The Confederate Commander reviews the Field
and decides on Plan of BattlePositions on the Morning of July
2Night March of the Federal Sixth CorpsIt was excelled by Law's
Brigade of Confederates The Battle was opened after Mid-dayGeneral
Hood appeals for Permission to turn the Federal LeftFailure to make the
Flanking Movement by the Confederate Right was a Serious MistakeHood, in
his usual Gallant Style, led his Troops forward among the RocksDesperate
Charges against all Earnest AdversaryHood wounded General Law
succeeds him in command of the Division" Little Round Top" an Important
Point"The Citadel of the Field"It was a Fight of Seventeen Thousand
Confederates against twice their NumberQuiet along the Lines of other
Confederate Commands" A Man on the Left who didn't care to make the
Battle will"Evidence against the Alleged Order for " Battle at
Sunrise"The " Order" to Ewell was DiscretionaryLee had lost his
Balance.
The fighting had by this time become tremendous, and brave
men and officers were stricken by hundreds. Posey and Wilcox dislodged the
forces about the Brick House.
General Sickles was desperately wounded !
General Willard was dead !
General Semmes, of McLaws's division, was mortally wounded!
Our left relieved, the brigades of Anderson's division moved
on with Barksdale's, passed the swale, and moved up the slope. Caldwell's
division, and presently those of Ayres and Barnes of the Fifth Corps, met and
held our strongest battle. While thus engaged, General Sykes succeeded in
putting Vincent's and Weed's brigades and Hazlett's battery on the summit of
Little Round Top, but presently we overreached Caldwell's division, broke it
off, and pushed it from the field. Of his brigade commanders, Zook was killed,
and Brooke and Cross were wounded, the latter mortally. General Hancock
reported sixty per cent. of his men lost. On our side, Barksdale was down
dying, and G. T. Anderson wounded.
We had carried Devil's Den, were at the Round Tops and the
Wheat-Field, but Ayres's division of regulars and Barnes's division were
holding us in equal battle. The struggle throughout the field seemed at its
tension. The brigades of R. H. Anderson's division could hold off other troops
of Hancock's, but were not strong enough to step to the enemy's lines. When
Caldwell's division was pushed away, Ayres's flank and the gorge at Little
Round Top were only covered by a sharp line of picket men behind the boulders.
If we could drive in the sharp-shooters and strike Ayres's flank to advantage,
we could dislodge his and Barnes's divisions, occupy the gorge behind Sykes's
brigades on Round Top, force them to retreat, and lift our desperate fighters
to the summit. I had one brigade Wofford'sthat had not been engaged
in the hottest battle. To urge the troops to their reserve power in the
precious moments, I rode with Wofford. The rugged field, the rough plunge of
artillery fire, and the piercing musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but
Alexander dashed up with his batteries and gave new spirit to the worn infantry
ranks. By a fortunate strike upon Ayres's flank we broke his line and pushed
him and Barnes so closely that they were obliged to use most strenuous efforts
to get away without losing in prisoners as well as their killed and wounded. We
gained the Wheat-Field, and were so close upon the gorge that our artillery
could no longer venture their fire into it. We were on Little Round Top
grappling for the crowning point. The brigade commanders there, Vincent and
Weed, were killed, also the battery commander, Hazlett, and others, but their
troops were holding to their work as firmly as the mighty boulders that helped
them. General Meade thought that the Confederate army was working on my part of
the field. He led some regiments of the Twelfth Corps and posted them against
us, called a division of Newton's corps (First) from beyond Hancock's, and sent
Crawford's division, the last of the Fifth Corps, splitting through the gorge,
forming solid lines, in places behind stone fences, and making steady battle,
as veterans fresh in action know so well how to make. While Meade's lines were
growing my men were dropping; we had no others to call to their aid, and the
weight against us was too heavy to carry. The extreme left of our lines was
only about a mile from us across the enemy's concentric position, which brought
us within hearing of that battle, if engaged, and near enough to feel its
swell, but nothing was heard or felt but the clear ring of the enemy's fresh
metal as he came against us. No other part of our army had engaged! My
seventeen thousand against the Army of the Potomac! The sun was down, and with
it went down the severe battle. I ordered recall of the troops to the line of
Plum Run and Devil's Den, leaving picket lines near the foot of the Round Tops.
