At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our
deployment was complete. Enemy shells had been falling close to the Colossus
and her 5th Division since 6.11 P.M., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 P.M.
; but the conditions of visibility made it difficult to distinguish the enemy's
battleships.
At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down
the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our
Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not at
the time be clearly established, but her German colours were flying and she was
in a position for attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 P.M. the
Iron Duke fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret guns
by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear of the line.
At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult
to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion on
board the Iron Duke, in her position towards the centre of the line, as to the
formation of the enemy's Fleet. The identity of ships insight on the starboard
beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to permit of fire being opened; but
at 6.30 P.M. it became certain that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of
the Battle Fleet and that the vessels then before the beam .were battleships of
the " Konig " class. The order was, therefore, given to open fire, and the Iron
Duke engaged what appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000
yards on a bearing 20 degrees before the starboard beam; other ships of the 3rd
and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire at about the same time,
and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards ; these
latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers as well as battleships.
The fire of the Iron Duke, which came more directly under my observation, was
seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes fired
registering several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enemy ships at
that time in sight from the Iron Duke (not more than three or four, owing to
smoke and mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second battleship was
seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, and settling by the stern. A large
number of observers in the Thunderer, Benbow, Barham, Marne, Morning Star and
Magic stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow up at 6.50 P.M.
The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged about
12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on other bearings, but ranges
could not at times be obtained from the range-finders of the Iron Duke at a
greater distance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M., in a temporary clear
channel through the mist, good ranges of 15,000 yards were obtained of a
battleship at which four salvoes were fired by the Iron Duke before she was
again hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was caused principally
by low misty clouds, but partly also by the heavy smoke from the funnels and
guns of the opposing Fleets. The direction of the wind was about
west-south-west with a force 2, causing the enemy's funnel smoke to drift
towards our line.
The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently
greater than in the centre at about 7 P.M., and the enemy's fire, which was
probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was more accurate at this
period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, the Colossus, being hit by
gun-fire, although numerous projectiles were falling near the ships of the 1st
and 5th Battle Squadrons.
Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the
Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, those
in the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as many as eight, and
were consequently better able to distinguish the formation and movements of the
enemy's Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing to the small number of ships
in sight, due to smoke and mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by
signal in the customary manner; the only course to adopt was for the captains
to direct the fire of their guns on to any target which they could distinguish.
The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east by
east, as already stated, but the van had hauled in to south-east without signal
shortly after deployment in order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M., as the
range was apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to south "by
divisions" in order to close the enemy. The King George V., leading the van of
the Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The
alteration was made " by divisions' instead of "in succession' in order that
the enemy should be closed more rapidly by the whole Battle Fleet.
This large turn (of four points) "by divisions" involved
some small amount of "blanketing' of the rear ships of one division by the
leading ships of that next astern, and at one time the Thunderer was firing
over the bows of the Iron Duke, causing some slight inconvenience on the bridge
of the latter ship; the " blanketing," however, was unavoidable and the loss of
fire involved was inappreciable.
At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the
rear of our battle line, and the Marlborough altered course to avoid one. They
were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were barely
visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to those on board the Iron
Duke. They might, however, have been fired by enemy battleships which were
within torpedo range, or by a submarine, the Revenge reporting that it was
thought that one had been rammed by that ship. The tracks of some of the
torpedoes were seen by the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very
skilful handling of the ships by their captains.
At 6.54 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred under the
fore bridge of the Marlborough, abreast the starboard forward hydraulic
engine-room. The ship took up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but
continued in action so effectively that she avoided three more torpedoes
shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 P.M., and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen
rapid salvoes at a ship of the " Konig " class, hitting her so frequently that
she was seen to turn out of line.
The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his
flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a "mine or torpedo." It was
assumed by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed
over the same locality without injury from mine. This proved to be the case,
the track of this torpedo not having been sufficiently visible to enable
Captain Ross to avoid it.
The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy's torpedoes
being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other
officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded in
producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface. The
information as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me until the
return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one torpedo was reported by
observers on board the destroyer Oak to have passed close ahead of the Iron
Duke at about 7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000 yards beyond that ship, and a
second was observed by the Benbow to pass apparently ahead of the Iron Duke at
8.30 P.M., neither of them was seen on board the flagship by the trained
look-outs specially stationed for the purpose.
Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a
signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of the Iron
Duke and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. This signal had, how ever,
been already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the Iron Duke in accordance
with the general battle orders giving discretionary powers to the commanders of
squadrons, and the line had been partly reformed before the signal was made.
An incident occurred at about 6.47 P.M. which was an
indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is impossible to
speak too highly. The destroyer Acasta, which had been badly hit aft during her
attack on enemy light cruisers in company with the Shark and had her engines
disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding officer, Lieut.-Commander J.
0. Barren, signalled the condition of his ship to the Iron Duke as that ship
passed, leaving the Acasta on her starboard or engaged side. The ship's company
was observed to be cheering each ship as she passed. It is satisfactory to
relate that this destroyer and her gallant ship's company were subsequently
brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the Nonsuch.
Shortly after 6.55 P.M. the Iron Duke passed the wreck of a
ship with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre portion
apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer Badger picking up
survivors. It was thought at first that this was the remains of a German light
cruiser, but inquiry of the Badger elicited the lamentable news that the wreck
was that of the Invincible. It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk
either by a mine or by a torpedo, and the latter appeared to he the more
probable cause of her loss. Subsequent information, however, showed that she
was destroyed by gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already
recorded.
