely, of inundation. However, all my men got safely across; we
reached higher ground, and escaped with nothing worse than wet feet.
Having thus carried out my orders, I received fresh ones to
drive the enemy out of the provinces of Frisia, Groningen and Drenthe. This
portion of the campaign was very difficult because of the thaw, the roads were
shocking, and for the most part under water. The country through which we were
marching was perfectly flat. We had to redouble our speed and activity, so as
to prevent the enemy from fortifying and victualling Groningen, Delfzyl, and
Coevorden. Frisia, owing to its situation, had been already evacuated, but the
inhabitants of Groningen came to me, imploring me to hasten our march, and to
deliver them from our common enemies, as they expressed it; in making this
request they were almost asking for a change of enemies, although my troops
kept most rigorous discipline. My advance-guard entered the town as the enemy
quitted it. We pursued, overtook, and defeated their rear-guard near Delfzyl.
At the same time I heard that Coevorden had opened its gates, and I extended my
line as far as the Ems, which the enemy had recrossed. We respectively took up
our positions on either side of the river, having, both of us, great need of
rest.
While I was inspecting my lines, I was informed of the march
of the Prussian army, and shortly afterwards a messenger with a flag of truce
brought me a letter announcing that the latter Power had just concluded the
Peace of Basle ; but as I had no official notification, I at once communicated
with the Commander-in-chief, who was also in ignorance of the event. I asked
for large reinforcements, and meanwhile kept a very strict look-out. Two fresh
divisions were sent to join and precede me, and these would not have been too
many had the first news of this unexpected peace proved untrue, because the
Prussians would have effected a junction with the allied army that I already
had in front of me. We at length received confirmation of the news, to the joy
of both sides. The line of demarcation laid down by the treaty followed the
right bank of the Rhine and the Ems to its mouth, the Prussians took the place
of their former allies on this bank, while we occupied the left. Territorial
divisions were formed, of which I had command of the first, composed of the
provinces of Drenthe, Frisia, and Groningen, and I established my headquarters
in the town of that name. .
After three months' rest, of which we all stood in great
need, I was called to the command of the provinces of Overyssel and Gueldres,
and later on to Utrecht and Holland.
Zealand being at this time threatened by the English, I was
ordered to go either to Middleburg or Flushing, whichever I preferred, in the
island of Walcheren, and a most unhealthy country. Five-sixths of my men were
soon down with fever, and I was so violently attacked that, in fear of my
life,I was ordered back to France to recover. All the events I have just
described occurred in the years 1794-5 It was towards the end of the latter
year that I returned to France, where my fever, which had been somewhat checked
before I left Flushing, seized me again at the end of six weeks.
By the end of the summer, 1795, I had recovered, and was
ready to return to my duty, when I had the pleasure of greeting Beurnonville,
who had just been exchanged and restored from his captivity. The command of the
army in Holland had been given to him. He offered to exchange with me. I
refused from a mistaken sense of delicacy, on account of our friendship,
fearing lest this preference should prejudice other Generals against him.
Scarcely had I returned first to Flushing, and then to
Middleburg, when, coming back from a tour of inspection round the island, I was
again seized with fever, and not withstanding all the measures employed,
especially quinine in large quantities, it could not be subdued until the
following spring, when the doses were trebled, and I was removed from that
horrible climate.
My friend Beurnonville had his headquarters at Utrecht. He
summoned me thither to recover. I had to diet myself very severely; but my
relapses, though still acute, were but the prelude to a fresh attack, which I
believe has remained unparalleled. Beurnonville was away at the time. On
hearing of the danger I was in, he hastened back at once. At length skill and
perseverance checked the fever, and I was sent to pass my convalescence at
Deventer, in Overyssel, where troops were assembling for the manoeuvres at
Gorssel. They were put under my command. I spared no pains to instruct and
train them, and thus got much exercise, which was good for my health.
Beurnonville came to inspect us. |