THE armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment
of a single object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was
possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was
the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an
important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was
therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less importance only
because the capture of Johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and
decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of Richmond,
Lee and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of
these two movements. This was the plan ; and I will now endeavor to give, as
concisely as I can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations
of minor detached but co-operative columns. As stated before, Banks failed to
accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use
of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been
expected ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.
Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is
true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work
being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement from
Halleck: " Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run;
never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and
handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out
of his six thousand.
The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two
columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the
other proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column
advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more
happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad at Dublin and
destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and
burning the bridge over New River. Having accomplished this they recrossed the
Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and there awaited further orders.
Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except
the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James
River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if
threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler by
daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred
early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the
enemy.
This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated
in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as
his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to fight
Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall
back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the
Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a footing
as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as
possible.
Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun
intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the
Weldon Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between
Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. He
made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack
Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the 11th he advanced slowly
until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, about half way between Bermuda
Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time Beauregard had been gathering
reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such
success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the Army of the
James as a distinct factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it
to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man
his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a
threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.
The position which General Butler had chosen between the two
rivers, the James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where
a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single
intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of
territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by the James
River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their junctionthe two
streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that
had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line
inclosed.
Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief
engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to
inspect
Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely
make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that
I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not. whether his position was
strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them
brought round by water to White House to join me and reinforce the Army of the
Potomac. General Barnard reported the position very strong for defensive
purposes, and that I could do the latter with great security; but that General
Butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any
effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and
Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force
he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that
he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out
from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to the rear
and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was impracticable,
because the enemy had substantially the sameline across the neck of land that
General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the
locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler's line
of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built
an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck ; and it was
therefore as if Butler was in a bottle, lie was perfectly safe against an
attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with
a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very
expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty sketch which
General Barnard had drawn ; and in making my subsequent report I used that
expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had
been said that would attract attentionas this did, very much to the
annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I know, very much to my own. I
found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of General Badeau's book,
which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was
retained there, though against my wishes.
I make this statement here because, although I have often
made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it
will correct history ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have
done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their
country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the Union.
General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave
his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion.
The further operations of the Army of the James can best be
treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being
so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which
the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.
Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great
Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various
co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of
the centre, I will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's
communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and
not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant
execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By thus
anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the
continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have
undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.
On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness
and when we were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut
loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and
attack his cavalry: to cut the two roadsone running west through
Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when
compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James
River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire
rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade.
The object of this move was three-fold. First, if
successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line
of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use
supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's
cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by
remaining with the army. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his
forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.
He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was
expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.
The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before
night Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his
command. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a
station on the-Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union
prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a
large amount of subsistence and medical stores.
Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards
Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and
an exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern,
only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and
more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart's front. A severe
engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels
were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners
were captured.
Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and
could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports
near he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for the
James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and
horses as well as to get food and forage for them.
He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but
in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He
then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow Bridge. He
found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying
the opposite side. The panic created by his first entrance within the outer
works of Richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear.
He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few
generals could have extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned,
were to the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining
and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. This
force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan
turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over
the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon
dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the
stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building.
On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the
Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp
on the James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into
communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to
be furnished.
Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania,
but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution
therefore had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his
command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of White
House.
The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy,
but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the
22d he was aylett's on the Matapony, where he learned the position of the two
armies. On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor,
in the vicinity of Chesterfield.
Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's
army : encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;
recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of the
enemy ; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles
of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the
enemy for more than two weeks. |