At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the
enemy was to the westward.
Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought
the enemy's line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 P.M. the Battle
Fleet was again in action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they
could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period was very baffling. The
range varied from as much as 15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,500 in
the rear, this difference in range indicating that the enemy's Fleet was
turning to the westward, as shown in the plan facing
In spite of the difficult conditions, the fire of many of
our battleships was very effective at this period. Some instances may be given.
At 7.15 P.M. the Iron Duke, as already mentioned, engaged a hostile battleship
at 15,000 yards range and on a bearing 74 degrees from right ahead. At 7.20 she
trained her guns on a battle cruiser of " Lutzow" type, abaft the beam, which
hid herself by a destroyer smoke screen; at 7.17 P.M. the King George V. opened
fire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship in the enemy's line, at a range
of about 13,000 yards; the Orion at a battleship ; the St. Vincent was "
holding her target (a battleship) effectively till 7.26 P.M., the range being
between 10,000 and 9,500 yards " ; the Agincourt at 7.6 P.M. opened fire at
11,000 yards on one of four battleships that showed clearly out of the mist,
and judged that at least four of her salvoes "straddled" the target; the
Revenge was engaging what were taken to be battle cruisers, obtaining distinct
hits on two of them; the Colossus from 7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship
taken to be a battle cruiser, either the Derfflinger or Lutzow, at ranges
between 10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct hits, two being on
the water line; whilst the Marlborough, as already mentioned, "engaged a ship
of the 'Konig' class. " Other vessels reported being in effective action during
this period. The Royal Oak, the ship next astern of the Iron Duke, opened fire
at 7.15 P.M. on the leading ship of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers,
at a range of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and fire was
shifted to the second ship which was lost to sight in the mist after a few
rounds had been fired. It was difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on
which fire was being directed, but one or more of the enemy's battle cruisers
had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 P.M., as a result of the heavy punishment
they had received from our battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron, and
were engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.
Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships of
the 1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effective fire
than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use was made of the
opportunities. This squadron, under the able command of Sir Cecil Burney, was
known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof was furnished during
the Jutland battle, if proof were needed, that his careful training had borne
excellent results. The immunity of the ships of the squadron from the enemy's
fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels very severe punishment, bears
eloquent testimony to the offensive powers of the squadron.
At 7.5 P.M. the whole battle line was turned together three
more points to starboard to close the range further; immediately afterwards two
ships ahead of the Iron Duke reported a submarine a little on the port bow; at
7.10 P.M. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser, was observed
to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. from the Iron Duke, and the Fleet was
turned back to south in order to turn on to the submarine and bring the ships
in line ahead, ready for any required manoeuvre. A heavy fire was opened on the
destroyers at ranges between 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the
destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke
screen. One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the effects of
the gunfire.
At a sufficient interval before it was considered that the
torpedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line, a signal was made to
the Battle Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions. Some minutes later
a report was made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my Staff
especially detailed for this duty, and provided with an instrument for giving
the necessary information) that this turn was insufficient to clear the
torpedoes, as I had held on until the last moment; a further turn of two points
was then made for a short time. As a result of this attack and another that
followed immediately, some twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the
track of the Battle Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority of them
passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons at the rear of the line.
It was fortunate that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were
apparently near the end of their run, and were consequently not running at high
speed. They were all avoided by the very skilful handling of the ships by their
captains, to whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in
avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the ships, by neighbourly
conduct towards each other, prevented risk of collision and kept their station
in the line. The captains were most ably assisted by the admirable look-out
kept by the organisation that existed for dealing with this danger. I doubt,
however, whether the skill shown would have saved several ships from being
torpedoed had the range been less and the torpedoes consequently running at a
higher speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow showed conclusively
that the percentage of torpedoes that would hit ships in a line when fired from
destroyers at ranges up to 8,000 yards was comparatively high, even if the
tracks were seen and the ships were manoeuvred to avoid them. One very good
reason is that torpedoes are always a considerable but varying distance ahead
of the line of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to judge the
position of the torpedo from its track. Many ships experienced escapes from
this and other attacks; thus the Hercules reported that she " turned away six
points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along the starboard side and
40 yards across the bow, and the other passed close under the stern "; the
Neptune reported that "the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the
fore-top, one of which passed very close and was avoided by the use of the helm
" ; in the Agincourt's report, a statement occurred that " at 7.8 P.M. a
torpedo just missed astern, it having been reported from aloft and course
altered " ; and again, " at 7.38 P.M. tracks of two torpedoes running parallel
were observed approaching ; course altered to avoid torpedoes which passed
ahead ; and at 8.25 P.M. torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed;
torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard bow " ; the Revenge
remarked, "at 7.85 P.M. altered course to port to avoid two torpedoes, one
passed about ten yards ahead and the other about twenty yards astern, and at
7.43 P.M. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two passing astern "; the Colossus
stated, " at 7.35 P.M. turned to port to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard
side" ; the Barham at this period reported that "at least four torpedoes passed
through the line close to the Barham " ; the Collingwood reported, " torpedo
track was seen 20 degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; large
helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close astern; at the same time
another was seen to pass about thirty yards ahead. " The captain of the
Collingwood, in remarking on the destroyer attack, added, " the great value of
this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, an outstanding feature of the
Battle Fleet action." |