OPERATIONS IN
MISSISSIPPILONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEECOMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT -
GENERAL COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES FIRST INTERVIEW WITH
PRESIDENT LINCOLN.
SOON after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to
distribute his forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville ;
Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank
of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected
also to have the co -operation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore.
Of course I approved heartily. About the 10th of January
Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got together his
Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to
Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command , and had him organize his
surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all.
Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was
occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry
with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined,
therefore, to move directly upon Meridian.
I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General
Sooy Smith to Sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman
got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7,ooo cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce
Smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,ooo with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith was ordered to
move about the 1st of February.
While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the
arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the
position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they
could gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the
information of General Polkas being at Meridian, and of the strength and
disposition of his command.
Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him,
composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were
very effective. Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not
equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's
men had had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and
followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent
that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result is often
decisive victory instead of. inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is
often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of
warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more
effective officer than he was.
Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved
out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the
Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached
Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon
on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to
enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here,
however, there were indications of the concentration of Confederate infantry,
and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious
engagement ; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons
about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being
picked up. He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having"
retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the
purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest before this
time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of
numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to
Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who
had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the 1st as
expected, had not left until the 11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result
was decidedly in For-rest's favor.
Sherman had written a letter to Banks,
proposing a co-operative movement with him against Shreveport, subject to my
approval. I disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other
important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to
the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must
have them for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved
abortive.
My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the
Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew
worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January
obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to
see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was
permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else,
but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly
with all parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had
remained at Nashville.
When I obtained this leave I was at
Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of
Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in
Mississippi. I directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to
keep up a threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had
again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as
possible there.
I learned through Confederate sources that
Johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably
to operate against Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East
Tennessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to
send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to
the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in command
in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of
the reinforcements Longstreet had received. My object was to drive Longstreet
out of East Tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign.
About this time General Foster, who had been in
command of the Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved
him, advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet
just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was
forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any
place where it could effect the most for their cause. I thought the advice was
good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of
Longstreet.
On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to
take Dalton and hold it, if possible; and I directed him to move without delay.
Finding that he had not moved, on the 1th I urged him again to start, telling
him how important It was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate
with Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then
again on the 21st, he not yet having started, I
asked him if he could not start the next day. He finally got off on the
22d. or 23d. The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but
took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported
that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor
teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.
He soon fell back.
Schofield also had to return for the same
reason. He could not carry supplies with him, and Long-street was between him
and the supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would
be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding
from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's success, which
eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington.
The bill restoring the grade of
lieutenant-general of the army had passed through Congress and became a law on
the 26th of February. My nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of
March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the
3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. The commission
was handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son, those of my
staff who were with me and a few other visitors.
The President in presenting my commission read
from a paperstating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery
of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak
in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines
of reply. The President said:
" General Grant, the nation's
appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains
to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this
commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United
States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding
responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will
sustain you. I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the
nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."
To this I replied: " Mr. President, I accept
the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of
the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the
full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if
they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of
that Providence which leads both nations and men." |