My loss was about six thousand, Meade's between twelve and fourteen thousand;
but his loss in general and field officers was frightful. When General
Humphreys, who succeeded to Barksdale's brigade, was called back to the new
line, he thought there was some mistake in the orders, and only withdrew as far
as a captured battery, and when the order was repeated, retired under protest.
General Stuart came down from Carlisle with his column of
cavalry late in the afternoon of the 2d. As he approached he met a cavalry
force of the enemy moving towards the Confederate left rear, and was successful
in arresting it. He was posted with Jenkins's three thousand cavalry on the
Confederate left.
Notwithstanding the supreme order of the day for general
battle, and the reinforcement of the cavalry on our left, the Second and Third
Corps remained idle during all of the severe battle of the Confederate right,
except the artillery, and the part of that on the extreme left was only in
practice long enough to feel the superior metal of the enemy, when it retired,
leaving a battery of four guns in position. General Early failed to even form
his division in battle order, leaving a brigade in position remote from the
line, and sending, later, another to be near Stuart's cavalry. The latter
returned, however, before night.
At eight o'clock in the evening the division on our extreme
left, E. Johnson's, advanced. The brigades were J. M. Jones's, Nicholls's,
Steuart's, and Walker's. Walker's was detached, as they moved, to look for a
detachment of the enemy reported threatening the far away left. When the three
brigades crossed Rock Creek it was night. The enemy's line to be assaulted was
occupied by Greene's brigade of the Twelfth Corps. It was reinforced by three
regiments of Wadsworth's division and three from the Eleventh Corps. After
brave attack and defence, part of the line was carried, when the fight, after a
severe fusillade between the infantry lines, quieted, and Walker's brigade
returned to the division. Part of the enemy's trenches, east of the point
attacked (across a swale), vacated when the corps moved over to the left,
General Johnson failed to occupy.
Before this, General Rodes discovered that the enemy, in
front of his division, was drawing off his artillery and infantry to my battle
of the right, and suggested to General Early that the moment had come for the
divisions to attack, and drew his forces from entanglements about the streets
to be ready. After E. Johnson's fight on our extreme left, General Early
ordered two brigades under General Harry T. Hays to attack. Hays had with his
Louisiana brigade Hoke's North Carolina brigade under Colonel Avery. He made as
gallant a fight as was ever made. Mounting to the top of the hill, he captured
a battery, and pushed on in brave order, taking some prisoners and colors,
until he discovered that his two brigades were advancing in a night affair
against a grand army, when he found that he was fortunate in having night to
cover his weakness, and withdrew. The gallant Colonel Avery, mortally wounded
and dying, wrote on a slip of paper, " Tell father that I died with my face to
the enemy." When Rodes was prepared, Hays had retired, and the former did not
see that it was part of the order for general engagement to put his division in
night attack that could not be supported.
Thus the general engagement of the day was dwarfed into the
battle of the right at three o'clock, that on the left at eight by a single
division, and that nearer the centre at nine o'clock by two brigades.
There was a man on the left of the line who did not care to
make the battle win. He knew where it was, had viewed it from its earliest
formation, had orders for his part in it, but so withheld part of his command
from it as to make co-operative concert of action impracticable. He had a
pruriency for the honors of the field of Mars, was eloquent, before the fires
of the bivouac and his chief, of the glory of war's gory shield; but when its
envied laurels were dipping to the grasp, when the heavy field called for
bloody work, he found the placid horizon, far and away beyond the cavalry, more
lovely and inviting. He wanted command of the Second Corps, and, succeeding to
it, held the honored position until General Lee found, at last, that he must
dismiss him from field service.
General Lee ordered Johnson's division of his left,
occupying part of the enemy's trenches about Culp's Hill, to be reinforced
during the night of the 2d by two brigades of Rodes's division and one of
Early's division. Why the other brigades of those divisions were not sent does
not appear, but it does appear that there was a place for them on Johnson's
left, in the trenches that were vacated by the Federal Twelfth Corps when
called over to reinforce the battle of Meade's left. Culp's Hill bore the same
relations to the enemy's right as Little Round Top did to his left. General
Fitzhugh Lee quotes evidence from General Meade that had Culp's Hill been
occupied, in force, by Confederates, it would have compelled the withdrawal of
the Federal troops.
General Meade, after the battle of his left, ordered the
divisions of his Twelfth Corps back to their trenches, to recover the parts
occupied by the Confederate left. It was night when the First Division
approached. General Ruger, commanding, thought to feel his way through the dark
by a line of skirmishers. He found the east end of his trenches, across the
swale, unoccupied, and took possession. Pressing his adventure, he found the
main line of his works occupied by the Confederates in force, and disposed his
command to wait for daylight. The Second Division came during the night, when
General Williams, commanding the corps, posted it on the left of the First, and
the division commanders ordered batteries in proper positions.
During the night, General Meade held a council, which
decided to fight it out. So it began to look as if the vicissitudes of the day
had so worked as to call General Meade from defensive to aggressive battle for
Culp's Hill. But the Confederates failed to see the opportunity and force the
issue as it was presented.
In General Meade's evidence before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, he puts his losses of the first and second days at twenty
thousand, and assigns two thirds of these to the battle of the 2d. As the
fighting against the three brigades of our left after night, and two brigades,
later in the night, from our centre, could not have been very severe, I claim
that his loss in the battle of his left was from twelve to fourteen thousand.
As events of the battle of the 2d passed, it seems fair to
claim that with Pickett's brigades present at the moment of Wofford's advance
for the gorge at Little Round Top, we could have had it before Crawford was
there.
Under ordinary circumstances this account of the second day,
made from the records, would be conclusive; but the battle of Gettysburg, which
may be called the epitome of the war, has been the subject of many contentions
of words. Knights of the quill have consumed many of their peaceful hours in
publishing their plans for the battle, endeavoring to forestall the records and
to find a scapegoat, and their representations may be given, though they do not
deserve it, a word of reply.
General W. N. Pendleton led off when making a lecturing tour
through the South for a memorial church for General Lee. He claims that he made
a reconnoissance on the afternoon of the 1st of July, and that upon his
reporting it, General Lee ordered General Longstreet to attack at sunrise the
next day. He did not venture to charge that the Second and Third Corps, that
were on the field and had had a good night's rest, were part of the command
ordered for the early battle, for the commanders, both Virginians, and not
under the political ban, could have brought confusing evidence against him; nor
did he intend to put General Lee in the anomalous position, inferentially, of
ordering part of the First Corpsthat should march through the night and
all nightto make the battle alone. The point of battle was east of the
Emmitsburg road; to find it, it was necessary to cross that road, but General
Sickles was moving part of his corps over the road during that afternoon, and
rested there the latter part of the day and during the night. So, to make the
reconnoissance, General Pendleton passed the Union troops in Confederate
uniformhe was military in his dressand found the point of battle.
Giving him credit, for the moment, for this delicate work and the mythical
order, let us find the end to which it would lead.
The only troops that could come under the order were
McLaws's division, part of Hood's, and the artillery, about ten thousand
men. These, after a hurried all-night's march, reached General Lee's
head-quarters about sunrise of the 2d, and by continued forced march could have
reached the point of battle, about five miles away, by seven o'clock, where
they would have encountered a division of the Third Corps (Birney's); presently
the Second anti Fifth Corps under Hancock and Sykes; then the First, Eleventh,
and Twelfth under Newton, Howard, and Slocum; then the balance of the Third
coming in on our rear along the Emmitsburg road,making sixty thousand men
and more. There was reason to be proud of the prowess of the troops of the
First Corps, but to credit a part of it with success under the circumstances
was not reasonable. Go to next part of
Chapter 27 |